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Resumen 
El efecto de las instituciones en los mercados de vivienda 
europeos: un análisis económico 
 
 
Introducción 
 
 
Durante el siglo XX y en especial en su segunda mitad, el mercado de alquiler 
ha ido perdiendo peso a favor de la vivienda en propiedad tanto en la economía 
española como en la del resto de países europeos. El gráfico R.1 muestra esta tendencia 
negativa en el peso del mercado del alquiler sobre el total de viviendas principales1 para 
algunas economías europeas en los años más recientes.  
 
En este contexto y si bien la reducción en el peso del mercado de alquiler (a 
favor del mercado de vivienda en propiedad) es un hecho común a la práctica totalidad 
de países, el caso español es especialmente extremo. El primer censo que recogió esta 
información (1970) ya indicaba que la proporción de vivienda principal en propiedad 
estaba en torno al 60% (tasa de propiedad del 63’4%). En el año 2008 era posible 
encontrar provincias españolas en las que la tasa de vivienda principal en propiedad 
superaba el 94% (Castellón, Soria o Lugo).  
 
Desde un punto de vista puramente económico, una fortaleza excesiva de la 
vivienda en propiedad genera algunas ineficiencias en el funcionamiento de la 
economía. Entre otros factores este efecto se debe a que una reducida tasa de alquiler 
puede acabar disminuyendo la movilidad de los trabajadores (Hardman e Ionnides, 
                                                 
1 Las viviendas principales son aquellas utilizadas como residencia primera o permanente. Se dividen en 
viviendas en propiedad (87’1% en España en 2007 según los datos del Ministerio de Vivienda), en 
alquiler (11’2%) y en viviendas cedidas de forma no lucrativa (1’6%).  
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1999, Barceló, 2006). De hecho se observa que las economías con una mayor tasa de 
alquiler, como Francia o Alemania,  también muestran una mayor movilidad 
interregional (Maclennan et al. 1998, Barceló, 2006). Paralelamente, la literatura 
económica relaciona una baja movilidad con un mayor desempleo (Layard et al. 1991). 
 
Numerosos factores pueden haber afectado a los mercados inmobiliarios 
impulsando al alza el mercado de la vivienda en propiedad. Entre ellos y sobre todo para 
los últimos años cabe citar la reducción general de los tipos de interés (Blanco y Restoy, 
2007) junto a la liberalización bancaria (Iacoviello y Minetti, 2003, Kumbhakar y 
Lozano-Vivas, 2004) o los aumentos en la renta per capita. 
 
Frente a estos factores, ampliamente estudiados en la literatura, otros factores 
que se podrían englobar como “institucionales” pueden también haber influenciado las 
tasas de alquiler y propiedad. Entre ellos, cabría citar la regulación de los mercados (las 
llamadas “instituciones formales”) y el funcionamiento del sistema judicial como medio 
de ejecución de los contratos y pactos realizados en esos mercados (las llamadas 
“instituciones de ejecución”). En ambos casos se puede afirmar que no han sido 
suficientemente estudiadas en cuanto a sus efectos en los mercados inmobiliarios. En 
consecuencia, esta tesis doctoral se centra en el análisis de los efectos de la regulación 
de los mercados inmobiliarios, en especial las normativas vigentes en los mercados de 
alquiler, que podrían haber introducido desincentivos relativamente importantes para los 
arrendadores de vivienda  así como el efecto del buen o mal funcionamiento del sistema 
judicial a la hora de hacer cumplir los pactos y contratos efectuados en esos mercados.  
 
 
El efecto de las “instituciones formales” en los mercados inmobiliarios 
 
 
Las normativas aplicables al mercado de alquiler son similares para los distintos 
países europeos y suelen introducir dos tipos de restricción que tienden a proteger al 
inquilino frente al propietario. Por un lado el llamado “control de rentas” (rent control), 
que limita los aumentos en el precio del alquiler una vez firmado el contrato y por otro 
el establecimiento de un periodo mínimo dentro del cual el arrendatario tiene derecho a 
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extender la vigencia del contrato aun en contra de los deseos del arrendador. En el caso 
español, estas normas están contenidas en la Ley 29/1994, de 24 de noviembre, de 
Arrendamientos Urbanos. 
 
La primera de estas restricciones (el “control de rentas”) ha sido estudiada de 
forma extensa tanto desde un punto de vista teórico (Basu y Emerson, 2000, Raess y 
Ungern-Sternberg, 2002, Basu y Emerson 2003) como empírico, especialmente para el 
caso de EEUU (Johnson, 1951, Sims 2007). Sin embargo, la segunda de estas 
restricciones (periodos obligatorios de contrato), al ser típicamente europea, no ha 
recibido tanta atención, así como tampoco el caso de “control de rentas” en economías 
como las europeas en las que el legislador ya tiene en cuenta la existencia de una 
inflación positiva a la hora de aprobar una nueva Ley. 
 
 
a) Las instituciones de los mercados de alquiler en la Europa de la posguerra: un 
análisis económico  
 
 
El capítulo segundo de esta tesis doctoral se centra en el análisis de los efectos 
económicos de las normativas de alquiler típicamente europeas en el mercado de 
alquiler. El capítulo proporciona en primer lugar evidencia de que las restricciones 
legales aplicables al mercado de alquiler son similares y han sufrido una evolución 
similar en los distintos países europeos (aunque con numerosas especificidades). 
Además, han estado vigentes al menos para gran parte del periodo para el que se conoce 
que ha existido una reducción de la proporción de vivienda alquilada en las distintas 
economías. En segundo lugar, el capítulo aborda el análisis del efecto de estas 
normativas en el mercado mediante un modelo teórico en la línea iniciada por Basu y 
Emerson (2000). 
 
           El modelo teórico adopta la estrategia de tratar el mercado de alquiler como un 
mercado con información asimétrica en el que los arrendadores tienen una información 
limitada del número de años que los inquilinos desean permanecer en la vivienda. Dado 
que la Ley permite al arrendatario decidir ese periodo (con un límite máximo), el 
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arrendador no puede sustituirlo por otro nuevo por un plazo indeterminado y, lo que es 
más importante, a consecuencia de ello no puede renovar las condiciones del contrato 
para igualarlas a aquellas del mercado. Si la Ley además establece un “control de 
rentas” (como es el caso en Europa), las condiciones firmadas en un primer momento 
con un arrendatario que decide quedarse en la vivienda por un gran número de años 
serán cada vez más anticuadas. Como resultado, si el crecimiento de las rentas del 
alquiler en los nuevos contratos firmados en el mercado está por encima del nivel de 
actualización permitido por la Ley (usualmente el IPC), el arrendador sufrirá una 
pérdida de renta real.  
 
Como conclusiones, este trabajo aporta en primer lugar evidencias que señalan 
que ambos tipos de restricción (control de rentas y periodos obligatorios de contrato) se 
encuentran vigentes al mismo tiempo en múltiples países europeos durante los últimos 
años. A continuación, analiza esta situación mediante un modelo teórico que apunta a 
que estas restricciones influyen negativamente en el mercado de alquiler debido a que 
pueden expulsar a algunos de los arrendadores del mercado.  
 
 
El efecto de las “instituciones de ejecución” en los mercados 
inmobiliarios: el papel del sistema judicial 
 
 
           Los arrendadores pueden verse afectados por un sistema judicial que sea lento o 
costoso a la hora de hacer cumplir los pactos estipulados en un contrato de alquiler. El 
problema sería especialmente relevante en un caso de impago o de desperfectos en la 
vivienda. Por tanto, no solo las leyes restrictivas pueden afectar al comportamiento de 
los arrendadores o vendedores de vivienda.  En general, la literatura sobre instituciones 
ha destacado un gran número de ineficiencias derivadas de un mal funcionamiento del 
sistema judicial: desde un aumento del número de empresas y hogares restringidos en 
cuanto al acceso al crédito a una reducción en la tasa de creación de nuevas empresas 
(Padilla y Requejo, 2000, Jappelli et al. 2005, Desai et al., 2005, Padilla et al., 2007).  
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           Sin embargo, es interesante destacar que se ha dedicado menos trabajo a estudiar 
el efecto directo del mal funcionamiento del sistema judicial en los mercados de alquiler 
y propiedad de vivienda. Para una perspectiva internacional es posible consultar el 
trabajo de Casas-Arce y Saiz (2006) que estiman el efecto del “formalismo judicial” en 
la decisión de alquiler. El formalismo judicial se basa en la dificultad general de utilizar 
el sistema judicial para resolver conflictos y está relacionada con el número y lentitud 
de los procedimientos necesarios para resolver un caso concreto. A mayor formalismo, 
mayor es el coste y tiempo esperado para resolver un conflicto (Djankov et al., 2003). 
Casas-Arce y Saiz utilizan de hecho la tasa de formalismo que propusieron Djankov et 
al. (2003). Sin embargo, no existe hasta el momento un análisis en profundidad de los 
efectos producidos por la ineficiencia judicial en la práctica sobre las proporciones de 
vivienda en alquiler y propiedad en España. Esta tesis doctoral aborda el problema para 
el caso español mediante dos de sus capítulos (los capítulos tercero y cuarto). 
 
 
b) La ejecución de contratos en España según la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil en el 
periodo 1966-2008: un análisis con índices de formalismo 
 
 
           El capítulo tercero de esta tesis doctoral parte de la metodología publicada por 
Djankov et al. (2003) para plantear una medida de “formalismo judicial” para España. 
Para ello es necesario adaptar varios de los componentes del indicador original a las 
exigencias del Derecho Procesal Civil español. Si bien Djankov et al. (2003) plantean 
su medida tan solo para un año, el capítulo tercero ofrece una aproximación de esa 
medida para el periodo comprendido entre 1966 y 2008 y ofrece además el resultado 
corregido por la utilización de los distintos procedimientos civiles españoles para el 
período 1995-2006. El capítulo aporta por otro lado una medida de formalismo concreta 
aplicada al caso de las resoluciones de los conflictos arrendaticios, que conformarían un 
procedimiento especial dentro del Derecho Procesal Civil español. Estas medidas de 
formalismo, de carácter no aplicado en tanto que se basan en las características de la 
regulación, se utilizan para explicar la eficiencia del sistema judicial español en la 
práctica (es decir, mediante el cómputo real de la capacidad de resolución y de la tasa de 
congestión y pendencia de los juzgados españoles).  
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           El capítulo concluye que la tasa de formalismo judicial en España se ha reducido 
desde 1966 lo que debería implicar algunas mejoras en eficiencia desde entonces. Esta 
mejoría teórica o indirecta sería especialmente relevante a partir del año 2001, por el 
efecto de la introducción de la nueva Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil2. Sin embargo, el 
trabajo también concluye que esta reducción en el formalismo ha atraído a los tribunales 
españoles un mayor número de casos a resolver, incrementando la carga de trabajo del 
sistema y con ello aumentando sus  tasas de congestión y de pendencia (y reduciendo la 
tasa de resolución). Así, la reducción en el formalismo judicial habría provocado 
indirectamente una caída en la eficiencia efectiva del sistema en vez de una esperada 
mejoría. 
 
           Respecto del resultado concreto para los conflictos arrendaticios, el trabajo 
concluye que no ha habido mejoras significativas en su tasa de formalismo, a diferencia 
de lo observado para el sistema judicial civil en su conjunto. 
 
 
c) ¿Está aumentando la ineficiencia judicial la tasa de vivienda en propiedad en 
España? Un análisis a nivel provincial 
 
 
           El capítulo cuarto pretende cuantificar, mediante un modelo econométrico, el 
efecto concreto del mal funcionamiento del sistema judicial en las tasas de vivienda en 
propiedad en España. Para ello se construye un panel con indicadores de eficiencia del 
sistema judicial a la hora de resolver conflictos y ejecutar resoluciones judiciales para 
todas las provincias españolas en el período 2001-2007 (concretamente se calculan tres 
tipos de medida: la tasa de resolución, la tasa de pendencia y la tasa de congestión para 
todos los casos).  
  
           En el modelo econométrico se aplican distintos controles que pueden hacer 
cambiar las decisiones de los propietarios de vivienda más allá de su relación con el 
sistema judicial, como pueda ser el coste de uso de la vivienda, la densidad poblacional, 
                                                 
2 Ley 1/2000 de 7 de enero, de Enjuiciamiento Civil. Esta ley entró en vigor el 8 de enero de 2001.  
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la proporción de población joven en la provincia, la riqueza de los posibles arrendatarios 
o su restricción al crédito.  
 
           El capítulo concluye, tras aplicar numerosas pruebas de robustez (estimaciones 
bietápicas mediante el método generalizado de los momentos, two-step GMM) que un 
aumento de la ineficiencia judicial implica un impacto positivo y significativo en la tasa 
de vivienda en propiedad en España. En otras palabras, la mayor dificultad para que el 
arrendatario vea cumplido su contrato y ejecutada una sentencia hará que opte por 
abandonar el mercado de alquiler. Tal efecto es, sin embargo, pequeño en comparación 
con otros muchos factores (como la renta), lo cual sería esperable. 
 
 
Conclusiones 
 
 
           Más allá de las conclusiones concretas de cada uno de los trabajos que componen 
esta tesis, es posible afirmar, de forma global, que las “instituciones” importan a la hora 
de analizar el funcionamiento de los mercados inmobiliarios español y europeo y que 
por tanto deberían ser abordadas en los distintos estudios que se vienen realizando sobre 
ellos. De hecho, es posible observar que recientemente el debate sobre el efecto de las 
instituciones analizadas en esta tesis doctoral está ya en el debate público. El Ministerio 
de Vivienda (2008 y 2009) ha denunciado que tanto la protección excesiva de los 
inquilinos como la lentitud de los juzgados a la hora de resolver conflictos por impago 
del alquiler podrían estar reduciendo el mercado de alquiler en España y que por tanto 
sería necesario reformarlos. Estas iniciativas estarían por tanto más allá de las medidas 
más clásicas de política económica usualmente aplicadas a este mercado como puedan 
ser las reformas en la fiscalidad de la vivienda o la dotación de vivienda protegida para 
compra o alquiler. 
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principales) en 12 países europeos. 
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Summary 
The effect of institutions on European housing markets: an 
economic analysis 
 
 
Introduction 
 
  
All over the 20th Century, and especially during its second half, the tenancy 
market has lost weight in all the European economies. Figure 2.1 graphs the weight of 
the tenancy market over the total number of principal residences in 12 European 
countries for the most recent years.3 In this context it should be noted that the reduction 
in the weight of the tenancy market is especially extreme in Spain. The first Census 
providing data on this respect (1970) showed that the proportion of residences in the 
property market was around 60% (property share of 63,4%). In 2008, in several Spanish 
provinces the property share was above 94% (Castellón, Soria o Lugo).    
 
The economic literature has shown that a too weak tenancy market may imply 
several inefficiencies for the functioning of the economy. Those inefficiencies are 
mainly caused by the reduced mobility of workers (Hardman and Ionnides, 1999, 
Barceló, 2006). In fact, in Europe, it could be observed that economies with stronger 
tenancy markets, such as France or Germany, also have higher interregional mobility of 
workers (Maclennan et al. 1998, Barceló, 2006). More importantly, the economic 
                                                 
3 “Principal residences” include the dwellings where individuals have their permanent or main home. 
Those residences can be owned (87,1% in 2007 in Spain following the data of the Ministry of Housing), 
rented (11,2%) and used as a result of a transfer or non-lucrative cession (1,6%).  
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literature stresses that economies with lower mobility of workers also suffer higher 
unemployment rates (Layard et al. 1991). 
 
Several factors may have affected the evolution of the tenancy and the property 
shares over the last decades. Among those are the interest rates that have fallen down 
(Blanco and Restoy, 2007), the liberalization of the banking sector since 1980 that may 
have played an indirect role (Iacoviello and Minetti, 2003, Kumbhakar and Lozano-
Vivas, 2004) or the increase in income per capita in all European economies. 
 
However, apart from those factors, which in fact have been extensively studied 
by the economic literature, others, as for instance those that could be grouped as 
“institutional determinants” may have also played an important role. Among them are 
the regulations (the so-called “formal institutions”), such as the tenancy Laws, and the 
mechanisms created to enforce the contracts signed by private parties in the housing 
markets, such as the judicial system.  
 
This Ph. D. thesis aims to analyze the economic effects of the regulations 
affecting the European (and therefore, the Spanish) tenancy markets and the effects of 
inefficiency in the enforcement institutions that are available in those markets. On the 
one hand, too restrictive rules applying to the tenancy contracts may introduce severe 
disincentives for the landlords to participate in the market. On the other, too slow or 
costly procedures to enforce the same contracts may exert the same effects, yielding as a 
result a reduced share of tenancy in the economy.  
 
 
The effect of “formal institutions” on the European housing markets 
 
 
The regulations affecting the tenancy markets are similar in the different 
European countries and usually introduce two types of restrictions which aim to protect 
the tenant. On the one hand, they usually introduce “rent control” rules which usually 
limit the increase in the rent paid by the tenant to the increase in the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) after the first year of the tenancy relation. On the other hand, several other 
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rules protect the tenant against eviction for a certain number of years. As a result, the 
tenant decides how long he wants to stay in the dwelling paying a limited rent to the 
landlord. In Spain those rules can be found in the Law 29/1994, of 24th November.4 
Chapter 2 of this Ph. D. thesis provides a survey of those restrictions for 12 European 
countries. 
 
The effects of rent control have been extensively studied both theoretically 
(Basu and Emerson, 2000, Raess and Ungern-Sternberg, 2002, Basu and Emerson 2003) 
and empirically, especially for the case of the USA (Johnson, 1951, Sims 2007). 
However, the measures that protect the tenant against eviction are typically European, 
and probably because of that they have not received the same attention. The same could 
be said about the specific “European” rules of “rent control” that were already designed 
for markets with positive rates of inflation. 
 
 
a) The institutions of house tenancy markets in post-war Western Europe: an 
economic analysis.  
 
 
Chapter 2 of this Ph.D. Thesis aims to analyze the effects of the typically 
European tenancy Law restrictions in the tenancy markets. First of all the chapter 
provides a summary of those regulations in 12 European countries, analyzing 
specifically the case for Spain, Finland, Italy and the UK. From that analysis it is 
possible to conclude that the restrictions were affecting the market almost for all the 
period in what a reduction in the tenancy weight in the economy was observed. 
Moreover, over the second half of the 20th century, the rules were similar in all the 
countries and suffered a similar evolution from a liberal conception of the tenancy 
relations to a more interventionist one. Chapter 2 analyzes theoretically the effects of 
those restrictions adapting a previously proposed model of Basu and Emerson (2000).   
 
 Following the model, the tenancy market is affected by an asymmetric 
information problem as landlords have limited information about the number of years 
                                                 
4 Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos. 
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that tenants want to stay in their dwellings. As it was already said, the Law protects the 
tenant for a certain period against eviction, thus the tenant decides how long he wants to 
stay (with a maximum term established by the Law). More importantly, the landlord 
cannot freely increase the rent during that time due to the rent control rules. Year after 
year, until the relation reaches the maximum term of protection established by the Law, 
the conditions contracted by the tenant and the landlord get outdated with respect to 
market conditions. As a result, if the rents in the market increase at a higher rate than 
the allowed rent increase by the “rent control” rules (usually the average CPI), the 
landlord will always suffer a real rent reduction.     
 
As conclusions, chapter 2 shows that both types of restrictions (rent control and 
protection against eviction) were affecting the tenancy contracts all over Europe during 
the second half of the 20th century. Following a theoretical model that exploits an 
asymmetric information mechanism, the chapter shows that those restrictions may 
imply some negative effects for the tenancy market, as those rules may disincentive 
some of the landlords from participating in the market.  
 
 
The effect of “enforcement institutions” in the housing markets: the 
role of the judicial system 
 
 
           Landlords may also be affected by deficient enforcement institutions, such as a 
slow or costly judicial system. For instance, if the landlord is confronted to a non-
paying or delinquent tenant he may decide to use the judicial system to evict the tenant 
or to ask for the lost rents. If it is too costly to use it, he may decide not to participate in 
the tenancy market any more. 
 
           The economic literature analyzing the enforcement institutions has stressed 
several undesired effects of an inefficient judicial system. For instance, it may increase 
the proportion of credit restricted enterprises or it may reduce the entry rate of new 
enterprises (Padilla and Requejo, 2000, Jappelli et al. 2005, Desai et al., 2005, Padilla et 
al., 2007).  However, the same literature has not paid the same attention to the effects of 
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an inefficient judicial system in the housing markets. Casas Arce and Saiz (2006), 
provide an international perspective of this problem analyzing the effect of “judicial 
formalism” on the housing tenure decision. “Judicial formalism” can be understood as a 
measure of procedural complexity of a judicial system. It aims to approximate the 
difficulty to use the system through a measure of the number and complexity of the 
procedures needed to have a case solved in a court. Djankov et al. (2003) found that 
formalism is related to higher cost and time invested to solve a conflict. Nevertheless, 
“formalism” is just an indirect measure of judicial inefficiency. The literature lacks 
some more efforts to measure the effects of judicial inefficiency on the housing markets 
using direct efficiency measures. Specifically no research can be found measuring the 
effects of a slow judicial system in the property and tenancy shares in Spain even 
though direct rates of judicial resolution or judicial congestion can be constructed. This 
Ph. D. Thesis tackles those problems in its third and fourth chapters analyzing the 
Spanish judicial system in the long run (chapter 3) and analyzing its relation with the 
functioning of the housing market in Spain (chapter 4).  
 
 
b) A characterization of the judicial enforcement of contracts in Spain in the 
period 1966-2008: analysis with formalism indices 
 
 
           Chapter 3 of this Ph. D. Thesis constructs a measure of procedural formalism for 
the Spanish judicial system in the long run. In order to do that, the methodology 
proposed by Djankov et al. (2003) has been applied after being adapted to the 
characteristics of the Spanish Civil Procedural Laws. 
 
           While Djankov et al. (2003) showed their results just for a year and for a very 
specific procedure (as they fixed the amount in dispute), the third chapter of this Ph.D. 
Thesis provides results for the period 1966-2008 and analyzes all the possible civil 
procedures in Spain (therefore, the chapter does not fix the amount in dispute, allowing 
for a richer analysis of the judicial system). Moreover, it corrects the results using real 
utilization rates of the different procedures for the period 1995-2006. Then, the chapter 
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also provides a long run measure of procedural formalism for the specific case of a 
tenancy conflict, such as the one originated by a non-paying tenant.5  
 
           As it was already discussed, even though the measure of “formalism” provides a 
profound analysis of how the Civil Procedural Law (CPL) of a country is designed it is 
just an indirect way to measure judicial efficiency. Following that idea, and taking into 
account that in Spain it is possible to construct direct measures of efficiency (through 
the computation of judicial resolution, pendency and congestion rates for the last 
decade), the third chapter also provides a discussion on the effects of formalism on 
recent developments of the Spanish judicial efficiency.  
 
           The chapter concludes that judicial formalism in Spain has fallen since 1966. 
Moreover, the reductions in formalism would be particularly important since 2001 as a 
result of the introduction of the new CPL.6 However, this indirect or theoretical 
improvements in the judicial system seems to have implied also an increase in the 
number of conflicts arriving to the Spanish courts, increasing the workload of the 
system and thereby increasing their rates of congestion and pendency (and reducing the 
rate of resolution). Thus, the reduction in legal formalism would have indirectly caused 
a drop in the effective efficiency of the system. 
 
           Regarding the particular result for the special procedures directed to solve 
tenancy conflicts, the chapter does not find any significant improvements in their rate of 
formalism, unlike what was observed for the civil justice system as a whole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Tenancy conflicts in Spain have to be solved using a special procedure set up by the Civil Procedural 
Law. 
6 The Parliament passed a new Civil Procedural Law in 2000 (Law 1/2000 of 7th January). This Law 
entered into force in 8th january 2001.  
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c) Is judicial inefficiency increasing the house property market weight in Spain? 
Evidence at the local level 
 
 
           The fourth chapter of this Ph. D. Thesis aims to quantify the effects of judicial 
inefficiency in the rates of home ownership in Spain. In order to do that, an econometric 
model exploiting interprovincial differences both in judicial efficiency and property 
shares over the last decade (2001-2007) is applied to the problem, therefore employing 
panel data techniques.  
 
           In this chapter, judicial efficiency rates are calculated both for the “declaratory” 
stage and the execution stage of the procedures needed to evict a non paying tenant and 
in three different ways (in the form of a resolution rate, of a pending cases rate and of a 
congestion rate). Also, several controls are introduced in the econometric model in order 
to take into account several other factors affecting the tenancy and property shares in the 
Spanish provinces that are not captured by the figures of the judicial system. That is the 
case of the user cost of housing (or the housing prices), the population density, the 
proportion of young population in the province or the wealth of the provincial 
population among others.   
 
           The chapter concludes, after estimating the model through two-stage generalized 
method of moments techniques (two-step GMM) and applying several tests of 
robustness, that an increased judicial inefficiency implies an increase in the rate of home 
ownership in the Spanish provinces. In other words, when the landlords face greater 
difficulties to enforce their contracts, many of them will choose to leave the rental 
market. As it may be expected, such effect is small compared with many other factors 
affecting the housing tenure decision (such as income). 
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Conclusions 
 
 
           Beyond the specific results of each of the chapters of this thesis, it is possible to 
confirm that "institutions" affect the functioning of the Spanish and European housing 
markets. Therefore the analysis of institutions should always be addressed in the 
economic analysis of those markets. Moreover, very recent events confirm how 
“institutions” are becoming an important part of the analysis performed by different 
public administrations when they aim to address the problems of the tenancy and 
property markets in Spain. For instance, the Ministry of Housing of Spain (2008 and 
2009) has claimed that excessive protection of the tenants and the slowness of the courts 
when resolving disputes involving non-payment of rents could be reducing the rental 
market in Spain. This analysis and the initiatives for reforming the regulations of the 
market are beyond the traditional economic analysis that was usually based in taxation 
measures or the provision of public housing. 
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Abstract 
 
 
This doctoral thesis focuses on the effects of formal (regulatory) and 
enforcement institutions on the housing markets in Spain and Europe. The dissertation 
is organized through a sequence of three research papers. The first paper (chapter 2) 
provides an economic analysis of the effects of post-war regulations on the European 
tenancy markets. The research concludes that both rent control and compulsory terms 
entail theoretically some negative effects for the weight of the tenancy market in the 
economy. The second paper (chapter 3) focuses on the functioning of the judicial 
system in Spain since 1966 providing a measure of its degree of formalism and a 
discussion on its level of efficiency. The study concludes that formalism has diminished 
in Spain, especially after year 2000, although no aggregate improvements exist in the 
case of the tenancy market. The third paper (chapter 4) provides econometric estimates 
of the effect of judicial inefficiency on the share of property of the Spanish economy. 
For that, a panel is constructed with up to three measures of inefficiency for the Spanish 
provinces for the last decade. This study concludes that judicial inefficiency has a 
positive, although minor, impact on the property share in Spain. From these studies it 
could be concluded that institutions matter in the functioning of the housing markets in 
Spain and Europe. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: the effect of institutions on economic 
performance 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Institutions 
 
 
As Coase (1992) and North (1981, 1990, 1994)7 highlighted, the explanation 
provided by modern economic theory of how the economy works, though precise and 
elegant, generally ignores two fundamental ingredients of the functioning of markets: 
institutions and time.8 Therefore, modern economic theory fails to provide convincing 
answers for a multiplicity of economic problems. For instance, at the aggregate level, 
the neoclassical and subsequent theories fail to explain the persistent differences in 
income across countries even though they may work well explaining the economic 
performance in developed economies (North, 1990). In other words, after accounting for 
the effect of capital and labour inputs and even after accounting for human capital and 
R&D, large differences in income remain across nations.9 Recent developments in the 
economic literature argue that “institutions” play a critical role in those differences (Hall 
and Jones, 1999, Helpman, 2008). 
 
                                                 
7 Ronald H. Coase and Douglas C. North won the Nobel prize in economics in 1991 and 1993 
respectively. 
8 Geography should also be taken into account as other factor usually ignored by the economic literature. 
However it is not the focus of this Ph.D. thesis. See section 1.6 for a discussion on the topic. 
9 Neither the neoclassical exogenous growth models (Solow 1956-Swan 1956 and Ramsey 1928-Cass 
1965 –Koopmans 1965) nor the endogenous (technological progress) growth theory (from the AK models 
to Lucas 1988) provide a convincing explanation of long term differences in economic development. 
 32 
At the microeconomic level, neoclassical theories sustain that prices are a 
suitable mechanism for signalling and representing the correct value of goods. That is 
true in an environment of perfect information, but prices rarely take into account the 
value of uncertain property rights and transaction costs (Coase, 1960, North, 1990). 
Related to that, neoclassical theories are insufficient in explaining why intra-firm 
coordination and economic planning, at least at the enterprise level, are occasionally 
better than the pricing system coordinating the incentives of economic agents.10 
 
North (1990, 1994) defined “institutions” as the “rules of the game” or the 
“incentive structure” of a society. That structure is formed by humanly devised 
constraints that rule any interaction. Thus, the concept would include “formal 
constraints” (for instance, the Law in a specific country that defines the property rights 
and several policy interventions), “informal constraints” (such as conventions, codes of 
conduct11 and, to a certain extent, “culture”) and the mechanisms created to enforce 
them (such as a judicial system). Time (History) shapes those institutions and adapts 
them to new circumstances through shocks and learning.12  
 
Individuals could reach to optimal contracts and could maximize their incomes 
without the need of an institutional guidance but only in the case of costless bargaining 
and full information (Coase, 1960, North, 1994). But as Coase (1960) stressed, 
assuming a frictionless economy, with full information available, is very unrealistic. 
This argument was empirically supported by a number of studies, some of them for very 
partial markets (see for instance, Demsetz, 1968) but also for the whole economy. 
Wallis and North (1986) found that in 1970 the size of the transaction sector in the 
United States (as percentage of GDP) was 54.7%.13 Likewise Dollery and Leong (1998) 
found 48.5% for Australia in 1971 (59.5% in 1991), Dagnino-Pastore and Farina (1999) 
                                                 
10 The discussion about the comparative efficiency of central planned economies with respect to 
capitalism is long out of the question, at least since the fall of the Soviet Union. However, it can be 
stressed that some central planned economies (for instance, the Soviet Union just after the Second World 
War) experienced higher growth rates than their capitalist counterparts for significant periods of time. 
That fact brought about the controversial idea that central planning could be a more efficient economic 
system under certain circumstances (Schumpeter, 1950). 
11 Following article 1 of the Spanish Civil Code (1889), conventions are a source of Spanish Law. 
12 In the words of Nicholas Crafts: “History matters because institutions and policies are persistent but 
shocks change their implications for productivity” (Ninth Figuerola Conference, Madrid, October 5th 
2009 “The contribution of new technology to economic growth: lessons from economic history”). 
13 Transaction costs are appropiately captured as final goods and therefore they should be included in the 
GDP (Wallis and North, 1988).  
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26.8% for Argentina in 1970 (34.5% in 1990) and Sulejewicz and Graca (2005) 49.7% 
for Poland in 1996. In other words, if we abandon the assumption of a regime of zero 
transaction costs, the legal system (as representative of the institutions of the economy) 
becomes crucial (Coase, 1992) as it can be understood as a guide to confront uncertainty 
(North, 1990). 
 
Since the seminal studies reviewed above, the interest in the analysis of the 
effect of institutions on economic performance has been growing steadily in the 
literature. Nowadays the authors working in this area of research are frequently at the 
top of the rankings of citations.14 Finally, two general conclusions can be reached from 
the recent literature15 (as predicted by North, 1999): institutions matter and they can be 
as important as capital accumulation, human capital or R&D explaining economic 
prosperity and economic change (Helpman, 2008).  
 
 
1.2 Inefficiency and change in the institutional matrix 
 
Ideally institutions are socially efficient and are created to provide correct 
information and guidance on human transactions. But, as it was highlighted by North 
(1981, 1990, 1999), institutions are usually inefficient as human agents have an 
imperfect and partial knowledge of the political-economic system for which they are 
created. Humans act on beliefs about how the political-economic system works. Then, 
the dominant belief becomes institutions through, for instance, the political and 
legislative process. That is to say, institutions are partially the outcome of a political 
process that also suffers from high transaction costs and scarce information. Politicians 
may tend to maximize the probability of being elected rather than producing the most 
efficient regulations. In fact, the public choice literature has provided several examples 
on how the political process may produce outcomes that diverge from the general 
preferences of the society (see for instance the median voter theory of Black, 1948, and 
Downs, 1957, and its criticisms, for example Romer and Rosenthal, 1979). Moreover, 
institutions that had been efficient in the past may become inefficient because they are 
                                                 
14 Thomson Scientific's Essential Science Indicators. http://sciencewatch.com/dr/sci/08/may4-08_4/ 
15 Several examples of the most recent literature in this area of research are analyzed in the next sections. 
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difficult to change (North 1999, Helpman, 2008) and thus may become outdated with 
respect to current economic and social conditions. 
 
Finally, another source of “wrong” institutions can be the “import” or 
“transplant” of institutions designed for other countries or other socio-economic 
environments. The extension of European legal institutions such as the Roman/Civil 
Law system or the Common Law system to other regions during colonizations is a case 
of legal transplant and, some argue, can have long-lasting economic implications (La 
Porta et al. 1997 and 1998, Djankov et al. 2003, La Porta et al. 2008). Apart from these 
historical examples, there are very recent examples of “transplants” (even though in 
very different circumstances) such as the introduction of a German-inspired property 
Law in China in 2007 or several other reforms in the legal environment of formerly 
socialist republics.16 In any case, background informal institutions may play a very 
important role on the success or failure of a transplanted institution.17  
 
Can we expect that time and learning will correct the “wrong” institutions? 
North (1990) is rather pessimistic about the process of institutional change as the 
information feedback is usually insufficient to correct beliefs and “models”. As a result, 
current institutions can be inefficient and reduce economic development instead of 
improving economic performance. In other words, they may increase transaction costs 
instead of reducing them, create coordination problems and disincentive agents to 
participate in the market.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 After the fall of many socialist or central planned economies, Civil Law was “imported“ by several 
countries in the 90’s such as Russia (ex-USSR).  
17 In general, it can be said that the issue of legal transplants and their effects generates a “tremendous 
heat” and it can lead to wrong conclusions about the “superiority” of certain systems or solutions with 
respect to others (La Porta et al. 2008). For instance, the Doing Business Project of the World Bank has 
been criticised several times because it promotes certain simplifications in the business regulations (such 
as the process of registering a property), inspired in the principles of Common-Law countries, that may 
not fit in countries with other legal cultures (Arruñada, 2007). 
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1.3 Classification of institutions 
 
 
1.3.1 Formal constraints and informal constraints  
 
 
Consistently with the complexity of the economy, institutions take very different 
forms. North (1990, 1994) proposed to classify them in “informal constraints”, “formal 
constraints” and “enforcement”.  
 
As it was said before, “informal constraints” would include conventions, norms 
of behaviour, codes of conduct, customs, traditions, etc. They are especially difficult to 
measure but their action is essential to explain why formal rules (the Law) may exert 
different results in different economies. In fact, it is not clear that formal rules can 
modify or “abrogate” pre-existing informal constraints. However, after admitting their 
crucial role, the key role among “institutions” is played by formal rules in any complex 
society. Only very simple or primitive human structures could be explained just 
analyzing “informal constraints”. 
 
“Formal constraints” would include the Law in a specific country. In the case of 
Spain or other societies based on Civil Law, that concept would include any written rule 
(the Constitution, Laws and other kinds of legislations, Decrees, Statutes, etc.) but also 
private contracts18 and certain judicial decisions. Thus, all the rules of organization of 
the polity, the property rights and all other “economic rules” should be included in this 
type of institutions (North, 1990). 
 
Several recent research projects have proposed new ways to measure “formal 
constraints”. Moreover, these studies have been successful in finding significant effects 
of those constraints on economic performance. Among many others, La Porta et al. 
                                                 
18 As article 1091 of the Spanish Civil Code (1889) establishes: “Las obligaciones que nacen de los 
contratos tienen fuerza de ley entre las partes contratantes y deben cumplirse al tenor de los mismos” 
(obligations arising from contracts have force of law between the contracting parties). 
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(2002) measured the regulations of entry of start-up firms and found that too heavy 
regulations do not produce any benefits for new firms. Botero et al. (2004) investigated 
the regulation of labour markets, providing a measure of restrictiveness. They found 
that more stringent regulations were related to higher unemployment. However, 
Djankov et al. (2008) measured the regulations affecting the financial markets and 
concluded that they need to be regulated to achieve efficient results. The Doing 
Business project of the World Bank has analyzed the latter regulations among many 
others following the methodology proposed in the cited papers since 2004.19 Also other 
international projects (such as the World Global Competitiveness index of the World 
Economic Forum)20 began to include “institutions” (generally referring to formal 
constraints) as a “pillar” to observe in order to characterize competitiveness. The 
complexity and cost of those projects denote the importance that “institutions” (as a 
field of research) is achieving in the economics profession.  
 
 
1.3.2 Enforcement 
 
 
Enforcement would include the mechanisms created to enforce the formal (and 
informal) constraints. In other words, the violation of a formal constraint may be put on 
trial before a judge (although other options may be available) and the violation of an 
“informal constraint” may deserve certain types of social punishment. 
 
Some enforcement mechanisms are provided by the public sector. The most 
representative example is the judicial system where a third-party (the judge) solves a 
specific conflict between private or public parties. Notaries would be another public 
instrument of enforcement that corresponds to more specific types of contracts and 
transactions.  
 
On the private side, arbitration may be available and also requires the 
participation of a third-party. However, theoretically, several other mechanisms of “self-
                                                 
19 The last release of the Doing Business Project took place in september 2009 (“Doing Business 2010: 
reforming through difficult times”). 
20 The last release also took place in september 2009. 
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enforcement” may be used, such as an agreement between the parties themselves or the 
use of primitive violence or coercion of one party over the other (Moreno Catena and 
Cortés Domínguez, 2004). Those mechanisms are probably more common in the case of 
enforcement of “informal constraints”. 
 
Finally, if there is enough information in the economy or it is not excessively 
costly to produce it, several complementary mechanisms of enforcement may appear, 
such as “reputation” or “prestige” (North, 1990). A company or a professional with 
good reputation may increase its profits in the market if the customers know that no 
problems will appear later on (therefore “reputation” may be a substitute of other 
instruments of ex-post enforcement). 
 
Enforcement is always costly, especially when a third-party is involved. Agents 
such as the judge or the arbitrator have limited information about the conflict which has 
to be solved. Moreover, those agents are influenced by incentives which may not 
coincide with those of the parties. Therefore enforcement is imperfect (North, 1990) and 
as a result, violating the Law (or other constraints such as the private contracts) may be 
a successful and profitable strategy (Becker, 1968, Stigler, 1970, Ehrlich, 1972, North, 
1999).  
 
In addition, North (1990) stresses that enforcement mechanisms are the main 
difference in the institutional structure between the Third World and the developed 
economies. This fact was analyzed by Djankov et al. (2003) for the specific case of 
judges, concluding that, at least at the formal level, the functioning of the courts differ 
significantly throughout the world. Similar results have been persistently found by 
several surveys such as the World Business Environment Survey of the World Bank 
(between 1999 and 2000) or the Doing Business project (World Bank) since 2004.21 
That fact has relevant implications for development. Different systems of legal 
enforcement would be related to different levels of investor protection (La Porta et al. 
1997 and 1998), to different levels in the availability of funding (Padilla and Requejo, 
2000, Fabbri et al. 2004, Japelli et al. 2005) and to lower entry of new firms (Desai et 
al. 2005). 
                                                 
21 The methodology of the Doing Business Project for this issue is based on Djankov et al. (2003).  
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To sum up, there exists a growing consensus about the notion that enforcement 
matters for economic development. If enforcing the Law or the contracts is too costly, 
several individuals may decide not to participate in the markets thus hampering 
economic development. 
 
 
1.4 Institutions of the housing markets 
 
 
North (1990) stresses in his research the “housing market” as an example of a 
market that is affected by an especially complex matrix of institutions. He considers the 
case of a specific transaction such as selling a house and analyzes several institutional 
determinants related to it. His interest is based on the following aspects: on the one 
hand, the housing market is deficiently analyzed by the neoclassical theories. North 
sustains that its prices rarely reflect all the transaction costs, as it is especially costly for 
the participants to obtain the relevant information of the goods dealt within the market. 
That information ranges from credit conditions to the respect of informal (and formal) 
rules by neighbours. On the other hand, in the housing market it is easy to find “wrong” 
institutions that increase transaction costs instead of reducing them.  
 
As a matter of fact the interest in the analysis of the housing market goes well 
beyond the specific example proposed by North (1990). The housing market as a whole, 
including both property and tenancy relationships, is a deeply regulated market with a 
rich set of public interventions and very complex enforcement instruments. Some of 
those institutions are correctly designed while others are outdated or deficiently planned 
and thus exert undesired effects.  
 
Several examples of unexpected effects produced by public interventions can be 
found in the economic literature. Taking the case of Spain (although similar policies can 
be found in several other countries), a stream of literature finds that the fiscal incentives 
introduced to help individuals to access house property have both harmed the tenancy 
market (Lopez García, 1996, García Vaquero and Martínez, 2005) and have been 
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regressive (Sanz, 2000, Bilbao Terol et al. 2006). Also, fiscal benefits or tax deductions 
designed to favor tenants in the tenancy market have usually benefited landlords, thus 
having a weak positive effect (Susin, 2002, Lafarrere and Le Blanc, 2004, Gibbons and 
Manning, 2006).  
 
Nevertheless, as it was already said, the housing market is affected by more 
permanent and wide-ranging institutions as general market regulations and enforcement 
instruments. Zoning and land regulations are probably one the most complex areas of 
the Law and have attracted the attention of several economic research projects. In 
several countries, zoning regulations promote directly or indirectly a model of 
“compact” city in order to save in transportation costs and energy. However, several 
studies blame the zoning and planning regulations for increasing land prices (Asabere 
and Huffman, 1999, Glaeser and Ward, 2006, Barker, 2008) or argue that the reduced 
transport costs related to “artificially” compact cities do not overcome other quality and 
environmental costs (Mills and De Ferranti, 1971, Brueckner and Fansler, 1983).  
 
Also enforcement institutions have a critical role in the housing market. Both the 
notaries and the property registry can be considered specific instruments of enforcement 
of this market. They provide full security to real estate transactions if they are well 
designed. However, they are costly to maintain and may reduce market activity if they 
fail. The Doing Business Project of the World Bank (2009)22 has recommended a 
simplification of the requisites related to registering property (and the role of notaries) 
arguing that very costly procedures hamper economic activity.23 
 
The examples given above are just a small sample of the institutions that were 
introduced in the housing market and produced unexpected effects (probably due to 
obsolescence or to poor design). Other examples of institutions that may affect the 
housing markets in an unexpected way or may exert negative economic effects are the 
tenancy market regulations24 (introducing rent control or compulsory terms) or slow or 
                                                 
22 As it was already said, the first database of the Doing Business Project corresponds to the year 2004. 
23 However, Arruñada (2007) criticized the over-simplification that may derive from the ideas of the 
Doing Business Project pointing out that simplification may also reduce information and legal certainty, 
increasing the costs of future dealings. 
24 Therefore, those regulations are examples of “formal constraints”. 
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inefficient instruments to enforce tenancy contracts. Those are the institutions analyzed 
in this Ph.D. thesis.  
 
 
1.5 Tenancy markets, property markets and justice 
 
 
During the 20th century and especially after the Second World War, the house 
tenancy market has lost weight with respect to the property market all over Europe. 
However, the reduction in the tenancy market weight is particularly extreme in Spain. 
The first Census compiling this statistic (1970) showed a proportion of house property 
around 60%. The last data available (Ministry of Housing, 2008), showed that the 
proportion had increased and was above 94% in some provinces. That can be seen as a 
controversial development as several studies stressed that a too much reduced tenancy 
share is inefficient and may decrease economic growth through a reduced mobility of 
workers (Hardmand and Ioannides, 1999, Barceló, 2006). In fact, it is observed that 
economics with bigger tenancy markets show higher regional mobility (for instance 
France or Germany) (Maclennan et al. 1998, Barceló, 2006) and at the same time the 
economic literature stresses that lower mobility is related to higher unemployment 
(Layard et al. 1991). 
 
Over the last decades several other factors may have affected the evolution of 
the property share in Spain. Among those are fast falling interest rates (Blanco and 
Restoy, 2007) especially after 1993, the liberalization of the banking sector since 1980 
that may have played an indirect role by favouring the access of households to credit 
(Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas, 2004, Iacoviello and Minetti, 2003) or a tax regime that 
provides incentives to buying rather than to renting (García-Vaquero and Martínez, 
2005). However, as it was already mentioned, other factors such as the institutions of 
the housing market may have affected the relative shares of tenancy and property 
markets, influencing the preferences of consumers towards buying. Two of those factors 
are the tenancy laws (as an example of “formal constraints”), which introduced 
constraints in private tenancy contracts, and the role of the judicial system that may 
disincentive some of the agents through an ineffective enforcement of the contracts. 
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1.5.1. The effect of “formal constraints” in the housing market 
 
 
Chapter 2 of this Ph.D. Thesis aims to analyze the effects on the tenancy market 
of two restrictions introduced by the typical European tenancy laws: “rent control” 
policies and “compulsory terms” that prevent the eviction of the tenant for a certain 
period.  
 
Rent control policies generally tend to “freeze” rents and allow only exceptional 
upward adjustments in the rent paid by the tenant (thus reducing the profitability of the 
contract for the landlord). However, in Spain and other European countries, the design 
of the “rent control” is less severe and usually includes automatic rent increases linked 
to the rate of inflation (the Consumer Price Index or similar indices).  
 
The effect of rent control policies have been studied extensively by the 
economic literature, both theoretically as in Basu and Emerson, 2000 and 2003 or in 
Raess and Ungern-Sternberg, 2002, and empirically as in Johnson, 1951 or Sims, 2007, 
probably because they can be found in most developed countries. However, the specific 
type of “rent control” found in Europe has not received the same attention. The same 
problem can be identified in the case of the rules that allow the tenant to decide the 
duration of the contract and thus protect him against eviction for a certain period. The 
latter rules are typically European and are very rarely found in other countries.  
 
The “compulsory term” or “protection against eviction” rules can be found in 
Spain and the rest of the European countries with different “time extents” of protection 
(for instance, 5 years in Spain, 3 in France or 6 months in the UK for certain types of 
contracts25).  
 
The effect of both types of rules, taking into account the regulatory specificities 
found in Europe (limited protection against eviction plus positive inflation clauses), are 
                                                 
25 “assured shorthold tenancy“. 
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tackled theoretically (using an asymmetric information framework similar to Basu and 
Emerson, 2000) in order to analyze their effects in the housing market. 
 
 
1.5.2. The effect of enforcement procedures in the housing market 
 
 
If there is a violation of a tenancy contract such as unpaid rent by the tenant, the 
landlord will try to enforce the contract using the enforcement mechanisms available. 
Although some extra-judicial solutions may be found (arbitration in some cases)26, the 
judicial system is the main enforcement mechanism available for the parties.  
 
The effects of a slow or a costly judicial system in the specific case of conflicts 
related to tenancy contracts have not received much attention in the economic literature. 
In any case, it is reasonable to assume that, if enforcing those contracts is slow or costly, 
landlords will bear higher costs and uncertainty and therefore some of them may decide 
not to rent their dwellings. As a result the relative share of the tenancy market would 
decrease.  
 
First of all, testing that hypothesis requires an extensive research on the 
efficiency of the judicial system. As it was already discussed, North (1990) believed 
that the main differences among institutions across nations could be found in the 
“enforcement” procedures. Some attempts to compare judicial systems worldwide can 
now be found in the literature. Djankov et al. (2003) compared the “efficiency” with 
which the judicial system evicts a delinquent tenant across 109 countries and found 
important differences, even among the most developed economies. However, Djankov 
measured “efficiency” indirectly, through the use of a “formalism index”. He assumed 
that higher formal procedures were related to low predictability and longer expected 
times of execution and in fact found some evidence in this direction. 
 
Casas-Arce and Saiz (2006) tested the hypothesis at international level (thus, 
again comparing different countries) analyzing the effect of judicial formalism (based 
                                                 
26 However, only the judicial system can execute an eviction in Spain. 
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on Djankov et al. 2003) on the share of rented dwellings. They found that an increased 
rate of formalism (implying indirectly higher costs of utilization of the system and 
slower decisions) implied a reduction of the weight of the tenancy market. However, 
neither study analyzes the case of Spain in depth nor uses direct measures of efficiency. 
In turn, this Ph.D. thesis aims to provide an estimation of the effects of judicial 
inefficiency on the housing tenure decision in Spain. For that purpose, two different 
perspectives are investigated (chapters 3 and 4).  
 
On the one hand, chapter 3 provides a discussion on the performance of the 
judicial system in Spain in the long run (1966-2008). The chapter adapts the 
methodology of Djankov et al. (2003) to the Spanish case and provides a measure of 
formalism for the Spanish justice. The measure is calculated for the whole judicial 
system in Spain in the case of solving two different conflicts: a general private (civil) 
conflict derived from an unpaid debt and the case of a tenant eviction. However, as it 
was already discussed, “formalism” is just an indirect way to measure “inefficiency”. 
Therefore, some direct measures of efficiency such as the congestion rate, the pending 
cases rate and the resolution rate are calculated, and the effects of the introduction of the 
most recent Civil Procedural Law in 2000 are discussed.27 Indeed, the reduced 
formalism implied by the introduction of the new Civil Procedural Law seems to be a 
good explanation for the developments in judicial efficiency since 2000.  
 
On the other hand, chapter 4 analyzes the effect of judicial inefficiency in the 
housing tenure decision in Spain through panel data techniques. Direct measures of 
“inefficiency” (congestion rates, pending cases rates and resolution rates) are calculated 
for all the Spanish provinces for different stages of the judicial procedure28 to solve a 
tenancy conflict for the period 2001-2007. Therefore, chapter 4 tests the hypothesis 
discussed above (whether an increased inefficiency in the enforcement of tenancy 
conflicts implies a reduced weight of the tenancy market) for the specific case of Spain, 
using disaggregated data at the local level. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Law 1/2000, of January 7th (Civil Procedural Law). 
28 The “declaratory” stage of a conflict derived from an unpaid rent and the “execution” stage. 
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1.6 A note on geography 
 
 
Geography has been also considered a determinant of economic development 
and, similarly to institutions and history, it has been long ignored by the economic 
literature.  
 
Several research papers have stressed the role of geography on economic growth 
through its effects on transport costs, diseases or agricultural productivity (Gallup et al., 
1998, Sachs, 2001). Many of the “geographical” effects can be changed through time 
(Henderson et al., 2000) if proper investments are done, such as transportation costs and 
the spatial distribution of economic activities, but others are persistent and difficult to 
change (diseases, climate).  
 
In any case, the most recent research relativizes the role of geography on 
economic development and stresses that, once it is taken into account the role of 
institutions, geography does not matter or its effect is very secondary (Acemoglu et al., 
2001, Acemoglu et al., 2002, Rodrik et al., 2004, Segura-Cayuela, 2008).  
 
The debate about the primacy of institutions over geography has not ended in the 
literature. Nevertheless, as the research experiments carried out in this Ph.D. thesis do 
not depend on typical economic geography problems, “geography” as a determinant of 
market outcomes has not been taken into account. 
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Chapter 2 
The institutions of house tenancy markets in post-war 
Western Europe: an economic analysis
29
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter provides an economic analysis of the post-war regulations of the European 
tenancy markets. Two representative types of market regulations are analyzed: the 
introduction of compulsory terms in the tenancy contracts (as a way to protect the 
tenant against eviction) and rent control. First, the study describes and analyzes the 
recent history of those Laws. The cases of Spain (used as a benchmark), Italy, Finland 
and the UK are analyzed more in depth, the last three as examples of "big reformers", 
in order to draw some general conclusions about the evolution of European institutions 
over the last decades. Then the effects of those regulations are theoretically explored by 
adapting a model of tenancy markets. The results show that both rent control and 
compulsory terms potentially entail negative effects for the European tenancy markets 
as they may drive some participants out of the market. Those effects are consistent with 
the trends observed during the second half of the 20th century in the different European 
markets. 
 
JEL Classification: N4, K12, L51, R31 
 
Keywords: rent control, tenancy contracts, compulsory terms 
  
                                                 
29 This chapter was presented in the forum of the III Harvard Course in Law and Economics (Harvard 
University, USA) (2006), in the research seminar of the Banco de España-Eurosystem (2006) and in the 
forum of the II Joint Summer School of the ESF Programme GlobalEuronet "Globalizing Europe" (Tartu 
University, Estonia) (2007). A previous version of this chapter was published as a working paper of the 
Department of Economic History and Institutions of Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (Wp 08-11). 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
     
In several European countries the weight of the tenancy market relative to the 
total stock of principal residences has diminished over the 20th century. Figure 2.1 
shows, from public data of the European central banks, recent evidence for 12 European 
countries. 
     
Several explanations could be provided to understand that general trend, ranging 
from the finance literature that takes housing as an investment good, to the more general 
housing economics literature that also takes housing as a consumption good (Henderson 
and Ionnides, 1983 and Rosen et al. 1984 for some early references). For instance, 
during the last decades, there have been improvements in the access to credit or a 
significant development of the financial markets (Iacoviello and Minetti, 2003, 
Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas, 2004, Blanco and Restoy, 2007) that may have favoured 
the property market. Also, some fiscal regimes have privileged buying versus renting 
(López-García, 1996, García-Vaquero and Martínez, 2005). However, in general, 
market regulations and institutions are usually neglected in more broad economic 
studies. 
     
In more specific literature that takes into account the market regulations, a weak 
tenancy market and a diminishing rate of tenancy, relative to property, is related, among 
other factors, to the introduction of rent control policies. The basic microeconomic 
intuition that relates a rent ceiling with a diminishing quantity and quality of the 
residences in the tenancy market has been supported by several empirical analyses 
(Johnson, 1951, Glaeser and Luttmer, 2003, Sims 2007). In fact, there seems to be a 
consensus among economists about the effects of rent control (Alston et al., 1992). The 
analysis carried out in several theoretical models also point to the same conclusions 
(e.g., Basu and Emerson, 2000, Raess and Ungern-Sternberg, 2002, Basu and Emerson 
2003). 
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However, most of the research on rent control has studied the type of market 
intervention enforced in cities or States of the United States (for a summary, Turner and 
Malpezzi, 2003). In contrast, less work has been done about the specific effects of the 
European type of tenancy restrictions. Exceptions to that are Peña and Ruiz-Castillo 
(1984) for Spain, Munch and Svarer (2002) for Denmark or Lyytikäinen (2006) for 
Finland. However, the focus of those studies is not the analysis of the design of the 
regulations themselves. 
     
Moreover, the regulations in force in the different European countries introduced 
not only rent control policies but also another restriction that protected the tenants 
against eviction for a certain term. Both of them may have had an effect on the general 
diminishing trend of the tenancy figures. At the same time partially liberalizing Laws, 
like the ones passed in the UK (England and Wales) and Finland may have had the 
opposite effects. 
     
The aim of this study is to analyze the regulations specifically directed to the 
tenancy markets in Europe and to provide an analysis of their economic implications. 
The structure of this paper proceeds as follows: first of all, the chapter identifies the 
most common market regulations affecting the European tenancy contracts by analyzing 
the different national Laws (section 2.2). Then, those regulations are introduced in a 
model of tenancy markets to theoretically test for their effects. For that purpose an 
adapted version of the model of Basu and Emerson (2000) is used (section 2.3). Finally, 
some conclusions linking the European regulations with the results of the model are 
provided (section 2.4). 
     
 
2.2 The regulations of house tenancy markets in Europe 
 
     
Tenancy is still today heavily regulated in Europe. At the beginning of the 20th 
century tenancy was not so heavily regulated and "contractual freedom" inspired the 
 56 
contents of tenancy contracts following the principle of "autonomy" of the private 
parties30 (Rodríguez-Aguilera and Peré, 1965). 
     
During the 20th century "contractual freedom" was restricted with the introduction of 
some tenancy regulations (rent ceilings, compulsory terms, control over the increase of 
the rent…). Some of them had the objective of improving the situation of the tenants in 
a context of flats shortage after the First or Second World War in several European 
countries or the Civil War in the case of Spain. 
     
Limiting the analysis to one of those restrictions, the control over the increase of 
the rent paid by the tenant, Arnott (1998) classified the different types of rent control 
into "two generations". A "first generation" rent control would include rent freezes and 
exceptional upward adjustments. A "second generation" rent control would include 
automatic percentage rent increases linked to the rate of inflation (or similar indices). 
While in the United States tenancy markets were gradually deregulated and very few 
cities maintained the controls after 1950, in Europe the first generation rent controls 
survived longer due to the long lasting effects of the Wars. Arnott (1998) identifies the 
surge of the second generation controls with the inflationary crisis of 1973. The old 
controls, as they did not allow for inflation correction, seemed too inefficient in a 
context of high inflation. 
     
As it was already mentioned, rent control is only one of the market regulations 
introduced in the European tenancy markets in the 20th century. Another main market 
regulation can also be identified in the different European systems: “compulsory terms” 
as a way to temporarily protect the tenant against eviction. It is possible to classify those 
regulations by their severity: the protection could be permanent, therefore rendering the 
length of the contract to the will of the tenant, or temporary (a protection given to the 
tenant for a few years time). The most recent regulations in the different European 
countries opt for the temporary solution (3 to 5 years). 
     
                                                 
30 That is present, for instance, in article 1255 of the Civil Code of Spain (1889) or article 1322 of the 
Civil Code of Italy (1942). Those articles follow the French tradition (article 1134 of the French Civil 
Code, 1804). 
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The aim of this section is to offer an overview of the history of those regulations 
(rent control and compulsory terms). A detailed analysis is provided for Spain, as a 
benchmark, Italy, UK and Finland. The last three cases as examples of countries that 
passed some relevant reforms over the last decades. Finally, section 2.5 offers an 
overview of the most recent regulations for a multiplicity of European countries (see 
Table 2.1). 
     
 
2.2.1 Spain 
 
     
The tenancy market was not deeply regulated in Spain before 1931. General 
rules of contractual freedom were applicable into the tenancy market with the exception 
of some partial decrees limiting the length and rent of the tenancy contracts for specific 
cases and cities during the decade of 1920.31 It must be highlighted that the Spanish 
Civil Code (1889), was mainly liberal and established in its article 1255 that private 
parties were free to agree any terms and conditions in a contract as long as they were 
respectful with the "Law, morality and public order". 
     
In 193132 the limitations to contractual freedom that were already introduced 
with the cited partial decrees became permanent. However, it is not possible to find a 
complete piece of regulation on tenancy markets until 1946, when the government of 
Franco passed the first "Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos" (Urban Tenancy Act).33 Since 
then, a "Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos" has been always in force in the Spanish 
tenancy market (the first as said, from 1946, and later on, with the regulations of 1964, 
1985 or the most recent one of 1994). The introduction of limitations to contractual 
freedom took place mainly as a reaction to the profound changes of the Spanish society 
before the Civil War such as the rural exodus to the big cities and, after 1936, the 
shortage of housing caused by the Civil War. In any case, more general populist reasons 
intervened in the initiatives as a way to gain support for the newly established political 
                                                 
31 Royal Decree of 21 of June 1920. Its effects were extended by other Royal Decrees in 1921, 1922, 
1923, 1924 and 1925. 
32 Decree of 29 December 1931. 
33 Law of 31 December 1946. 
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regimes (on one hand, the Spanish Second Republic, and after 1939, Franco's 
dictatorship). 
     
The Law of 1946 established a strict regulation over the tenancy contracts and 
made nearly inapplicable the principles of the Civil Code. As Rodríguez-Aguilera and 
Peré (1965) noted, the new Law responded to a new "social sensitivity". That regulation 
introduced, among others, two important regulations: "compulsory terms" and 
"regulated rents". At this stage, the interventions were severe. The protection against 
eviction for the tenant, that is, the compulsory term to be introduced in the contract, was 
unlimited. Even the close relatives of the tenant were able to succeed him as tenants in 
the same dwelling and with his same conditions. With respect to the rules governing the 
rents, the Law established fixed one-time increments in the rent paid for the flats rented 
before the end of the Civil War and freezed the rents for the new contracts. 
     
In 1964 the government passed a new Law through a new Decree.34 Several 
amendments to the old legislation had been introduced in the previous decade (Law of 
22 December of 1955 among others), and it was necessary to publish a new legal text to 
rationalize and clarify the regulation. The new Law ruled the tenancy market until 1985 
but it did not introduce significant changes in the rules governing the term of the 
contract (the indefinite extension of the term was still in force). On the other hand, a 
very timid change in the rules governing the rents was introduced. The Law allowed to 
increment the rents in the contracts signed after 1956 after the fifth year of renewal. The 
increase was tied to an official index related to the "cost of life" published by the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) (National Statistics Institute). 
     
The statistical information available about the tenancy market in Spain is very 
scarce, although it is reasonable to infer that during the period in which the regulations 
were in force the proportion of rented dwellings diminished. The census of 1970 
showed that 30,1% of the main residences were rented in Spain while in 1981 that 
proportion had fallen to 20,8%. 
     
                                                 
34 Decree 4104/1964 of 24 December 1964. 
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Public opinion increasingly perceived that those types of regulations were not 
having any positive impact on the housing market and that the situation was now 
different from that of the post-war period. As a consequence, in 1985, with the so-called 
"Decreto Boyer"35, the Government took a relevant step to liberalize the tenancy market 
by eliminating the compulsory extensions for all tenancy contracts signed after its 
enactment. However, the rents were still tied to the consumer price index (CPI) and the 
Decree was not applicable to all the contracts signed before 9th may 1985. Therefore its 
liberalizing measures did not apply to an important part of the tenancy market. 
     
The measures taken aimed to revitalize the tenancy market but the figures of the 
censuses suggest that the effect of the new rules was quite limited: the census of 1991 
showed a further reduction in the weight of the tenancy market (15.2% of the main 
residences) although it can be said that the pace of reduction had also slowed down.36 
     
In 1994, the Parliament37 enacted the most recent Urban Tenancy Act (Ley de 
Arrendamientos Urbanos 29/1994).38 Two objectives of the Law must be highlighted. 
First, it aimed to reduce the instability caused by the very short terms of the contracts 
that were signed under the “Decreto Boyer” and to fit the problem of the coexistence of 
very different types of contracts (the new contracts after 1985 and the "old" rigid 
contracts from before). For that, the Law of 1994 reintroduced compulsory terms for a 
limited period of 5 years. On the other hand, it maintained a rent control that tied the 
increments in the rent to the CPI. Finally it also included some rules for the contracts 
signed before 1985 (that were still regulated by the norms of 1964) in order to allow 
them to expire in the medium term. 
     
This short historical survey shows that the two types of intervention that this 
paper aims to analyze were in force in Spain without interruption (with the exception of 
the "Decree Boyer") since 1931 (or 1946 if we only count for the Law level 
regulations). On the other hand, it is possible to identify an evolution from very severe 
                                                 
35 Royal Decree 2/1985 of 30 April 1985. 
36 As the preamble of the Law 29/1994 states: “El Real Decreto-Ley 2/1985 ha tenido resultados mixtos 
(…) Ha permitido que la tendencia a la disminución en el porcentaje de viviendas alquiladas que se 
estaba produciendo a principios de la década de los ochenta se detuviera, aunque no ha podido revertir 
sustancialmente el signo de la tendencia (…)”. 
37 Cortes Generales. 
38 Law 29/1994 of 24 of November 1994. 
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interventions, like the rules on terms and rents of the Law of 1946, to milder 
interventions, as the ones passed with the Decree Boyer and the Law of 1994. In the 
classification of Arnott, the rent control in Spain turned into a "second generation" type 
in the decade of 1960, at least for a part of the tenancy market. The modernization of the 
regime of the compulsory extensions of the tenancy contract had to wait until 1985. 
     
 
2.2.2 Italy 
 
     
As it was highlighted in the case of Spain, the general rules applying to the 
tenancy contracts in Italy were liberal. The Civil Code of 1942 established in its article 
1322 that the content of the contracts is free, although it must respect the Law. 
However, in Italy, as in Spain, it is possible to find several special regulations since the 
decade of the 1920's that partially introduced restrictions affecting the rents and the term 
of the contracts (Breccia and Bargelli, 2005). 
     
The first complete Law on tenancy contracts was not passed until 1978.39 It 
introduced a quite severe rent control system as the rent was determined by the criteria 
introduced by the legal text. In fact, the Law included different coefficients depending 
on the population of the municipality, age of the building, floor number, cadastral type, 
state of repair or preservation. On the other hand, the Law established a compulsory and 
extensible term of 4 years. Other compulsory terms of 6 to 9 years were applicable 
depending on the activity to be developed in the dwelling (6 years if the property was 
going to have industrial use). 
     
In 199240, a new Law deregulated rents for the new contracts and introduced 
some rules to deregulate the older contracts under some restrictions. No changes were 
passed for the case of compulsory terms. That Law can be deemed as the introduction of 
the second generation rent control in Italy. 
     
                                                 
39 Law 392/1978 ("sull'equo canone") of 27 July. 
40 Decree-Law of 11 July 1992 (converted in Law 359/1992 of 8 August). 
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Those steps towards liberalization were confirmed in 1998 with the enactment of 
the most recent tenancy Law in 1998 (Law 431/199841), which confirmed the 
liberalization of the rents introduced by the brief reform of 1992. With the new Law, the 
parties can freely negotiate the rent as well as the increase of the rent in future periods, 
although there are some special cases in which the increase in the rent is limited (a 
maximum of 75% of a "cost of life" measure). On the other hand, the Law 431/1998 
maintained the rules related to the duration of the contract by establishing a minimum 
term of four years. 
     
The reforms of Italian regulations towards a more liberal framework for the 
tenancy contracts were influenced by the idea that the market was not working properly. 
36% of the dwelling stock was rented in 1980 but just 22,5% in 1991 (see figure 2.1). 
Recent data from 2004 show that the decreasing pattern continued, reducing the share to 
just 18,6%. Thus, the partially liberalizing measures do not seem to have inverted the 
downward trend. However, as in the case of Spain the pace of reduction seems to have 
slowed down recently. 
     
 
2.2.3 Finland 
 
     
As in the previous cases, at the beginning of the 20th century, the legal basis of 
the tenancy contracts was again liberal in the sense that mainly non-compulsory 
restrictions were applying to the tenancy contracts (Ralli, 2005). After the First World 
War, Finland passed through different periods of regulation and deregulation. Rent 
control was introduced for the first time during the First World War but was lifted by 
the first Law on tenancies of 1925.42 Following the same pattern, the second period of 
rent control took place during the Second World War, but in this case, the restrictions 
were maintained after the end of the conflict. In fact, the restrictions applied to several 
cities until the decade of 1960. 
     
                                                 
41 Law 431/1998 of 9 December. 
42 Law 166/1925 of 12 May. 
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Then, a more deep rent regulation, that proceeded to freeze the rents of the 
tenancy contracts, took place in 1968 (thus, as an example of first generation rent 
control). In 1969, as a reaction to the effects of the rent freeze, tenants were also given 
protection against eviction in an unlimited basis. The restrictions were also introduced 
in the Constitution in 1970. 
     
The regulations affecting the tenancy market in Finland were gradually relaxed 
afterwards. The rent freeze was substituted by a complex system of rent regulation in 
the decade of 1970 and was confirmed, with some reforms in the Law 634/1987. 
     
Heavy regulation was accompanied by a relative contraction of the tenancy 
market. From 1970 to 1990 the rented share of the dwelling stock shrank from 32.5% to 
24.7% (see figure 2.1). 
     
In the decade of 1990 the market was gradually liberalized again in three steps: 
from 1991 some buildings constructed after the beginning of the year in specific zones 
of Finland were freed from rent control. The measure was extended to all the new 
contracts in 1992. Finally, the new tenancy Law of 199543 deregulated all tenancy 
contracts (the only exception that still survived to the deregulation were the special rules 
for the state-subsidized rental dwellings of the ARAVA program). On the other hand, 
the new Law did not include any restrictions with respect to the term contracted. Any 
short-term agreement was possible. It can be concluded that Finland is the only example 
of total liberalization of the tenancy market in the European Union. 
     
Lyytikäinen (2006) identifies the abolishing of the rent control with both a rise 
in the rent paid and an increase in the share of rented dwellings. On the one hand, the 
average rent per square meter increased by 57% between 1990 and 2004. On the other, 
the share of the housing market that was rented increased to 31% in 2004. 
     
 
                                                 
43 Law 481/1995 of 31 March. 
 
 
 
 
 
 63 
 
 
2.2.4 United Kingdom 
 
     
The UK (England and Wales in this study) does not have a specific "housing 
Law". Thus, the applicable norms to the tenancy contracts stem from more general 
branches of Law such as property Law and contract Law (Cowan and Laurie, 2005). 
However, as it was said when analyzing the examples of some continental countries, 
some restrictions applicable to the tenancy market were introduced by enacting special 
regulations. 
     
The history of such special regulations (statutes) in the case of England and 
Wales is especially rich. The first example of rent control and protection against 
eviction is found during the First World War with the "Increase in Rent and Mortgage 
Interest Act" of 1915.44 The end of the War was not taken as an opportunity to de-
regulate the market and in fact several other Acts45 preserved or even extended the rent 
controls (Diamond, 1960). As a matter of fact, the restrictions (rent control in this case) 
did not disappear until 1965. It was then when rent control was substituted by rent 
regulation as an evolution from a "first generation" to a "second generation" rent 
control. 
     
Paish (1972) highlights some effects of these long-lasting restrictions in 
England. According to him, they clearly had a negative effect over the maintenance of 
the dwellings. Also, they reduced the mobility of tenants who rented a rent-controlled 
dwelling (as they found unprofitable to move) and also reduced the number of units 
being let, as an important part of the formerly rented dwellings were gradually 
channeled towards the property market. 
     
Some empirical studies in specific cities of the United States have found similar 
effects to those observed in England and Wales. Sims (2007) found that de-regulation in 
                                                 
44 Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act, December 1915. 
45 Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920. The Rent and Mortgage Restrictions 
Act, 1923. Furnished Houses (Rent Control) Act, 1946. Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act 1949. 
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Boston increased the number of houses to let (but also the rent paid). The same author 
found that rent restrictions reduced the quality of the dwellings being rented. That result 
was previously found for other historical experiences of rent control as in New York 
(Olsen, 1972, Early, 1999). 
     
Later on, the Rent Act of 1977 established a "protected tenancy” which included 
a second generation rent control, although the increase in the rent responded to complex 
provisions and also maintained a permanent protection against eviction for the tenant. 
Thus, the tenant could stay in the dwelling as long as he needed. 
     
Thus, the market had to wait until the enacting of the Housing Act of 1988 to see 
any significant liberalization. The Housing Act of 1988 abolished the rent regulation. 
As far as compulsory terms are considered, the Act introduced a new type of regulated 
contract, the "assured shorthold tenancy" with a protection term against eviction for just 
6 months. However, it also included an "assured tenancy" contract, with similar 
conditions to the old "protected tenancy". Finally, a new Housing Act of 1996 
introduced further changes in favor of the generalization of the "assured shorthold 
tenancy". 
     
Consequently, England and Wales have suffered an evolution from a liberal 
concept of tenancy contracting to a strict system of contract restrictions, finally 
returning again to a quite liberal concept of tenancy contract in which the main 
restriction is the "compulsory" term of 6 months, that is quite short compared to 
regulations of other European countries. 
     
The figures of the tenancy market in England and Wales also show quite 
important changes. In 1900, just 10% of households were owner-occupiers while in 
2000 that proportion reached 70% (Cowan and Laurie, 2005). In 2004, the share of 
rented dwellings in the UK was 31% (see figure 2.1). We can observe a slow reduction 
in the proportion of rented dwellings during the last decades although more recently this 
proportion remained stable. 
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2.2.5 Recent reforms 
 
     
These cases suggest the existence of a general pattern in the evolution of tenancy 
market regulation in Europe over the 20th century: initially all countries moved from a 
liberal concept of tenancy relations toward a more protective and regulated approach. 
That change was influenced by the War experience. The introduction of very restrictive 
regulations coincides with significant reductions in the share of rented dwellings. Later 
on, all countries tended to reduce the burden imposed on the landlord and tried to reduce 
tenant's protection although no country (with the exception of Finland) liberalized 
completely the tenancy market. In fact, de-regulation was paralleled by an increase in 
rented dwellings in Finland and stabilization in other cases. Those effects can be taken 
as partial evidence, admittedly very weak, that the restrictive European regulations may 
have produced some negative effects in the European markets. As it was said before, 
there are some other important factors affecting the tenancy market that are not taken 
into account in this partial-equilibrium argument (i.e. improved access to credit, 
changing mobility patterns, etc). 
     
All European countries nowadays have some kind of "second generation" 
controls (with the exception of Finland). Table 2.1 shows two key features of the 
current European regulations in 12 EU member states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
England/Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden): 
the minimum length of the tenancy contract (if such term exists, see column TERM) 
and the rules governing the increase of the rent paid by the tenant (see column RENT). 
     
Across Europe, direct regulation of the rent that a landlord can charge at the 
moment of signing a contract has completely disappeared. On the other hand the 
negotiation of the increase in the rent paid by the sitting tenant after the first year of 
contract is not free but regulated in several countries following a "second generation" 
type of control. For instance in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain or Portugal 
the increase of the rent is tied to an index set by the Law (see table 2.1). In Austria, 
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Portugal and Spain that limit is the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Similarly, in Belgium 
the maximum increase is the "cost of living". In France the maximum increase is given 
by the "construction cost index" (set by the Government). Other countries had similar 
restrictions until recent years (Finland). 
     
In relation to the second issue, the Law usually protects the tenant against 
eviction for a certain period (see column "TERM") by setting a "compulsory term" (for 
instance five years in Spain). Therefore the tenant may decide not to move for five years 
or to move after the first one, but the landlord cannot reduce the length of the contract. 
Even when the owner needs the residence for his own use the rules are very restrictive. 
It is after those five years when a real re-negotiation between the landlord and the tenant 
could be initiated. In other countries other terms are applied (four years in Italy or three 
years in France). Other jurisdictions, like the ones in several cities of the United States 
or Asia, do not introduce this second restriction or establish a simpler "infinite" or 
unconditional protection. 
     
 
2.3 A model for European tenancy markets 
 
     
The objective of this section is to explore theoretically the effects of the 
European-type of tenancy market regulations on the quantity of houses being let in the 
market. For this purpose, the model proposed by Basu and Emerson (2000) is modified 
and adapted to the general European framework. Understanding the impact of restrictive 
institutions can help to identify one of the possible determinants of the significant 
reduction of the share of the tenancy market in Europe. 
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2.3.1 The Basu and Emerson model for tenancy markets and the European 
institutions 
 
     
In their original model, Basu and Emerson (2000) study a very restrictive "first 
generation" type of rent control. In their setup, once the contract is signed, the landlord 
cannot update the rent until the end of the contract and, as the Law protects the tenant 
against eviction forever, the tenant decides how long he wants to stay in the residence. 
Under these conditions, the tenant can take a residence for a rent (freely negotiated at 
that moment) and keep it until he decides to move out. In this context, due to the 
eroding effect of inflation, it is of extreme relevance for the landlord to know the kind 
of tenants he takes (type understood as "long-stayer" or "short-stayer" as, with inflation, 
the rent in real terms is being reduced, period after period). In this institutional setting, 
inflation acts as a tax on landlord's income with redistributive consequences, adverse to 
owners and favourable to tenants. These stylized institutions differ quite considerably to 
what the Law regulates nowadays in Europe (see table 2.1). 
     
Even though no database is available about the average length of the contracts 
for the different countries and years, in Europe nowadays policymakers are aware of the 
existence of inflation as an "ever" increasing "cost of living" in the economy as it was 
stressed in section 2.2. Therefore European legislations allow the landlord to increase 
the contracted rent, period after period, by a rate linked to some indicator of past 
inflation (CPI or a similar index). As it was also analyzed before, that would be a 
"second generation" rent control. Note that those measures are related to the increase of 
prices in the whole economy (and not specifically to the increase of price or rent in the 
tenancy market). 
     
Another main feature of the typical European regulation is that, although the 
Law protects the tenant against eviction, the protection does not last forever (and 
usually just for 3 to 5 years). This is in contrast with the Basu and Emerson (2000) 
model in which the protection lasts forever. 
 68 
     
 
2.3.2 Basics of the model 
 
     
Basu and Emerson (2000) propose a partial equilibrium model for the tenancy 
market in which the market is affected by a problem of information asymmetry and 
adverse selection. There are two types of agents in the model: landlords (several or 
limited in number, therefore allowing for the analysis of market power) and tenants. 
     
The main aspect of the tenants' side of the market is that they are distributed in 
groups or types that differ in how long they stay in the residence. To be consistent with 
the usual contracts signed in the rental markets in Europe (where the contracts are 
usually signed on a yearly basis) and to apply later the model to Europe it can be 
assumed that a type 1 tenant stays 1 year in the residence. A type 2 stays 2 years and so 
on. A fraction i of the tenants is of type i (all types together sum up to a probability, p, 
of 1). If t represents time, the following can be written: 
 
ntttt <<<< ...321  (2.1) 
 
Therefore, the length of the contract will be defined by the tenant's type as it is 
the tenant who decides when to move (as he is protected against eviction forever in the 
Basu and Emerson (2000) setup). 
     
The tenant knows his type, but the landlord does not have that information 
before the tenant decides to leave the residence. Therefore, the landlord will not be able 
to choose the tenants' type. 
     
An essential issue of the model is that it assumes that there is inflation (1 - β) in 
the economy and that fact is not corrected by any mechanism. The rent asked by the 
landlord will diminish over time in real terms period after period. Therefore the landlord 
receives the real value β after one period (or the fraction β of the rent if the rent is 
different from 1). Also, it is necessary to take into account that a landlord does not value 
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the same a rent he receives today compared to the rent that he will receive tomorrow. 
Therefore a discount factor (δ) has to be introduced in the model. 
     
vi is the value of the rents that a landlord receives from his tenants if only type i 
tenants show up. Each tenant of type i will generate the following income (if the rent R 
= 1): 
     
 
12 (...)1 −++++ tβββ  
 
     
Summing up for an infinite succession of type i tenants and taking into account 
the discount factor, we have: 
     
 
{ [ ] [ ] }itti vv ii δβδβδβδ +++++= −12 (...)1  (2.2) 
 
     
Then, the following holds: 
 
If i < j then vi > vj    (2.3) 
     
On the other hand, v(i) is the value of the rents that a landlord receives when only 
types i or above show up. 
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Where pk is the probability of getting a type k tenant into the apartment. Then, 
the following holds, 
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If  i < j  then v(i)>v(j)   (2.5) 
     
 
As it can be noted, from the point of view of a landlord, the higher the value of v 
the better. Therefore he would prefer to have short stayers rather than long stayers. That 
is because the effect of inflation, that erodes the value of rent in real terms. 
     
In their model, Basu and Emerson (2000) introduced adverse selection through 
limiting the types of tenants that will be finally renting a residence. If the rent is very 
high some types of tenants will not find it affordable to rent and therefore will opt for 
other options, like remaining in the family home. This outside option is assumed to be 
the same for the different types of tenants and it is assumed to have a similar value in 
any case. Therefore, the different outputs of the model are generated by heterogeneity 
on the tenants side (as it was said, some of them are short stayers while others want to 
rent the flat for very long periods). 
     
The adverse selection mechanism works in that case because the model proposes 
that the short stayers are the first ones to decide not to rent when the rent is high. 
Supposing that renting a residence gives the tenant a utility of T and remaining in the 
parents home (or equivalent options) a utility NT, the difference (D) between both 
utilities must be positive for an individual to prefer renting. 
     
 
T – NT = D > 0     (2.6) 
 
 
For a tenant it is not important the rent R but that rent expressed in present value 
terms (vi), thus already "eroded" by the inflation. Therefore a tenant will rent if: 
     
 
T – NT = D ≥ Rvi  (2.7) 
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Note that vi depends on i, so if j > i then vi > vj. 
     
On the other hand, Basu and Emerson (2000) call V(R) the landlord's expected 
present value of the rents he receives when the rent (in nominal terms) is R. See figure 
2.2. 
 
 
V(R) reaches its maximum when R = D/vn  (2.8) 
 
 
Being D/vn a critical level of the rent at which the higher type of tenant (so far 
the type n or the type 4 in figure 2.2) decides not to rent. C represents the cost for the 
landlord of leasing out a residence, for instance, preparing the apartment to be rented 
paying some administrative fees. Please note that the costs may be proportionally higher 
the shorter the periods the tenants stay in the flat (for instance, it may be necessary to 
paint walls or refurnish floors more frequently), although that circumstance is not 
included in this setup. 
     
We have the following critical values of V(R) as a result, 
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Figure 2.2 can be explained as follows: the curves v(i) define the height of the 
V(R) curve at the breaking points. 
     
The results obtained in this basic setup are the following: if we have a 
monopolistic landlord, he will charge a rent R=D/vn. So only the higher type (n) will 
stay in the market (all the rest of the types will find it un-affordable to rent and will opt 
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for other options). The higher type that stays in the market is the tenant that wants to 
rent the residence for four years in figure 2.2 (or the one renting the residence for three 
years in figure 2.4). On the other hand, when there are competitive landlords, the height 
of the peaks (defined by the breaking points in the V(R) line as highlighted before) play 
an important role. The rent R* will be defined by C=V(R) that is, the intersection 
between the line C and the V(R) curve. The rent paid in the market will approach the 
cost of preparing the residence to be rented. 
     
The rent R obtained in that case will define which types (if any) of tenants will 
decide not to rent. The lower the C the lower the equilibrium rent and therefore the less 
types of tenants that will be "excluded" from the market. 
     
 
2.3.3 The basic model with inflation (CPI) adjusted rents 
 
 
Basu and Emerson (2000) based their model on the existence of inflation in the 
economy and the absence of mechanisms to correct for it. As it was already said, the 
inflation will erode the real value of the rent and therefore the landlord will be interested 
in having short-staying tenants instead of long-stayers. What are the effects for the 
model if the landlord is allowed to increase the rent exactly to overcome the erosion 
produced by the inflation (as general inflation or Consumer Price Index, CPI)? The 
question is relevant for the European case as in Europe the Law (see Table 2.1) allows 
for inflation escalation in the contracts. 
     
With inflation escalation (following β in the model), and in the case the landlord 
always hosts tenants that want to stay just "i" periods (with R=1 euro), the following 
holds, including a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1): 
 
     
{ }itti vv ii δδδδ +++++= −12 (...)1    (2.9) 
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Which is equivalent to: 
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Equation 2.10 does not depend on any sub-index. Therefore the type of tenant is 
irrelevant for the landlord in this case as expected. 
      
In line with this, it is possible to analyze how other expressions simplify when 
inflation escalation is allowed. As before, v(i) represents the stream of income a landlord 
receives when type i tenants or above make themselves available for the landlord. 
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That, properly simplified, is again: 
     
 
)1(
1
)( δ−=iv     (2.12) 
     
 
Once more the type of the tenant is irrelevant for the landlord when rent 
escalation following the inflation is allowed (equation 2.12 does not depend in any sub-
index). 
     
With those results it is not possible to differentiate between those that find it 
worthwhile to rent and those who prefer to stay out of the tenancy market. 
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As Rvi ≤ T - NT and vi does not depend any more on the type, then we have, 
 
 
NTT
R
−≤
− )1( δ   (2.13) 
 
     
Therefore the type of the tenant is not important in the decision of renting. In 
any case condition 2.13 is required to hold to have a tenancy market (otherwise no one 
would be willing to rent). 
     
As a criticism to the considerations made above it should be said that concluding 
that the introduction of rent escalation (following β in the model) removes the 
mechanism of adverse selection is not true in all the cases. Only if the CPI (taken as β) 
coincides with the observed increase in the rents contracted in the market (the sub-index 
of rented property of the CPI), the correction by β would eliminate the adverse selection 
mechanism in the market. The next section is devoted to discuss that topic. 
     
 
2.3.4 European rent escalation and adverse selection 
 
     
Overcoming the adverse selection problem is only possible if the allowed rent 
escalation follows the increase in the rents observed in the tenancy market (the sub-
index of rented property in the CPI or a similar index representing just the tenancy 
market) and not a general price index (as it is often the case in Europe). Of course, an 
escalation following a general price index solves the problem if the increase in the rents 
in the tenancy market specifically coincides with it. Objectively, that situation is 
difficult to occur and it is not the general case for the European economies. Figure 2.3 
graphs the difference between the HICP inflation (harmonized inflation) in housing 
(rents plus gas, water and electricity as provided by the indicators of Eurostat) and the 
general or overall inflation. As it can be seen, that difference is usually well above 0 
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(the thick black line). The graph indicates that housing is more inflationary than the 
overall HICP that is usually taken into account in the European regulations. 
     
The incentive for a landlord to prefer short stayers versus long stayers is related 
to the fact that the rent he gets is eroded, period after period (once signed a contract), 
compared to that asked in the new contracts in the market. If the landlord gets short 
stayers he will be able to reset the rent he asks as soon as he has a new tenant and 
therefore he would be able to charge the rent at the market level, fully updated to the 
inflation and rent market increase of the last periods. If the Law allows to fully update 
the rent, period after period, following the observed market increase in the tenancy 
market specifically, the incentive for the landlord to have short stayers disappears. He 
would get the same revenue (if there is not extra costs) updating the rent of the sitting 
tenant or changing the tenant for a new one in the market. 
     
Therefore, does the updating of the rent following just the "inflation" 
(understood as the general "consumer price index" or "cost of living") remove the 
incentive of the landlord to have short stayers? The answer is no, if the increase in the 
rent index (i.e. the specific "inflation" of the tenancy market) is higher and that is the 
general case in Europe (Figure 2.3). 
     
These statements can be tested in the model. For convenience, the rate at which 
the rents grow in the market can be stated as 1 - γ. On the other hand, forcing somehow 
the notation, lets call θ the rate at which the regulation allows the landlord to update the 
rent period after period (note that it is possible to rewrite it as θ=1 - β). θ may be 
understood as the CPI index (or as a "cost of life" index) in the European regulations. 
     
It can be demonstrated that in a market where the Law allows to escalate the rent 
following θ and θ < 1 - γ, then there is a problem of adverse selection in the tenancy 
market. 
     
The stream of income that the landlord receives (when having just tenants who 
stay i periods) would be (if R = 1 euro): 
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Taking into account a discount factor δ as before, we can now construct the 
expressions we need to set up the model. 
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That is, 
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Then, the following holds (a proof is provided in section 2.A.1) 
     
 
If  i < j  then vi > vj    (2.17) 
 
     
As before, v(i) represents the stream of income a landlord receives when type i 
tenants or above make themselves available for the landlord. 
    
 
)])]([)]([(...))]([)]([1[ )(
12
)( i
tt
n
ik
n
ij
j
k
i v
p
p
v kk θγδθγδθγδθγδ +++++++++












=
−
=
=
∑
∑
   
(2.18) 
 77 
     
That can be rewritten as follows, 
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Then the following also holds (a proof is provided in section 2.A.2): 
     
 
If  i < j  then v(i) > v(j)    (2.20) 
 
     
As it is possible to conclude from the equations set out so far, the landlord 
prefers short stayers than long stayers as the income he receives will be higher with 
short stayers. Also the agents are not indifferent with respect to time. A long stayer pays 
less per period (in real terms) than a short stayer. The decision of renting is affected by 
that fact. 
     
As before: 
     
 
T - NT = D > Rvi          (2.21) 
 
     
As it was said, if i < j then vi > vj. Thus, short stayers will be the first types of 
tenants to decide not to rent because they "suffer" a higher value v. Therefore there is a 
clash between the interests of the landlord and the behavior of the potential tenants 
when they make their decisions. The landlord's expected present value of the rent will 
reach its maximum when R = D/vn. That is, D = Rvn. 
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Caveats. If the rent escalation allowed is below the rate of rent increase in the 
tenancy market (what was called "rent index"), the adverse selection problem continues 
to affect the market outcomes. 
     
Therefore, even though the Law in Europe allows for rent escalation following 
the general inflation or a similar index, it does not avoid the adverse selection problem 
to affect the market outcomes when the rent signed in the new contracts grows faster 
than the rate of inflation. The inefficiency in the market will be higher if the difference 
between the CPI (or other general index of inflation considered in the Law) and the 
specific rent index grows. 
     
 
2.3.4.1 Between extreme cases 
 
 
Let’s derive a general result explaining how the inefficiency in the tenancy 
market increases when the difference between the rent price index and the allowed 
escalation (CPI) increases. The following is proposed: 
     
 
If  θ < θ’  then  vi(γ+θ) < vi(γ+θ’)  and  v(i)(γ+θ) < v(i)(γ+θ’)   (2.22) 
 
     
Having a given rate of rent increase in the market (1 - γ), an increase in the 
allowed rate of escalation (θ to θ’), will yield that vi(γ+θ)<vi(γ+θ’) and v(i)(γ+θ) < v(i)(γ+θ’)    
ceteris paribus. The expression vi(γ+θ) denotes that vi now depends on the measure γ+θ. 
It is worth noting that an increase in θ (having γ constant) is a bad new, a priori, for a 
tenant, as the real rent he will pay increases. 
     
From the fundamental equations already proposed it is possible to derive the 
following (when R = 1). 
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By inspection of equation 2.23 it is easy to see that the higher the θ, the higher is 
the value of vi (if γ is constant). 
     
Also, 
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Then the higher the θ, the higher the value of v(i). 
     
Graphically, when observing the shape of the V(R) curve it is important to stress 
that the curves representing v(i) and vi are steeper the higher is γ+θ (i.e. the lower is the 
escalation allowed by the Law the flater are those lines). Therefore it is of interest to 
observe the "peaks" generated by those curves because those peaks will determine the 
rent paid in the market when several landlords compete. The height of a peak is defined 
by (D)v(i)/vi. Therefore it is necessary to analyze the value of v(i)/vi when the allowed 
escalation changes. 
 
Having that k > i (the tenant of type k stays longer that a tenant of type i) the 
following must hold when θ < θ’, 
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Lets define τ as the extra time a type k stays in the residence with respect to a 
type i. Then, from the general derivation calculated in 2.16, the following holds, 
     
 
i
i
i
i
t
t
t
t
i
k
v
v
)]([1
)]([1
1
1
)(
)(
θγδ
θγδ
δ
δ τ
τ
θγ
θγ
+−
+−
⋅
−
−
=
+
+
+
+     (2.26) 
 
 
And having that, 
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It is obtained that an increase in θ (i.e. a reduction of the gap between the market 
rent increase and the "CPI") yields an increase in
)(
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From 2.25, the following must hold (for θ < θ’). 
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Inequality 2.28 is indicating that the higher the rent escalation θ allowed by the 
Law, the higher the "peak" (at the break points). 
 
Caveats. If there are several landlords competing to get the tenants and a cost C 
of preparing a residence to be rented, the equilibrium rent is defined graphically by the 
point of hit between C and the V(R) curve. If we observe that the escalation allowed is 
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lower (and therefore the lines and the peaks get flatter and shorter respectively), the 
equilibrium rent must increase as the V(R) line moves to the right and the peaks are now 
shorter. 
     
A higher rent excludes more types of potential tenants from the market. As θ 
grows, the peaks of the V(R) line get higher and the break points move to the left having 
as result a smaller R (so less types are excluded, that is a relief for the adverse selection 
problem). 
     
On the other hand, in a monopolistic case, the rent will be set up at D/vn. Hence 
the equilibrium rent will change slightly depending on the value of vn (as vn(γ+θ) < 
vn(γ+θ’)). So when the escalation allowed is higher, the equilibrium rent for the case of 
monopoly is lower.   
     
The statements made above indicate that allowing for a higher rate of escalation 
mitigates the inefficiency of the market. 
     
 
2.3.4.2 If there is a reduction in the market rents 
 
     
If γ is exactly equal to the amount that the government allows for escalation (the 
"cost of living" or the CPI) no adverse selection will take place. 
     
What would happen to the old tenancy relations in a market where the rents 
agreed in the new contracts are diminishing through time? In that case the rents of the 
market (the rents agreed in the new contracts signed one period after another) would be 
falling. i.e. the new tenants (the tenants that just arrived to the market) would be paying 
less than the old tenants renting similar flats. How can a landlord keep the tenant? The 
only way is to reduce the rent he asks at a rate (falling) near to the one of the market. 
     
In this case, there is not a problem of adverse selection and therefore the Law as 
usually passed in Europe does not produce the inefficiencies studied when there is a 
persistent reduction of market rents. 
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2.3.5 Analysis of contracts with limited term of protection for the tenant 
 
     
As it was already discussed, the Law in Europe does not generally protect the 
sitting tenant forever. In fact, the Law usually protects the tenants against eviction for a 
short number of periods (usually 3 to 5 years). After that term, the tenant and the 
landlord will have to renegotiate the contract. Thus, the continuation of the relation is 
not guaranteed. Therefore the contract is virtually new after the relation reaches the term 
of protection. 
     
The aim of this section is to introduce this limited protection for the tenant into 
the model. A relevant issue for the landlord in the model is that he cannot distinguish 
between tenants' types. With a Law that protects the tenants for m periods, the landlord 
knows that the "higher" type of tenant that exists in the economy is a type tm. That is to 
say that a landlord is not willing to keep a tenant more than m periods as for any n > m, 
vm > vn and v(m) > v(n). Therefore, in this context of asymmetric information, if the Law 
protects the tenant for m periods, the higher types disappear (after m periods the 
landlord will evict the tenant if he does not pay the actual market rent). 
     
If before introducing the restriction the higher type of tenant in the economy was 
a type k and afterwards a new Law including a protection term of m periods is passed 
and if k < m, that "limited term of protection" is neutral and does not produce any effect 
in the economy. Thus, in the next paragraphs we assume that the higher type of tenant 
(k) existing in the market is willing to stay longer in the residence than the protection 
term (m periods established by the Law). Therefore, we study the case in which the Law 
is a constraint. 
     
Introducing the term in the model. The analysis should cover how the 
expressions for vi and v(i) change if the limited protection term is present and thus if 
there is a new equilibrium in the market. 
     
 83 
vi does not change if we change the different types of tenants that exist in the 
economy. Although note that a value v exists only for the types i ≤ m. On the other 
hand, v(i) changes. Now, the tenants that may "show up" correspond to a less number of 
types. Lets call v(i,m) to the value for the expression v(i) when just types i to m can show 
up. Then the following condition holds: 
     
 
v(i,m+1) < v(i,m)              (2.29) 
     
 
To prove 2.29, we know that, 
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Then, equation 2.30 can be expressed as follows, 
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That is below zero: 
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When the Law protects the tenant against eviction for a longer time, the value of 
v(i) diminishes (i.e v(i,m+1) < v(i,m)). If a Law reduces the number of periods of protection 
against eviction from m+1 to m we should expect an increase of the value of v(i). In 
figure 2.4 a situation where the Law reduces the maximum term of protection from m=4 
to m=3 is represented. 
     
Case of having a monopolistic landlord. Reducing the number of periods of 
protection yields a reduction in the rent charged by the monopolist, therefore less 
(lower) types of tenants are excluded from the market. 
     
As it was discussed already, the monopoly charges a rent equal to R=D/vt. 
Where t represents the higher type existing in the economy. If the number of periods of 
protection against eviction are reduced, t will be lower. With a lower t the value vt is 
higher. With a higher vt the rent R charged by the monopolist will be lower if the 
outside option does not change. 
     
Case of having competitive landlords. When the number of periods of 
protection is reduced, the equilibrium rent also decreases. That could exclude, therefore, 
less (lower) types of tenants from the market. That is, the landlords will charge a rent 
determined by the cost C of letting the dwelling to be rented into the market. 
Graphically, as the curves defined by vi continue to be in the same place, but the curves 
defined by v(i) are now steeper, there is now a new V(R) line. This V(R) line maintains 
the places were the "breaks" (peaks) (D/v1, D/v2...) can be found, but the height of the 
peaks are now higher. The coincidence between the V(R) line and the C line will yield 
an equilibrium rent that is lower than before. 
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2.3.6 Summarizing the results of the model 
 
 
The aim of the model was to analyze the effects in the market of the introduction 
of two highly spread (and typically European) institutions: a maximum allowed increase 
in the rent asked by the landlord (rent control) and the protection against eviction for the 
tenant for a limited number of periods (protection against eviction). 
     
If the rent escalation allowed is below the rate of rent increase in the tenancy 
market, an adverse selection problem affects the market outcomes. The adverse 
selection problem gets worse as the difference between the allowed escalation and the 
market rent increase grows. That will increase the equilibrium rent and, through the 
mechanism of the model, it will exclude some tenants from the market. On the other 
hand, it was concluded that the longer the time that the Law protects the tenant against 
eviction, the higher is the rent paid in equilibrium (therefore more tenant types are 
excluded from the market). Note that the effects of both restrictions go in the same 
direction. 
     
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
 
This study provides an economic analysis of the regulations affecting the 
European tenancy contracts. Although rent control has drawn the attention of the main 
part of the literature on tenancy markets, the analysis of the regulations in place in 
Europe points to the existence of another main intervention in the market called 
"protection against eviction" or "compulsory term" that has been usually neglected. 
Moreover, from the same analysis of European institutions it is relevant to note that all 
countries had similar regulations during the 20th century and that most of them shared 
the same evolution from a liberal approach towards the tenancy relations to a more 
regulated and restrictive type of regulations. Both types of European regulations (rent 
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control and protection terms against eviction) are tested theoretically in an information 
asymmetry model of tenancy markets proposed by Basu and Emerson (2000). The 
model, which was originally designed for analyzing contracts with no inflation clause 
and potentially infinite length, is adapted to include rent escalation and limited 
protection against eviction. The results of the model show that those interventions (rent 
control and compulsory terms) entail some negative effects as they may drive some 
participants out of the tenancy market. 
     
Therefore the model provides a partial-equilibrium explanation, based on the 
European tenancy Laws, for the diminishing weight of the tenancy markets in Europe 
during the 20th century. Moreover, the introduction of several legal restrictions in the 
tenancy market in several European markets was coincident with the reduction in the 
proportion of rented dwellings in the housing market. 
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2.A Appendix: proofs 
     
 
2.A.1 Proof for expression 2.17 
     
 
It has been followed the demonstration of Lemma 1 of Basu and Emerson (2000) 
to provide a proof for 2.17. 
     
It was the aim to demonstrate that: 
 
 
If i < j then vi > vj 
 
 
Lets assume that tj = ti+1 and that vj
k is the present value of rents earned by a 
landlord whose first k tenants are of type i and all others of type j. 
     
It is possible to see that vj
1 > vj. For a rent R=1, vj
1 is the following: 
     
 
j
tt
j vv
ii δθγδθγδθγδ ++++++++= −121 )]([(...))]([)(1        (2.33) 
 
 
And because tj = ti+1 
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So, it can concluded that, 
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That implies that vj
1 > vj. And as Basu and Emerson (2000) comment, if            
vj
k > vj
k-1, as lim k→∞ vj
k = vi, it must be true that vi > vj ■ 
     
     
2.A.2 Proof for expression 2.20 
     
 
It was the aim to demonstrate that: 
 
 
If  i < j  then v(i) > v(j) 
 
     
As already discussed, vk has the following value: 
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That is, 
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Then, note that v(i) can be expressed as follows: 
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With 2.38 and 2.39 the following expression is obtained: 
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That after doing some algebra is exactly the expression used for 2.24,   
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v(i) is a weighted average of vi, vi+1, ..., vn. If j > i then v(i) is obtained from v(j) 
distributing the weight that j had among the rest of the values of v (i.e. for i, i+1, ..., j-
1). 
     
As conclusion it is found that if k < j and vk > vj (done in the last section), then it 
must follow that v(i )> v(j) (when j < i) ■ 
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Figure 2.1: Share of rented dwellings in 12 EU countries 
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Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse (2007). 
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium with four types of tenants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self elaboration. 
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Figure 2.3: Housing component of the harmonised inflation indices (HICP) minus 
general HICP in 12 EU countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat (2008). 
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Figure 2.4: Effects of a reduction in the protection term 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self elaboration. 
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Table 2.1: Recent legal regimes of the tenancy contracts in Europe 
 
 
COUNTRY LAW in force in the 
period of study 
 
TERM RENT Other 
clarifications 
Austria ABGB (Civil Code) 
(1811) and MRG 
(1981) as special 
Statute 
Minimum term of 3 
years  
The rent and the rent increase is 
thoroughly regulated. The Law sets the 
maximum rent at the time of 
conclusion of the contract. The 
increase in the rent is possible but it 
has an upper bound (the consumer 
price index) 
 
Belgium Statute of 1991 
(comprehensive 
amendment in 1997) 
Minimum term of 3 
years  
An index-clause can be introduced to 
increase the rent (although increasing it 
further than the "cost of living" can be 
declared void in courts). A market rent 
review can take place each three years 
(without the risk of being declared 
void in court) 
 
Denmark Rent Act 
(consolidated as Act 
347 of 14/05/2001). 
Rent Control Act 
(consolidated as Act 
348 of 14/05/2001) 
No minimum term is 
established by the Law 
although notice from the 
landlord to terminate the 
contract is subject to 
severe conditions. The 
landlord may give notice 
if he intends to use the 
apartment for himself. 
Increase is allowed if justified (the 
value of the property must be 
significantly higher than the rent paid 
in proportion to that). An increase via 
an "index-clause" is generally not 
allowed. In small multi-storey 
properties the rent is determined by the 
usual rent paid for properties of equal 
location, size, type, facilities and 
condition 
 
England and 
Wales 
Rent Act 1977. 
Housing Acts 1980, 
1988, 1996 and 
Common Law. 
Several regimes are in 
force. From 1997 the 
“assured shorthold 
tenancy” is the default 
form of tenancy (the 
parties can contract for 
the term they wish but 
the tenant has the right 
to stay in the property 
for the initial 6 months 
in any case). 
There is not a public general control 
over the increase in the rents although 
a specific rent increase may be 
submitted to control (courts, 
assessment committee). “Rent 
regulation” properly disappeared after 
the Housing Act of 1988. 
Tenancies created 
before 15 January 
1989 are governed 
by Rent Act 1977. 
After that date (and 
before 28 February 
1997) tenancies 
can be “assured 
tenancy” or 
“assured shorthold 
tenancy”. 
Finland Statute 482/1995. 
Statute 653/1987 
(derogated). 
No restriction. Under 
previous Statutes, the 
grounds for eviction 
were strict. Although 
landlord’s need to use 
the apartment for 
himself was a valid 
ground to evict the 
tenant. 
No restriction. Usually the rent 
increase is linked to the consumer 
price index.  
More general rent 
regulation existed 
before Statute 
482/1995 such as a 
linkage to a public 
index. 
France Mermaz act, Law 
89-462 (1989) 
Minimum term of 3 
years (if the landlord is 
an individual) 
If the tenancy contract provides the 
possibility of increasing the rent, the 
increase cannot exceed the 
construction cost index (provided 
publicly). In case of extension, the new 
rent must refer to the average rent of 
the neighborhood. 
 
Previous Acts 
introduced similar 
restrictions: Law 
82-526 (Quillot 
Act), Law 86-1290 
(Quilès-
Méhaignerie) 
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Germany Civil Code (BGB).  
Amendments of 
2001 and 2002 
The landlord has to give 
a reason listed in the 
BGB to terminate the 
contract 
If the rent exceeds in 20% the rent 
charged in comparable premises the 
landlord can be fined. An increase in 
the rent can only take place after one 
year of tenancy. The increase can be 
agreed freely or linked to a cost-of-
living index. If the increase is not 
agreed in the contract the landlord can 
still ask for it but it cannot exceed the 
customary in the area of the premise 
(and in any case cannot exceed 20% 
increase in 3 years) 
 
Ireland "Common Law" 
system plus some 
Statutes (Residential 
Tenancies Bill 2003) 
Tenant can ask for an 
extension (up to 4 years) 
after 6 months of 
tenancy 
No restrictions under the regime 
applicable before 2003 
 
Italy Law 392/1978. 
Reform introduced 
by Law 431/1998 
Minimum term of 4 
years 
Before 1998 the rent and rent increase 
was regulated. From 1998 there is no 
regulation on this respect (rent 
increases can be freely updated by 
agreement of landlord and tenant) 
 
Portugal Civil Code (1966). 
Decree-Law 321-
B/1990. 
Minimum term of 5 
years 
The parties can choose between a “free 
rent regime” or a “conditioned rent 
regime”. Free regime: the rent and its 
increase are freely agreed. Although in 
the residence tenancy (in contracts up 
to 8 years) the increase is regulated 
(increase related to the consumer price 
index). Conditioned regime: the rent is 
set by the Law (that takes into account 
the average rents of similar premises). 
The conditioned regime can be 
mandatory under certain circumstances 
A new Law 
(6/2006) has been 
passed.  
Spain Royal Decree-Law 
2/1985. Law 29/1994 
(Urban Tenancy 
Act). 
Minimum term of 5 
years (Law 29/1994). 
The rent increase is linked to the 
consumer price index 
Under Royal 
Decree-Law 
2/1985 (between 
1985 and 1995) 
there was no 
compulsory 
extension of the 
contracts  
Sweden Special Tenancy act 
(1968), introduced in 
the Land Code 
(1970) 
No minimum term 
established by the Law. 
However, the Law 
establishes a strict 
regime for the landlord. 
For instance, it is not a 
sufficient ground to 
terminate the contract 
that the landlord need 
the apartment for his 
own use 
Prices are normally determined by 
collective bargaining by associations. 
The courts do some rent control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Legislations, government Law databases and EUI Tenancy Law Project. 
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Chapter 3 
A characterization of the judicial system in Spain: analysis 
with formalism indices
46
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In this chapter, a previously proposed measure of “procedural formalism” of the 
judicial system has been adapted in order to characterize the judicial enforcement of 
contracts in Spain in the long run (1966-2008). Spain has a multiplicity of procedures 
for the same type of civil dispute depending on the amount of the conflict. In this paper 
all those procedures are analyzed. The result of this research indicates that formalism 
of the Spanish judicial system has diminished in the most recent years for a multiplicity 
of civil procedures but not for the case of the procedures assigned to solve tenancy 
conflicts. The results help to explain the most recent developments of the resolution, 
congestion and pending cases rates of the Spanish Judicial System. The results also 
contests the level of formalism assigned to Spain by previous works in this field. 
 
 
JEL Classification: K40, K41, O10 
 
Keywords: judicial efficiency, procedural formalism, contract enforcement, 
development 
                                                 
46 This paper was presented in the IV annual Conference of the SIDE-ISLE (Università di Bologna) 
(2008), in the Law Department seminar of Universitat Pompeu Fabra (2008) and in the research seminar 
of the Master of Law and Economics of Universidad de Salamanca (2009). A previous version of this 
study was published as a working paper of FEDEA (Working Paper 2009-23). 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
 
3.1.1 Literature review 
 
 
As Coase (1960) highlighted, carrying on market transactions needs not only 
contracting, but also undertaking the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of 
the contract are being observed. The same can be said about the Law and its 
enforcement. It is not only important to have “good” regulations, but also to be able to 
enforce them.  
“Contracting” and “enforcing” are important economic problems. As it was 
discussed in chapter 1, if they are overly costly many transactions may not take place. 
Enforcement of private contracts has many examples, one of them of an essential 
economic meaning: the respect and maintenance of private property against external 
threats. 
Since the early statements about the importance of good “institutions” for 
economic performance (North, 1990), it has been found several times that the protection 
afforded to property rights or, more in general, the possibility of enforcing the Law, is 
directly related to economic development.  Acemoglu et al. (2001) found that better 
“protection against expropriation” had positive effects on the country’s income. Rodrik 
et al. (2004) measured the quality of institutions as the prevalence of the “rule of Law” 
(that is a wider concept that also captures the protection afforded to property rights) and 
also found that was significant in explaining development.  
The enforcement of contracts and regulations can take place through purely 
private mechanisms (such as arbitration) or through public means. Judicial enforcement 
would be the paradigmatic case of the use of public means and it is the focus of this 
chapter. Therefore, following what it was said above, a deficient judicial system may 
imply costs to the economy and constitute a deterrence of economic transactions. At 
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international level, several studies analyze more particularly the effect of well-
functioning judicial systems on the economy.  First of all, “good” judicial systems 
(together with good legal environments) seem to promote greater development of 
financial markets. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), argue that different systems of legal 
enforcement (such as the different Law families, i.e. Roman/Civil Law, Common Law, 
etc.) are related to different levels of investor protection (Common law countries having 
a stronger protection if compared to Civil law countries). Weaker investor protection 
leads to smaller debt and equity markets.   
In fact, a good judicial system is considered essential to ensure the availability of 
cheap funds that promote economic development (Padilla and Requejo, 2000). Jappelli 
et al. (2005) analyzed a panel of the Italian provinces and found that credit is more 
widely available when there is a higher judicial efficiency. Similarly, a lower proportion 
of credit-constrained households (for a panel of Italian judicial districts) was also 
observed (Fabbri et al, 2004).   
Besides the financial system itself, some effects of well-functioning judicial 
systems are observed in the area of firm dynamics. Desai et al. (2005) found that greater 
judicial interference and greater formalism of the judicial procedures are associated with 
lower entry of new firms in the markets. Desai et al. utilized as a measure of formalism 
the indicator proposed by Djankov et al. (2003) that will be analyzed in the next 
sections.  
 
 
3.1.2 Evidence for Spain 
 
 
Between 1999 and 2000 the World Bank conducted an international survey 
“World Business Environment Survey” administered to enterprises that included some 
questions to assess the judicial system of the country and its effectiveness in enforcing 
property rights.  The results for some of the questions for Spain, and also for France, 
Italy, Germany, UK and the United States, are included in table 3.1. Spain is below the 
average of the OECD countries in the questions about the judicial system if we compare 
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countries with similar income. Batra et al. (2003), using this survey, observed that 
countries with higher discontent with affordability and quickness of the judicial system 
seemed to perceive also less fairness and impartiality. 
From 2004, the Doing Business Project of the World Bank publishes a more 
ambitious survey called “Enforcing Contracts”. It includes three indicators on the 
efficiency of contract enforcement on the basis of how a company has to go through the 
judicial system to recover an overdue payment. Specifically it follows the step-by-step 
evolution of a commercial sale dispute between two businesses that have their conflict 
solved by a local court in the biggest city of the country (in the case of Spain, a court of 
first instance, juzgado de primera instancia, of Madrid). The amount of the claim is 
assumed to be fixed and equal to 200% of the country's income per capita. The 
indicators observed are the number of required interactions between the parties and the 
court in order to finalize the procedures, the estimated cost incurred during the dispute 
and the estimated time to resolve the dispute. Results for Spain (and again for France, 
Italy, Germany, UK and US) are also included in table 3.1. Spain holds the position 52 
out of 183 analyzed countries in the 2009 and 2010 reports.47 The Doing Business 
project provides the results and rankings in this issue just for the most recent years, 
therefore we lack the information on this indicator during the last decades.  
Justice has also attracted the attention of private and public authorities in Spain. 
The Círculo de Empresarios (2003) conducted a survey among Spanish enterprises 
(members of the organization) about the situation of the Spanish justice. In general, 
justice in Spain gets a medium or low level of satisfaction. The results reflect the 
opinion that Spanish justice is too slow and that predictability of the judgments is low. 
An almost complete agreement exists among the enterprises when they are asked if the 
“simplification of the procedures” would be a good measure (among others) to apply to 
the Spanish justice.  
From the public administration perspective, there have been more efforts to 
analyze the situation of justice in Spain during the last years. Some statistics on judicial 
activity are available in Spain since 1995. In fact, analyzing the efficiency of the 
Judiciary is an important issue for national public authorities not only for the reasons 
                                                 
47 The last release of the Doing Business Project took place in september 2009 (“Doing Business 2010: 
reforming through difficult times“). 
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already cited (i.e. the judicial system may be a determinant of competitiveness) but also 
because maintaining the system is costly and requires a high public expenditure (0,35% 
of GDP in Spain, 2003, 0,5% if we also include prisons) (Jiménez and Pastor, 2007) and 
employs an important number of public workers (57000) for whom an appropriate 
system of incentives and productivity is an important issue (Cabrillo and Pastor, 2001, 
Cabrillo and Fitzpatrick, 2008). 
At the research level it is possible to find for the Spanish case similar results to 
those of Japelli et al. (2005). Padilla et al. (2007) found that better efficiency of justice 
is related to a better functioning of credit markets across the Spanish provinces and 
regional Governments (Comunidades Autónomas). 
 
 
3.1.3 Objectives of this chapter 
 
 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the degree of formalism 
of the judicial system in Spain as the main public mechanism of contract enforcement 
and to provide a discussion on its efficiency.48 The analysis covers the period 1966-
2008 therefore providing a long run view of the system that is not given by the sources 
already cited. This will allow to show the effects on formalism of several changes in the 
Spanish procedural Laws like the one that took place in 2000 (under the new Civil 
Procedural Law of 2000).  
Specifically, a judicial formalism index is provided for the period analyzed. For 
that purpose the methodology of Djankov et al. (2003) is followed once it has been 
adapted to the Spanish legal environment and once some important assumptions made 
by the authors have been relaxed. The most important one is that Djankov et al. (2003) 
fix the amount of the dispute. That assumption limits their analysis to one single 
procedure. In this chapter all the different civil procedures of the Spanish system are 
                                                 
48 Special attention is paid to the procedures directed to evict a non paying tenant. 
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analyzed for the period under study.49 An analysis of the effects of formalism in the 
figures of effective efficiency50 of the Spanish justice is also provided in this chapter. 
Finally a comparison with the results of previous literature is also discussed. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the methodology of 
Djankov et al. (2003) and presents the adaptations and assumptions made for studying 
the Spanish legal system. Section 3 describes the main issues of the Spanish procedures 
during the period of study and discusses the results of the different indicators. Section 4 
makes some international comparisons of the results obtained in this work. Section 5 
discusses the case of the special procedures needed to evict a non-paying tenant. Section 
6 draws some final conclusions.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
 
3.2.1 The “formalism” indicator proposed by Djankov et al. (2003) and description 
of the variables 
 
Djankov et al. (2003) used data from the judicial systems and procedures in 109 
countries to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution. The 
authors observe and “map” two types of possible disputes between private parties to be 
solved before the courts: the collection of a check (an unpaid debt) and the procedure to 
evict a non-paying tenant. Both of them, especially the first one, are “representative” 
cases of civil disputes before the national courts. An analysis of their formalism can be 
considered representative of the whole system. From their set of results, they conclude 
that, ceteris paribus, higher procedural formalism predicts longer duration of dispute 
resolution and also lower enforceability of contracts (therefore expected duration is 
highly correlated with formalism). The result would suggest that the legal structure is an 
essential dimension of judicial efficiency rather than the level of development of the 
country by itself. 
                                                 
49 Please note that Balas et al. (2008) provide the value of the index for Spain between 1950 and 2000 but 
their work suffer from the same assumptions as Djankov et al. (2003) 
50 Measured as the resolution rate, the congestion rate and the pending cases rate of the judicial system. 
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The source of data they use is a questionnaire that covers all the stages of the 
typical procedure that a company or an individual must follow to recover a debt. The 
authors make some assumptions to simplify the analysis: they consider that the case is 
solved by the courts in the country’s largest city and they also fix the amount (of the 
unpaid debt). Fixing the amount implies that they analyze just one single procedure in 
the Spanish case. 
The questions and stages of the procedures analyzed are guided by the 1994 
International Encyclopaedia of Laws-Civil Procedure (Kluwer Law International). 
The formalism index proposed by the authors is composed of 7 sub-indicators: 
“Professionals vs. Laymen”, “Written vs. Oral”, “Legal justification”, “Statutory 
regulation of evidence”, “Control of Superior Review”, “Engagement formalities” and a 
measure of the number of “independent procedural actions”. Each sub-indicator is 
scored from 0 to 1 (several intermediate results are possible). Each sub-indicator is 
composed of several variables that are assigned the score of 0 or 1. The formalism index 
is the unweighted sum of the sub-indicators and, thus, has a result out of a maximum 
score of 7. Higher scores mean more “formalism” and, thus, more complexity and 
longer expected duration of the procedure. Table 3.2 contains more information on the 
variables included in each sub-indicator. 
The sub-index for “professionals vs. Laymen” analyzes the intervention of 
professional judges (versus laymen) in all the procedures and their specialization for 
solving specific cases. It also considers whether legal representation is mandatory or not 
to act before a court, as legal representation is costly. The higher is the 
“professionalism” required or the lower is the specialization, the higher will be the 
index. More specialization of the courts is understood as a way of introducing “mass 
production” into the judicial system and therefore of, hypothetically, increasing the 
number of cases solved.   
The sub-index for “Written vs. Oral elements” analyzes, among other issues, if it 
is compulsory in all the steps of the procedure to have all the notifications made by 
written documents and if they need to be “legalized” by a judicial officer. The sub-index 
also analyzes the formalism of the decisions of the court and the steps to enforce them. 
More written elements increase the score of the sub-index. 
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The sub-index for “legal justification” measures whether it is necessary to justify 
all the actions and requests (such as the claim or complaint) to the court in legal terms, 
with legal reasoning (or by expressly citing legal concepts and norms) or if simpler 
requests merely justified on grounds of “equity” are enough. Legal justification usually 
requires legal training and as a result, legal representation becomes necessary. The sub-
index also takes into account if resolutions by the court need to be legally justified or 
they can be based simply on “equity”. More “legal justification” increases the value of 
the sub-index. 
The sub-index for “statutory regulation of evidence” deals with the rules 
governing the “evidence” discussed and considered by the judge (oral interrogation of 
the parties or a witness, written documents…). It also considers if the evidence must be 
recorded in all cases. More rigid criteria make the sub-index have higher scores. 
The sub-index for “control of superior review” considers whether enforcement 
of a court decision can be suspended if the decision is appealed. Also it considers the 
possible content and scope of the appeal. Automatic suspensions and a comprehensive 
review of the previous decision (including revision of old evidence already discussed) 
make the sub-index to increase. 
The sub-index for “engagement formalities” considers certain formalities that 
may be present in the procedure, such as a compulsory stage of “pre-conciliation”. “Pre-
conciliation” is not “wrong” in itself. In fact, it may solve the conflict without the need 
for a full judicial procedure. What the indicator measures is whether it is “compulsory” 
or not. If it is compulsory, it may be superfluous in some cases.  
The sub-index “engagement formalities” also takes into account whether a 
judicial officer must “legalize” the documents received or sent by the court. Higher 
formalities or added steps (such as compulsory pre-conciliation) increase the result of 
the sub-index. 
The sub-index for the number of “independent procedural actions” counts the 
number of “steps” needed to complete filing, service, trial, judgment and enforcement. 
The sub-index is constructed according to the values obtained in the full sample of 
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countries. It takes value 0 for the country with a lower number of actions and one for the 
country with the maximum amount. 
Djankov et al. (2003) observe that the sub-indicators move in the same direction 
and are positively correlated with the overall index of formalism. Therefore, they 
consider not necessary to design a specific methodology for the construction of the 
formalism index. 
 
3.2.2 Appraisal and criticism of the indicator 
 
 
An important question arises from the indicator of Djankov et al. (2003). Is 
“judicial formalism” a good policy indicator? Does reducing formalism improve 
judicial systems? Is it desirable to reduce formalism in all cases? 
One criticism questions the basic assumptions of the indicator: informal justice 
is said to be more vulnerable to subversion by the powerful, i.e. reducing time and cost 
of the procedure may also reduce its fairness.  
As mentioned above, the indicator proposed by Djankov et al. (2003) penalizes 
formalism. In fact, the indicator takes as a model the “neighbourhood model”, inspired 
by the Common Law (as a consequence “Common Law” countries generally perform 
better both in Djankov et al. (2003) and in the Doing Business Project). Common Law 
countries have less tradition of written norms but, from the perspective of Roman/Civil 
Law, the lack of legal justification of the procedures is considered to give rise to risk of 
loss of “legal certainty” and thus a risk of increased partiality.  
Another criticism points out that the indicators may not be representing the 
whole picture of institutions but just the reaction of the system to very specific case-
studies (Ménard and Du Marais, 2008).  Moreover, other specific case-studies challenge 
the assumptions of the sub-indices of Djankov et al. (2003). For instance, Garoupa et al. 
(2008) conclude that specialized courts in Madrid, after controlling for other relevant 
variables, may not be faster than the regular courts.  
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More in general, the results of the Doing Business Project, which takes as 
methodology the paper of Djankov et al. (2003) among others, have been criticised by 
Arruñada (2007). Arruñada, who analyzes the procedures needed for setting up a firm, 
criticises that this type of indicators may concentrate the efforts of the reformers in 
simplifying the regulations rather than evaluating their real effects.  
In favour of Djankov et al. (2003), it can be said that their conclusions coincide 
also with those of the World Business Environment Survey completed before their 
work. Batra et al. (2003), following that survey, also concluded that reduced time and 
cost of the procedures are associated with perceptions of more fairness and impartiality. 
It can be highlighted, in any case, that formalism must not be considered as 
“desirable” or “undesirable” by itself but, from the results of Djankov et al. (2003), it 
can be related to longer and more costly procedures. 
When adapting the indicators to the Spanish case some of the assumptions made 
by Djankov et al. (2003) will be relaxed, thus giving some relief to the criticisms 
already cited. 
 
 
3.2.3 Adapted indicators for Spain and Spanish data 
 
 
The objective of this study is to provide a description of the Spanish judicial 
system through the analysis of the resolution of a representative civil dispute through 
court decisions.  
The representative dispute is the action to recover a debt such as a check 
collection (that is also a dispute chosen by Djankov et al. 2003 in their indicators).51 
The dispute takes place between two or more private parties (therefore there is no public 
administration involved) and it is assumed to be solved by a “juez de primera instancia” 
(court of first instance). Other solutions, such as arbitration are not taken into account.  
                                                 
51 This paper also discusses the case of tenant eviction in section 3.5. 
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In order to improve the indicators and address some of the criticisms generated 
by them, some assumptions made by Djankov et al. (2003) are relaxed: it is not 
necessary to assume that the conflict is solved in a particular place or city in Spain as 
the procedures are homogeneous throughout the country and it is not assumed to be a 
conflict for a particular amount. As will be seen in the next section, the type of 
procedure used in Spain depends heavily on the amount in dispute.52 Therefore, all the 
possibilities are analyzed (8 in the last decades) unlike in Djankov et al. who only 
analyze the procedures for a very specific case. As it was already said, Balas et al. 
(2008) suffer from the same assumptions as Djankov et al. 
For the Spanish case there is no data on “judicial quality” (understood as 
effective average time needed to get a decision from the court) if we try to describe the 
system over a long period of time. Therefore, having a measure of formalism as an 
approach to expected duration is useful.  
For the comparability of data over time and across types of procedures, it is an 
advantage to be dealing with just the case of Spain as quite stable social conditions can 
be assumed in relation to justice, legal culture and corruption.  
The formalism index proposed for the Spanish economy is composed of the six 
first components explained above. As this study only analyzes Spanish justice, the 
seventh component is not included. Therefore, the formalism index proposed has a 
maximum score of 6. Table 3.2 contains more information on the sub-indices and 
variables. The last two columns contain some legal foundations for the scores given in 
this paper for Spain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 For instance, the disputes concerning the property of a book or a car would be solved through different 
procedures because they have very different values. 
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3.3 The Spanish judicial system, 1966-2008 
 
 
3.3.1 Civil Procedural Laws 
 
 
As it was mentioned in the previous section, the objective of this study is to 
provide a description of the judicial system by analyzing a representative dispute 
resolved through the courts. That representative dispute is the action to recover a debt 
such as a check collection. 
For such cases, and in general for all disputes arising under private contracts, in 
Spain the procedures are regulated by the “Civil Procedure Law” (CPL, Ley de 
Enjuiciamiento Civil). The latter establishes the rules of access to the court system, the 
formalisms that the parties must comply with, the role of the judge or court, the rules 
governing evidence, the control by superior instances and any other related issues. Two 
general Civil Procedure Laws has been passed in Spain since the 19th century, the first 
one in 1881 (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, Real Decreto de Promulgación de 3 de 
febrero de 1881, CPL 1881), that governed the procedures until 2001, and the most 
recent one, Law 1/2000 (Ley 1/2000, de 7 de enero, de Enjuiciamiento Civil, CPL 
2000) in force since 8th January 2001. Several minor reforms and amendments have 
been passed during the last decades.  
From these Laws it can be concluded that in Spain there is not just one 
procedure to recover debts. The type and characteristics of the procedure will depend on 
the estimated amount of the debt. Under the CPL 1881 there were 4 types of procedures, 
“juicio de mayor cuantía”, “juicio de menor cuantía”, “juicio verbal” (named as “old” in 
the tables and figures to distinguish it from the new procedures passed under CPL 2000) 
and “juicio de cognición” (that was not regulated in the main text of the CPL but in a 
more specific piece of legislation, Decree of 21st November 1952). The CPL 2000 
introduced a new set of procedures: “juicio ordinario”, “juicio verbal” (type I and II) 
and a special “fast” procedure suitable for debt recovery under certain circumstances 
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called “proceso monitorio”. All new disputes that come before the courts after 8th 
January 2001 must take the form of one of the procedures of the CPL 2000. As it was 
mentioned above, although the names seem similar, the old type of “juicio verbal” is a 
different procedure compared to the “juicio verbal” introduced by the CPL 2000. 
Table 3.3 describes the applicability of the different procedures by amount. As it 
can be seen, several amendments changed the amounts that define the applicability of 
the different procedures. For instance, to collect an unpaid debt of €1000 after 2001 the 
applicable procedure would be the “juicio verbal”. But if the estimated amount is 
€4000, the procedure would be a “juicio ordinario”. The new procedures under CPL 
2000 are not clearly heirs of the old types as it will be seen.  
The period under study is 1966-2008 to cover the most recent reforms in the 
procedural Laws. During that period, various amendments changed the amounts 
applicable to each procedure. The first set of amounts was defined by Law 46/1966 and 
was applicable until 1985 (when Law 34/1984 entered into force). The last change in 
the amounts, before the new CPL 2000 entered into force, was made by Law 10/1992.  
 
 
3.3.2 Formalism indices for the Spanish procedures 
 
 
As it was explained above, to analyze the “formalism” for the Spanish case 
requires the construction of an index for each of the applicable procedures. Therefore, 
the objective here is to obtain a measure of formalism for each of the 8 procedures cited 
in the previous subsections and observe their evolution through time. That will allow to 
obtain a comparison between them in a tractable manner and also a comparison over 
time. Finally, a compound indicator, taking into account the different possibilities is 
provided. 
Figures 3.1 to 3.6 show the results for the 6 sub-indicators that compose the 
“formalism index” used here (Professionals vs. Laymen, Written vs. Oral, Legal 
justification, Statutory regulation of evidence, Control of Superior Review and 
Engagement formalities). Extensive information is provided in table 3.2. Figure 3.7 
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shows the result for the “formalism index”. The vertical lines in years 1985, 1992 and 
2001 indicate relevant changes in the procedures due to a change in the whole Law 
(with the approval of the new CPL in 2000) or minor changes made by Law 34/1984 
and Law 10/1992. 
As expected, the procedures that are established by the CPL for solving cases 
involving lower amounts are also less “formal” (“juicio verbal old” before 2000 and 
“juicio verbal II” after 2000) (see figure 3.7). Also higher sub-indicators are related to 
higher nominal amounts (Figures 3.1-3.6). An exception is the “Proceso monitorio” 
(after 2000) that also has a low degree of formalism, although it can be used to solve 
disputes involving quite large amounts. In fact the “proceso monitorio” was especially 
created to be a “simple” procedure to use under strict circumstances.  
All the sub-indicators have shown some improvement (that is, lower scores are 
obtained for all or some of the procedures) in recent years. The improvements are 
reflected in the global indicator of formalism (figure 3.7). All the quantitative results are 
included in table 3.4. 
With respect to the problem of the consistency of the indicators, as observed in 
the study of Djankov et al. (2003), the sub-indicators move in the same direction and 
are positively correlated with the overall index of formalism. Table 3.5 provide the 
correlations among the formalism index and its components. All correlations are high 
and positive.  
 
 
3.3.3 A compound indicator of formalism 
 
 
The previous results give us the levels of “formalism” of each of the procedures 
allowing to make comparisons among them. It would be desirable to obtain a single 
indicator of formalism to represent the situation of the whole system independently of 
the specific procedure needed for a specific dispute. That indicator can be constructed 
since data on the usage of the different types of civil procedures over time (1995-2006) 
are available.  
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Figure 3.8 represents the proportion (in %) of disputes resolved by each type of 
procedure between 1995 and 2006. The data are taken from the public database of the 
CGPJ (Consejo General del Poder Judicial, General Council of the Judicial Power) and 
represent the disputes resolved by the first instance (and first instance plus 
“instrucción”) courts excluding “family conflicts” and executions. After 2000, all the 
new cases that were filled in the Spanish courts took the form of one of the new 
procedures, therefore in a few years all the cases resolved by the system will be dealt 
with the new procedures. Meanwhile, as can be seen in the figure, in the first years after 
2000 it is still possible to find a relevant, but diminishing, proportion of disputes solved 
under the form of the old procedures. 
The data have two important drawbacks: the period available is very limited and 
the data does not differentiate between the two “types” of “juicio verbal” (after 2001), 
as explained above.    
Figure 3.9 (data in table 3.6) shows a composite indicator of formalism taking 
into account the proportion of solved cases explained above. It is assumed that half of 
the new cases between 0 and €3000 took the form of a “juicio verbal I”. Figure 3.9 
shows that the implementation of the new Law 1/2000 implied a significant reduction in 
the “formalism” of the Spanish judicial system.  It can be expected that the measure of 
formalism will stabilize around the results of 2006 as the weights of the old procedures 
in the system approach to 0. 
That reduction in general formalism can be explained by the introduction of 
some reforms in the judicial system by the CPL 2000. The CPL 2000 introduced a 
simple fast procedure (proceso monitorio) for a quite wide range of amounts (up to 
30000 euros). More specifically in the “proceso monitorio” legal representation is not 
mandatory unless the procedure is transformed in another type of procedure (due to the 
opposition of the debtor). Also the complaint may be submitted to the court in a 
simplified form. Moreover, the number of steps needed to complete the procedure may 
be very limited under CPL 2000: the “proceso monitorio” begins with the presentation 
by the creditor of the documents which demonstrate that a debt was left unpaid by a 
debtor. If, faced with those documents, the debtor acknowledges before the judge that 
the debt exists and he is willing to pay, the procedure ends without any further steps. On 
the other hand, as we have seen, the CPL 2000 inherited some of the previous 
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simplifications, such as the elimination of the pre-trial conciliation. All those 
innovations lead to a decrease in the formalism index. 
 
 
 
3.3.4 Effects of formalism in the judicial system figures 
 
 
The CGPJ offers data (for 1995-2006) on the number of cases resolved per year 
by the judicial system, the number of new cases that entered the judicial system during 
the year and the number of cases still pending at the end of the year.  From these 
figures, it is possible to compute 3 relative measures of the efficiency of the judicial 
system: the resolution rate (equation 3.1) is defined as the ratio between the cases 
resolved and the cases that entered the system for a specific year, the pending cases rate 
(equation 3.2) is defined as the ratio between pending cases in a specific year and the 
cases resolved in the same period, and the congestion rate (equation 3.3) is defined as 
the ratio between the sum of pending cases plus new cases in a specific year and the 
cases resolved in the same year. Higher resolution rate, lower pending cases rate and 
lower congestion rate are related to greater efficiency of the judicial system.   
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Table 3.7 shows that formalism is positively correlated with all three measures 
in the case of the years 1995-2006 (see figure 3.10 for a graphical intuition). This could 
be interpreted as evidence, although admittedly very weak, that a reduction of 
formalism might have had a positive impact on the system through a reduced congestion 
and pending cases rate. On the other hand, the improvements in formalism may also 
have attracted a higher amount of new cases to the courts (an increase in litigation) and, 
therefore, a reduction in the resolution rate.  This would suggest that a net improvement 
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in the judicial system needs not only reforms in the procedures but also more resources, 
in order to cope with the new disputes reaching the courts.  
 
 
3.4 Comparison with the results of Djankov et al. (2003) and other 
international indicators 
 
 
As mentioned above, the indicator of formalism proposed in the previous 
sections relaxes some of the assumptions made in Djankov et al. (2003) and takes into 
account all the procedures related to debt recovering, unlike the indicator proposed by 
Djankov et al. Therefore it would be interesting to compare the results of both pieces of 
research.  
The indicator of formalism of Djankov et al. was composed of 7 sub-indicators 
of which the last one (“independent procedural actions”) had to be removed from the 
indicator proposed in this paper. Therefore, in order to obtain comparable results in both 
cases, the seventh sub-indicator should be removed from the results from Djankov et al. 
(2003). Their result for the formalism index in Spain (data from 2002), once the seventh 
sub-indicator is removed, is 4,96. The formalism index proposed in this paper for 2002 
takes the value of 3,81. In the case of Djankov et al., Spain is in position 106 out of 109 
countries. Therefore Djankov et al. (2003) conclude that Spain has a very formal system 
of justice. On the findings set out in this paper, Spain would be in position 79 out of 109 
countries. Thus, Spain would be in a mid-position.  The latter result should hold as all 
the different procedures for debt recovery are taken into account, and not only a very 
specific case. 
Conversely, another way to compare the indicators would be to add to the 
indicator obtained in this paper the component that is lacking when compared with 
Djankov et al. (2003) (“independent procedural actions”). Djankov et al. (2003) provide 
the value of each of the sub-indicators and therefore it is possible to add the value given 
by them to the component that is needed.  Note that this is a strong assumption as 
adding their component for “independent procedural actions” to the indicator proposed 
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in this chapter would mean considering that the value they offer for “independent 
procedural actions” (0,29 in 2002) is constant across the different types of procedures. 
The formalism indicator obtained in this paper for 2002 was 3,81. If the result for 
“independent procedural actions” (0,29) is added it is obtained a result of 4.1 that is 
significantly lower than their result for formalism in Spain (5,25).  With a value of 5,25 
(obtained by Djankov et al, 2003) Spain is in position 101 out of the 109 analyzed 
countries. With the results obtained in this paper Spain is in position 81 (out of 109). 
Figure 3.11 represents the regression between the average (1995-2004) GDP per 
capita (in constant prices) and the formalism index taken from Djankov et al. (2003) 
adding an extra observation for Spain with the value of the formalism index obtained in 
this paper (once the seventh sub-indicator of Djankov et al. 2003 is added). Formalism 
is significantly and negatively correlated to the average GDP per capita. Therefore, less 
formalism seems to be related to wealthier economies. As can be seen in the figure, 
Spain is above the expected level of formalism given its GDP per capita and, therefore, 
its formalism may constitute an obstacle to development. On the other hand, the 
measure of formalism obtained in this paper is more consistent with the level of 
development of Spain if we compare it with the original measure obtained by Djankov 
et al. (2003). 
In conclusion Spain gets significantly better results when the assumptions made 
by Djankov et al. (2003) are relaxed. In fact, the World Bank, when measuring the 
institutions related to contract enforcement in the Doing Business Project, gives Spain a 
mid-position in the classification that would be consistent with the results of this paper. 
Following the Doing Business project (“2010” release), Spain would be in positions 97, 
81 and 30 out of 183 countries if we classify the countries by the number of procedures, 
by the duration of the procedures and by the estimated cost of litigation respectively. 
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3.5 A special case: evaluation of the procedures needed to evict a non-
paying tenant 
 
 
A well functioning tenancy market depends heavily on the correct enforcement 
of its contracts. Delays in the eviction of non-paying tenants are a strong disincentive to 
rent and that may entail a reduction in the weight of the tenancy market in the housing 
market (this hypothesis is tested in chapter 4). 
A weak tenancy market entails negative effects for the labour markets. In fact, it 
can be seen that there is a negative relationship between home ownership and mobility 
(Maclennan et al., 1998) and that a high percentage of geographical mobility takes place 
among workers that were renting their homes (Barceló, 2006). The reduced mobility 
implied by inefficient tenancy markets is related to higher unemployment (Layard et al., 
1991) and a reduced efficiency of the economy (Hardman and Ionnides, 1999). On the 
other hand, a strong tenancy market is beneficial to relieve the pressures in the property 
market (Arce and López-Salido, 2007). 
Unlike the case of recovering a general debt, which was analyzed in the previous 
sections, the procedure for tenant eviction is a single, special procedure of Spanish Law, 
which does not depend on the amounts owed (although the quantity of the rent disputed 
may change some characteristics of the procedure).  
Apart from the “substantive” Law on Tenancy (understood as the “Urban 
Tenancy Act”) that has changed several times during the recent decades (the last change 
taking place under Law 29/1994), the procedures applicable in the case of a dispute are 
included in the applicable CPLs. The Civil Procedural Law of 1881 established a 
special, unique, procedure for eviction called “juicio de deshaucio” that resembles the 
“juicio verbal (old)” analyzed above. The new CPL 2000 establishes that such a dispute 
should be resolved under the “juicio verbal” procedure (I or II, depending on the 
amount owed) but excluding the other procedures. 
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Note that these procedures lead to a judgment that gives back full rights over the 
dwelling to the owner and force the tenant to leave the property. However, the non-
paying tenant may still decide not to comply with the judgment (and thus, not to leave 
the property although he no longer has any more rights over it). In that case, a further 
procedure would be required: execution of the judgment (that concludes with a forced 
eviction53). The analysis herein is carried out for the main procedure and not for the 
execution. 
Table 3.4 contains the results for the indicator of “eviction procedure” (extensive 
information is provided in table 3.2). As it was already said, the results are those of the 
“juicio verbal (old)” before CPL 2000, and a similar result to those of the new “juicio 
verbal” afterwards. Unlike the indicator describing a very general case of debt recovery, 
the “formalism” in the case of eviction has increased slightly. That can be explained by 
the fact that, depending on the amount, the litigants may need legal representation after 
2001, while under CPL 1881 that legal representation was not needed, at least in part of 
the procedure. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
 
Djankov et al. (2003) proposed a measure of procedural formalism that was 
related to higher complexity and expected duration of the dispute within the judicial 
system. At international level, they did not find significant improvements in fairness or 
quality related to higher formalism. In this paper is it proposed to adapt those indicators 
to the Spanish legal system to observe the evolution of formalism over time and the 
different procedures. The results show that the level of formalism in the Spanish 
economy is lower than the one obtained in Djankov et al. (2003). In fact, the level of 
formalism obtained in this research would be more consistent with the Spanish GDP per 
capita.  
                                                 
53 “lanzamiento”. 
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In addition, it can be concluded that formalism has decreased over time in Spain 
during recent decades. Particularly, the new CPL 2000 has reduced significantly the 
formalism of the whole system. This effect can be explained by the different initiatives 
introduced by the CPL 2000, such as the creation of a simple fast procedure (proceso 
monitorio) for a quite wide range of amounts (up to 30000 euros). This has also allowed 
more disputes to be broad before a court without legal representation. Moreover, some 
steps in the procedures have disappeared in recent years, as the compulsory pre-trial 
conciliation (in 1984). Nevertheless, it should be stressed that “formalism” is just an 
“indirect” measure of judicial efficiency. This chapter also shows that the direct 
measures of efficiency (resolution rate, pendency cases rate and congestion rate) 
suffered worsenings over the last decade. This contra intuitive result may be partly 
derived from the coincident reductions in formalism. In other words, a less formal 
system may have attracted much more conflicts to the system, thus reducing in the end 
the efficiency of the courts. However, in the case of tenancy market conflicts (such as 
the procedures needed to evict a non-paying tenant), the formalism index developed in 
this chapter does not show any improvements in the most recent decades.  
 
Finally, as to the issue of how to achieve further reductions in formalism, the 
methodology applied in this paper would support several refinements in the Spanish 
judicial system. In particular, reducing the number of procedures in which the litigants 
need legal representation would be a positive step in that direction. Related to that, 
reducing the complexity of the complaint or the opposition would help to make the 
initial steps of the procedure less formal. If legal justification of the complaint is not 
compulsory, legal representation may be not necessary, at least in the initial steps of the 
procedure. That would reduce the costs for the litigants. The indicators would also 
support giving more freedom to the judges to assess the admissibility and weight of 
evidence. Also they support simplifying and reducing the number of notifications 
needed during the procedure. A very different problem that would need to be tackled is 
the one detected when inflation is taken into account. The analysis of the applicable 
amounts in real terms shows that the more formal procedures may be used to resolve 
disputes involving minor amounts over time due to the eroding effect of inflation. Thus, 
inflation may increase formalism over time. 
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3.A Appendix: applicable amounts in real terms 
 
 
A problem with the system of procedures explained above (section 3.3) is that it 
establishes a rigid set of amounts that can only be changed by a new Law. As a result, 
the Law was not taking into account the effect of inflation and, therefore, year after year 
the limits of the different procedures were falling in real terms. Table 3.3 describes the 
applicable amounts for each procedure in nominal terms. For instance, the applicable 
amount for a “juicio ordinario” was in 2001 €3000 or more, and this amount remained 
unchanged in the following years. 
Figure 3.12 shows the amounts applicable to the different procedures in real 
terms, therefore after adjusting for inflation. As a consequence, over time smaller 
amounts were brought under more “complex” procedures. The “steps” in the graph 
coincide with the cited amendments in the CPLs.  
Inflation entails several costs. Probably the best known is the distortion caused 
by inflation in money demand. Dolado et al. (1997) have identified other costs for the 
Spanish economy, some of them related to rigid regulations such as the ones governing 
taxation.   
In this respect, in the same way that inflation may lead to distortions in revenue 
through incomplete or delayed indexation of tax brackets, the lack of indexation of the 
amounts to which Spanish civil procedures apply may produce unexpected changes in 
formalism. More formal procedures become applicable to actions for lower amounts if 
inflation is present in the economy. Thus, inflation may increase the formalism of the 
judicial system. 
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Figure 3.1: Total professional vs laymen index 
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Source: Self elaboration. 
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Figure 3.2: Written vs oral elements index 
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Source: Self elaboration. 
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Figure 3.3: Legal justification index 
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Source: Self elaboration. 
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Figure 3.4: Statutory regulation of evidence index 
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Figure 3.5: Control of superior review index 
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Figure 3.6: Engagement formalities index 
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Figure 3.7: Formalism index 
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Figure 3.8: Solved conflicts by type of procedure 
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Figure 3.9: Composite indicator of judicial formalism in Spain 
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Figure 3.10: Formalism and judicial system figures 
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Figure 3.11: GDP per capita and formalism 
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Figure 3.12: Applicability of the different judgment types 
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Table 3.1: Doing Business (World Bank) rankings and indicators for “Enforcing 
Contracts” (2006-“2010”) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Doing Business Project (2009) and World Business Environment Survey (2000) 
Rank
Procedures 
(number)
Time 
(days)
Cost 
(% of debt)
Justice is 
never quick
Justice is 
never 
affordable
Never able 
to enforce 
decisions
Judiciary is a 
major obstacle 
to business
FRANCE
1999 - - - - - 47,0% 16,3% 2,1% 4,1%
2006 - - 30 331 17,4 - - - -
2007 - - 30 331 17,4 - - - -
2008 - - 29 331 17,4 - - - -
2009 31 8 29 331 17,4 - - - -
2010 31 6 29 331 17,4 - - - -
GERMANY
1999 - - - - - 20,6% 18,6% 4,2% 8,0%
2006 - - 30 394 14,4 - - - -
2007 - - 30 394 14,4 - - - -
2008 - - 30 394 14,4 - - - -
2009 27 9 30 394 14,4 - - - -
2010 25 7 30 394 14,4 - - - -
ITALY
1999 - - - - - 62,4% 43,8% 8,9% 16,3%
2006 - - 41 1390 29,9 - - - -
2007 - - 41 1210 29,9 - - - -
2008 - - 41 1210 29,9 - - - -
2009 74 158 41 1210 29,9 - - - -
2010 78 156 40 1210 29,9 - - - -
SPAIN
1999 - - - - - 41,2% 13,5% 4,2% 12,2%
2006 - - 40 515 17,2 - - - -
2007 - - 40 515 17,2 - - - -
2008 - - 39 515 17,2 - - - -
2009 51 52 39 515 17,2 - - - -
2010 62 52 39 515 17,2 - - - -
UNITED KINGDOM
1999 - - - - - 17,3% 18,2% 1,0% 2,0%
2006 - - 30 404 23,4 - - - -
2007 - - 30 404 23,4 - - - -
2008 - - 30 404 23,4 - - - -
2009 6 23 30 404 23,4 - - - -
2010 5 23 30 399 23,4 - - - -
UNITED STATES
1999 - - - - - 23,2% 25,3% 7,1% 2,2%
2006 - - 33 300 14,4 - - - -
2007 - - 32 300 14,4 - - - -
2008 - - 32 300 14,4 - - - -
2009 4 9 32 300 14,4 - - - -
2010 4 8 32 300 14,4 - - - -
Doing business/Enforcing contracts World Business Environment SurveyEase of 
doing 
business 
rank
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Table 3.2: Description of the variables and adaptation notes for Spain (a)(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION AND ADAPTATION
Notes under 
CPL 1881
Notes under 
CPL 2000
General jurisdiction 
court
The variable measures whether a court of general or of limited jurisdiction would be
chosen or assigned to hear the case under normal circumstances. We define a
court of general jurisdiction as a state institution, recognized by the law as part of
the regular court system, generally competent to hear and decide regular civil or
criminal cases. A limited jurisdiction court would hear and decide only some types
of civil cases. Specialized debt-collection or housing courts, small-claims courts,
and arbitrators or justices of the peace are examples. Equals one for a court of
general jurisdiction, and zero for a court of limited jurisdiction. For the Spanish case
it is possible to say that, in general, courts are of general jurisdiction, that is the
case of the "juzgados de primera instancia" (first instance courts). The existance of
very specific cases of "limited" jurisdiction such as "juzgados de violencia de
género" cannot be taken as representative of the whole system. The "juzgados de
paz" (justices of the peace) only exist in municipalities that do not have first instance
courts.
Article 51 et seq. Article 813
Professional vs 
non-professional 
judge
The variable measures whether the judge, or the members of the court or tribunal,
could be considered as professional. A professional judge is one who has
undergone a complete professional training as required by law, and whose primary
activity is to act as judge or member of a court. A non-professional judge is an
arbitrator, administrative officer, practicing attorney, merchant, or any other
layperson who may be authorized to hear and decide the case. Equals one for a
professional judge, and zero for a non-professional judge. Judges in Spain are
always professional. On the other hand, in Spain the parties have the option to have
their conflict solved by an "arbitro" (non-professional judge) although in that case
the case would be solved outside the judicial system.
Article 51 et seq. -
Legal 
representation is 
mandatory
The variable measures whether the law requires the intervention of a licensed
attorney. The variable equals one when legal representation is mandatory, and zero
when legal representation is not mandatory. In Spain legal representation should be
understood as the assistance by "abogado" and "procurador". Therefore only the
full mark is given when both are mandatory and half mark is given when only
"abogado" is compulsory (for instance the case of the "juicio de cognición" under
CPL 1881). Zero mark is given to the "proceso monitorio" under CPL 2000 as,
although the opposition may need representation, is ends by itselt the procedure. 
Article 51 et seq. Articles 23, 437
Filing
Equals one if the complaint is normally submitted in written form to the court, and
zero if it can be presented orally.
Articles 524 et 
seq., 720. Also 
article 29 Decree 
21-11-52
Article 437
Service of Process
Equals one if the defendant’s first official notice of the complaint is most likely
received in writing, and zero otherwise.
Articles 525 et 
seq., 722. 
Also articles 30 
and 38 
Decree 21-11-
52
Article 161
Opposition
Equals one if under normal circumstances the defendant’s answer to the complaint
should be submitted in writing, and zero if it may be presented orally to court.
Written complaints and answers are the normal case in Spain although under the
"juicio verbal" (under both CPLs) the defendant's answer is done as part of the
"vista" and therefore not necessarily in a written form. Opposition of the defendant
in the proceso monitorio transforms it in a "juicio verbal" or "ordinario" (the
opposition ends the "proceso monitorio").
Articles 503 et 
seq., 687 et 
seq., 722. Also 
article 40 Decree 
21-11-52.
Articles 443, 815
Evidence
Equals one if evidence is mostly submitted to the court in written form, in the form
of attachments, affidavits, or otherwise, and zero if most of the evidence, including
documentary evidence, is presented at oral hearings before the judge. In Spain the
complaint is supported by evidence that is usually sustained with written
documents. In some cases, as "juicio verbal" (CPL 1881) in which the first approach 
to the court is done through a standarized form (papeleta), special rules apply. Also
in the "juicio verbal" under CPL 2000.
Articles 504 and 
579 et seq., 699 
et seq., 720 et 
seq. See 
especially 522. 
Also article 49 
Decree 21-11-
52
Article 440, 812, 
814
Final arguments
Equals one if final arguments on the case are normally submitted in writing, and
zero if they are normally presented orally in court before the judge. In Spain the part
of the procedure understood as "final arguments" may be identified as "actos
conclusivos" or "formulación de conclusiones". That part of the procedure does not
exist in all cases, for instance: "juicio verbal" and "juicio de cognición" (CPL 1881)
and orality has been extended under CPL 2000.
Articles 667 et 
seq., 701. There 
are not "actos 
conclusivos" in 
the case of 
"juicio verbal 
(old)" and of 
"cognición".
Article 433
Judgment
Equals one if the judge issues the final decision in the case in written form, and zero
he issues it orally in an open court hearing attended by the parties. The defining
factor is whether the judge normally decides the case at a hearing. If the judge
simply reads out a previously made written decision, the variable equals one.
Conversely, for an orally pronounced judgment that is later transposed into writing
for enforcement purposes, the variable equals zero. The indicator is understood as
to penalize formalism assuming that originally oral judgments may be less
constrained in pre- established formalisms. Please note that the proceso monitorio
(CPL 2000), finishes with an "auto", there is not "sentencia". Half marks is given in
that case although an "auto" is also written. The regulation for "sentencias" contains
some especialities and formal pre-requisites (Article 209 CPL 2000, Article 248
LOPJ).
Articles 364, 
678, 701 et seq., 
731 et seq.
Articles 210, 816 
et seq.
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Source: Self elaboration,  Djankov et al. (2003) and Spanish Civil Procedural Laws. 
a) Please note the singularities of the regulation of the “proceso monitorio” (CPL 2000). If there is 
opposition to the demand under a “proceso monitorio”, the procedure ends and it is transformed in a 
“proceso ordinario” or “verbal”. 
b) Judgment is understood as “sentencia”. The “proceso monitorio” ends with an “auto”. See 
explanations to the indicators. 
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Table 3.2 (cont.): Description of the variables and adaptation notes for Spain 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION AND ADAPTATION
Notes under 
CPL 1881
Notes under 
CPL 2000
Notification of 
judgment
Equals one if normally the parties receive their first notice of the final decision in
written form, by notice mailed to them, publication in a court board or gazette, or
through any other written means. The variable equals zero if they receive their first
notice in an open court hearing attended by them (that case, "sentencia in voce" is
not usual in Spain). All final decisions are assumed to be written in Spain in general
terms, including the "auto" in the proceso monitorio (CPL 2000).
Article 270 et 
seq.
Article 212
Enforcement of 
judgment
Equals one if the enforcement procedure is mostly carried out through the written
court orders or written acts by the enforcement authority, and zero otherwise. Zero
is also given when the parties can enforce themselves the judgment (a general term
of 20 days is given in Spain under CPL 2000) not being neccesary further
intervention by the judge.
-
Article 548 et 
seq.
Complaint must be 
legally justified
The variable measures whether the complaint is required, by law or court regulation, 
to include references to the applicable laws, legal reasoning, or formalities that 
would normally require legal training. Equals one for a legally justified complaint, and 
zero when the complaint does not require legal justification (specific articles of the 
law or case-law). If "legal representation" is not compulsory and the demand may 
be sent to the court in a formalized form (like a "papeleta") value 0 is given.
Articles 524, 
680, 720. Also 
article 29 Decree 
21-11-52
Articles 399, 437
Judgment must be 
legally justified
The variable measures whether the judgment must expressly state the legal 
justification (articles of the law or case-law) for the decision. Equals one for a legally 
justified judgment, and zero otherwise. Legal justification is  compulsory in Spain 
(including the case of an "auto", although read the notes to previous indicators). 
Half mark is considered for "proceso monitorio" under CPL 2000 in order to reflect 
the more simple nature of the procedure if there is no opposition. 
Article 248 LOPJ 
(Spanish 
Judiciary Act).
Articles 208 et 
seq.
Judgment must be 
on Law (not on 
equity)
The variable measures whether the judgment may be motivated on general equity 
grounds, or if it must be founded on the law. Equals one when judgment must be 
on law only, and zero when judgment may be based on equity grounds.
- -
Judge cannot 
introduce evidence
Equals one if, by law, the judge cannot freely request or take evidence that has not
been requested, offered, or introduced by the parties, and zero otherwise. In the
"proceso monitorio" (CPL 2000) "evidence" is understood as the documentary
evidence sent to the tribunal with the complaint (no "interrogations" take place
under that procedure),
Article 652 Article 429
Judge cannot 
reject irrelevant 
evidence
Equals one if, by law, the judge cannot refuse to collect or admit evidence
requested by the parties, even if she deems it irrelevant to the case, and zero
otherwise.
Articles 497.5, 
566, 639
Articles 285, 446
Out-of-court 
statements are 
inadmisible
Equals one if statements of fact that were not directly known or perceived by the
witness, but only heard from a third person, may not be admitted as evidence. The
variable equals zero otherwise. In Spain the judge or tribunal is free to admit or not
the statement depending on the circumstances.
Article 659 -
Mandatory pre-
qualification of 
questions
Equals one if, by law, the judge must pre-qualify the questions before they are
asked of the witnesses, and zero otherwise.
Articles 639, 641 Articles 302, 368
Oral interrogation 
only by judge
Equals one if parties and witnesses can only be orally interrogated by the judge,
and zero if they can be orally interrogated by the judge and the opposing party.
Articles 652 Articles 302, 368
Only original 
documents and 
certified copies are 
admissible
Equals one if only original documents and "authentic" or "certified" copies are
admissible documentary evidence, and zero if simple or uncertified copies are
admissible evidence as well.
Article 597 Article 318
Authenticity and 
weight of evidence 
defined by law
Equals one if the authenticity and probative value of documentary evidence is
specifically defined by the law, and zero if all admissible documentary evidence is
freely weighted by the judge.
Article 596 et 
seq.
Articles 319, 326
Mandatory 
recording of 
evidence
Equals one if, by law, there must be a written or magnetic record of all evidence
introduced at trial, and zero otherwise.
-
Articles 145 et 
seq.
Enforcement of 
judgment is 
automatically 
suspended until 
resolution of the 
appeal
Equals one if the enforcement of judgment is automatically suspended until 
resolution of the appeal when a request for appeal is granted. Equals zero if the 
suspension of the enforcement of judgment is not automatic, or if the judgment 
cannot be appealed at all. In spain, in general terms, the judgments can be 
"provisionally" enforced even in the case of appeal. Under CPL 2000, no "appeal" 
(understood as "apelación")  is possible against the "proceso monitorio" (opposition 
transforms the proceso monitorio in other type of procedure).
 Articles 383, 
384, 385, 702
Articles 524 et 
seq.
Comprehensive 
review in appeal
Equals one if issues of both law and fact (evidence) can be reviewed by the 
appellate court. Equals zero if only new evidence or issues of law can be reviewed 
in appeal, or if judgment cannot be appealed. An "apelación" can review both the 
Law and the evidence. A "casación" only reviews the Law.
Articles 862, 897 
et seq.
Article 456 et 
seq.
Interlocutory 
appeals are 
allowed
Equals one if interlocutory appeals are allowed, and zero if they are always 
prohibited. Interlocutory appeals are defined as appeals against interlocutory or 
interim judicial decisions made during the course of a judicial proceeding in first 
instance and before the final ruling on the entire case. "Autos" and "providencias" 
are considered "interim decisions" in this variable.
Article 376
Articles 451 et 
seq. 455
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SOURCE: Djankov et al. (2003) and Spanish Civil Procedural Laws.
Source: self elaboration,  Djankov et al. (2003) and Spanish Civil Procedural Laws. 
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VARIABLE DESCRIPTION AND ADAPTATION
Notes under 
CPL 1881
Notes under 
CPL 2000
Mandatory pre-trial 
conciliation
Equals one if the law requires plaintiff to attempt a pre-trial conciliation or mediation
before filing the lawsuit, and zero otherwise. Pre-trial conciliation was compulsory
before Law 34/1984 (with the exception of the "juicio verbal". Afterwards (and also
under CPL 2000) conciliation is voluntary. Thus, the value of the indicator has
diminished.
Article 460. 
Amendment by 
Law 34/1984
-
Service of process 
by judicial officer 
required
Equals one if the law requires the complaint to be served to the defendant through
the intervention of a judicial officer, and zero if service of process may be
accomplished by other means.
Articles 525, 680 
et seq., 722. 
Article 38 
Decree 21-11-
52
Articles 152, 
276, 439. 
Judgment SAP 
Barcelona
20-12-2004
Notification of 
judgment by 
judicial officer 
required
Equals one if the law requires the judgment to be notified to the defendant through
the intervention of a judicial officer, and zero if notification of judgment may be
accomplished by other means.
Article 252 Articles 161, 815
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Table 3.2 (cont.): Description of the variables and adaptation notes for Spain 
 
Source: self elaboration,  Djankov et al. (2003) and Spanish Civil Procedural Laws. 
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Table 3.3: Applicability of the different procedures in nominal terms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUICIO MAYOR 
CUANTÍA
JUICIO MENOR 
CUANTÍA
JUICIO 
COGNICIÓN
JUICIO 
VERBAL (OLD)
1966-1984 > 3.005 € 301- 3.005 € 60 - 301 € < 60 €
1985-1991 > 601.012 € 3.005 - 601.012 € 301 - 3.005 € < 301 €
1992-2000 > 961.619 € 4.808 - 961.619 € 481 - 4.808 € < 481 €
PROCESO
MONITORIO
JUICIO
ORDINARIO
JUICIO 
VERBAL (I)
JUICIO 
VERBAL (II)
2001-2008 < 30.000 € > 3.000 € < 3.000 € < 900 €
Source: Spanish Civil Procedural Laws. 
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Table 3.4: Results for the indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total professional vs laymen 1,00 1,00 0,83 0,67 0,67
Index written vs oral elements 0,88 0,88 0,75 0,50 0,50
Legal justification 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,67 0,67
Statutory regulation of evidence 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50
Control of superior review (before 1991) 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67
Control of superior review (after 1991) 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,33 0,33
Engagements formalities (before 1984) 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,67 0,67
Engagements formalities (after 1984) 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67
Formalism index (before 1984) 5,04 5,04 4,75 3,67 3,67
Formalism index (after 1984) 4,71 4,71 4,42 3,67 3,67
Formalism index (after 1991) 4,71 4,71 4,42 3,33 3,33
UNDER CPL 2000
PROCESO 
MONITORIO
JUICIO
ORDINARIO
JUICIO
VERBAL I
JUICIO
VERBAL II
EVICTION 
PROCEDURE
Total professional vs laymen 0,67 1,00 1,00 0,67 0,83
Index written vs oral elements 0,56 0,75 0,50 0,50 0,50
Legal justification 0,50 1,00 1,00 0,67 0,83
Statutory regulation of evidence 0,25 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38
Control of superior review 0,33 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67
Engagements formalities 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67
Formalism index 2,98 4,46 4,21 3,54 3,88
JUICIO
VERBAL
EVICTION 
PROCEDURE
UNDER CPL 1881
JUICIO
 MAYOR 
CUANTÍA
JUICIO
 MENOR 
CUANTÍA
JUICIO
COGNICIÓN
Source: self elaboration. 
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Table 3.5: Correlations of the formalism index and its sub-indices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Professionals vs. Laymen 1
Written vs. Oral 0,6683 1
Legal justification 0,9108 0,6602 1
Statutory regulation of evidence 0,3148 0,5125 0,5584 1
Control of superior review 0,7006 0,4914 0,8047 0,3111 1
Formalism index 0,9048 0,8067 0,9665 0,5917 0,8221 1
Statutory 
regulation of 
evidence
Control of superior 
review
Formalism 
index
Professionals 
vs. Laymen
Written vs. Oral
Legal 
justification
 
Source: self elaboration. 
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Table 3.6: Global formalism index for Spain 1995-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Formalism
1995 4,09
1996 4,10
1997 4,12
1998 4,14
1999 4,14
2000 4,13
2001 3,96
2002 3,81
2003 3,69
2004 3,66
2005 3,59
2006 3,55
 
Source: self elaboration 
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Table 3.7: Correlations of the formalism index and figures of the judicial system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resolution rate Pending cases rate Congestion rate Formalism
Resolution rate 1
Pending cases rate 0.5412 1
Congestion rate 0.1110 0.8956 1
Formalism 0.7087 0.8720 0.6566 1
 
Source: self elaboration 
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Chapter 4  
Is judicial inefficiency increasing the house property market 
weight in Spain? Evidence at the local level
54
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Compared with the rest of the European countries the weight of the house property 
market in Spain is very high, which is consistent with the weakness of the tenancy 
market. In this context, it has often been argued that an inefficient judicial system, 
implying a cumbersome procedure to evict a non-paying tenant or simply needing a 
long period to execute a decision, may be an important determinant of the tenancy 
market weakness, as it constrains the effective supply by reducing the profitability of 
landlords. This chapter has studied this effect econometrically using a panel data 
approach and exploiting the differences in the judicial efficiency that exists among the 
Spanish provinces. Three different measures of judicial efficiency are constructed for 
the Spanish provinces over the last decade. After controlling for several other factors, 
this study concludes that the degree of inefficiency of the judicial system has a positive, 
although minor, impact on the differences in the property share among provinces in 
Spain. 
 
JEL Classification: K40, R21 
 
Keywords: judicial efficiency, property market, tenancy market, contract enforcement 
                                                 
54 This chapter was presented in the research seminar of the Banco de España-Eurosistema (2009). 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
 
Since the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) the weight of the house property 
market has been increasing persistently in Spain. Although the official statistical 
information available is very scarce, using the census database it is known that the 
proportion rose from 63,4% to 82,2% between 1970 and 2001. Moreover, following the 
estimations of the Spanish Ministry of Housing (2008) the average property rate rose in 
a further 2,1 percentage points in the period 2001-2007. 
Several factors may have affected the evolution of the property share in Spain 
over the last decades. Among those are the interest rates that have fallen down (Blanco 
and Restoy, 2007) especially after 1995, the liberalization of the banking sector since 
1980 that may have played an indirect role (Iacoviello and Minetti, 2003, Kumbhakar 
and Lozano-Vivas, 2004), the tenancy Laws that have become more stringent after the 
II World War (see chapter 2), or the favourable fiscal regime of buying versus renting 
(López García, 1996, García-Vaquero and Martínez, 2005). 
Several studies have pointed out that the factors mentioned above are not 
exclusive of Spain and that the increase in the property rate can be found in several 
other markets of the European Union and also in the United States (Louvot-Runavot, 
2001). Nonetheless, the weakness of the tenancy market as compared to the property 
market is somehow exceptional in Spain. This situation is generally regarded as 
undesirable for several economic reasons. The most important one is perhaps that a 
weak tenancy market is related to lower mobility of persons and workers (Maclennan et 
al., 1998, Barceló, 2006) which tend to increase the unemployment rate (Layard et al., 
1991) and to reduce the efficiency of the economy (Hardman and Ionnides, 1999). More 
recently, Arce and Lopez-Salido (2007) stressed how a well developed house renting 
sector can be a crucial device to avoid housing prices bubbles and an excessive 
concentration of resources in the building sector. As a result of these concerns, and 
especially during the housing boom experienced in Spain in the last decade, the Spanish 
authorities have paid systematic attention to the problems of the housing market. 
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It is in this context that it was decided in September 200855 to pass new 
regulatory measures aiming to protect the owners of rented dwellings. These reforms 
were directed to improve the functioning of the tenancy market, and thus, to reduce the 
weight of the property market. Those measures included, on the one hand, a reform of 
the Spanish “Civil Procedure Law” (CPL, Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil)56 in order to 
speed up evictions and the collection of rents by the owners and, on the other hand, a 
reform of the Spanish Tenancy Law (Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos)57 in order to 
relax the compulsory term of protection of the tenant, thus giving the owner more legal 
grounds to shorten up the term of the tenancy contract.58  
Underlying those proposals is the idea that both a slow judicial system (implying 
a cumbersome procedure to evict a non-paying tenant or simply a lengthy period to 
execute a decision) and too strict rules governing the tenancy contracts (such as the 
compulsory term introduced by the Tenancy Law that was analyzed in chapter 2) have 
been detrimental for the tenancy market as they reduce the effective supply and may 
have contributed to reduce the share of rented dwellings. 
This chapter focuses on the impact of an inefficient judicial system on the 
housing tenure outcomes. In order to do that, the cross-province variation existing in the 
weight of the house property market is exploited. In fact, the performance of the judicial 
system when solving tenancy conflicts and when it executes decisions (evictions) also 
varies at the local level and may have different effects on the provincial housing 
markets. Thus, the present research aims to assess to what extent the efficiency of the 
functioning of the judicial system explains the variation of the weights of the property 
market in the Spanish provinces. 
Moreover, even though the increase in the property rate at an aggregate level in 
Spain seems to have slowed down in the last decade, some strong dynamics can still be 
found at a provincial level. The province with the highest proportion of property in 2007 
was 3,9% higher than the equivalent in 2001. More importantly it is to note that during 
this period there is a difference of at least 14% between the province with a higher 
                                                 
55 Press note of the Ministry of Housing of Spain of 24/9/08. In December 2008 the Government 
submitted to the approval of the Congress the cited proposals in the form of a draft bill.  
56 Law 1/2000, of January 7th (Civil Procedural Law). 
57 Law 29/1994, of November 24th. 
58 See the press note of the Ministry of Housing of Spain of 15/10/09 for specific details on the proposed 
legal grounds. 
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proportion of property and that with the smaller one. Thus, some local factors may be 
affecting the provincial markets that are different from those that can be identified at an 
aggregate level. 
 
 
4.1.1 The judicial system and the economy 
 
 
An important part of recent economic research aims to explore the relation 
between institutions and economic development (see chapter 1). In fact, some literature 
has explored the potential effects of a slow or inefficient judicial system on economic 
performance, although the research is generally directed to compare different 
international aggregate cases. A good judicial system is expected to foster economic 
development (Padilla and Requejo, 2000), or to make credit more accessible (Jappelli et 
al. 2005).  
Also at the international level, some work has been done relating specifically the 
judicial system and the tenancy markets. Djankov et al. (2003) proposed a measure of 
formalism of the judicial system when evicting a non-paying tenant. They concluded 
that higher formalism is related to more difficult evictions and higher unpredictability of 
the procedures. The results and methodology by Djankov et al. (2003), although very 
relevant, cannot be used in the experiment that is proposed here because, as it was said, 
they work on an international level and for a specific year. Therefore, they cannot 
capture the variability in efficiency within a specific country. The latter may be caused 
by differences in the application of the CPL and not by the CPL by itself (see chapter 3 
for a discussion on the topic).  
Casas-Arce and Saiz (2006) used the measure of Djankov et al. (2003) to 
explain the decision between owning and renting in a set of countries. They found that 
more formalism is expected to reduce the weight of the tenancy market although, again, 
their conclusions are directed to an international analysis. 
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4.1.2 Organization of this chapter 
 
 
In order to empirically test the hypothesis that judicial inefficiency increases the 
share of property in the economy (or conversely reduces the tenancy contracts signed in 
the market) three different indices of judicial efficiency have been constructed for each 
Spanish province based on official judicial data. Then, their impact in the property share 
is estimated after controlling for a set of other relevant economic and demographic 
factors. 
The overall organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 presents a 
theoretical background for the problem and the econometric strategy adopted for the 
estimation after exploring previous works in this area of study. Section 4.3 explores the 
database and variables and introduces the methodology used to measure the efficiency 
of the judicial system. Section 4.4 presents the estimations using panel data techniques. 
Finally, section 4.5 offers the conclusions of this study. 
 
 
4.2 Modeling the effects of institutions on the housing tenure outcomes 
 
 
4.2.1 Empirical literature review 
 
 
Several economic studies pointed out that a wide group of socio-economic 
factors (economic, demographic or social determinants) affect the decision of buying or 
renting a dwelling (from the point of view of a potential tenant or a potential buyer) or 
the decision of putting a property in the rental market (from the point of view of the 
potential landlord). Among them, the permanent income of individuals, the relative 
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price of buying versus renting (or the user cost), financial restrictions, taxation and 
some demographic variables could be included.59 
Although all the determinants affecting one side of the market will have an 
effect in the equilibrium share of property or tenancy of the economy (and therefore 
would be affecting indirectly both sides of the market in any moment), some studies 
split those factors as mainly “demand factors” or “supply” factors (affecting more 
directly the decisions of landlords). Other determinants, as prices would affect both 
sides of the contracts at the same time and should be treated as endogenous. 
This subsection aims to provide a very partial survey of both the empirical 
literature and the most studied variables affecting the housing tenure choice. Special 
attention is paid to the “demand” or “supply” considerations if they were studied by that 
literature.  
First of all, several works studied the effect of pure demographic factors such as 
the proportion of young population or the proportion of married couples on the share of 
property of the economy (as an outcome of the housing tenure choice) (see Jaffe and 
Rosen, 1979 or Green, 1995). It would be expected that the tenancy rate is positively 
related to the proportion of young population but negatively related to an increase in the 
share of married couples. Following the same references, those factors are usually 
identified as “demand” factors. In fact, the age of a landlord has not been a point of 
discussion in the same research. 
In turn, another demographic factor, the population density, would be affecting 
mainly the landlord decisions (the supply side) and not the tenant side. Linneman 
(1986) argues that landlords face reduced costs of monitoring and higher efficiency in 
supplying housing services in the case of highly populated towns. Thus, we would 
expect to find a negative relation between homeownership and population density 
coming from the landlords side (also Fisher and Jaffe, 2003). 
The effect of wealth in the house tenure decision is also widely studied in the 
literature (De Leeuw and Ekanem, 1971, Haurin et al. 1996). In several studies it is 
found that, among other factors, the homeownership rate is positively related to GDP 
                                                 
59  Other factors cited in the introduction, such as the tenancy Laws are not studied in the rest of this work 
as they will not introduce any interregional variation to exploit in the estimations. 
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per capita or similar income measures (reducing the demand for tenancy), although that 
relation is not always significant (Fisher and Jaffe, 2003).60  
Credit constraints and financial capacity are also determinants of the tenancy or 
property share observed in the economy. They affect mainly the tenant/buyer side as the 
financial constraint will prevent some tenants to buy a property (Jaffe and Rosen 1979, 
Hargreaves, 2003, Lauridsen and Skak, 2007, Mayordomo, 2008). In fact, this effect 
may be coincident with the age, as younger individuals may face higher constraints 
because their actual income is much lower than their future earnings (Lafayette et al. 
1995). 
Finally, the price of renting versus buying affects both sides of the contracts. To 
put it another way, it can be understood as the outcome of the contracts in the market. In 
any case, the higher the price of buying (with respect to the price of renting a dwelling), 
the higher the number of individuals opting for renting a house. The opposite argument 
would hold for the other side of the contract (the landlord/seller). The measure of 
“prices” takes very different forms in the literature: some works have estimated the 
effect of rental prices (Jaffe and Rosen, 1979), while others opt for relative measures. 
For instance, Hendershott and Shilling (1980) studied the effect of the relative cost of 
owner-occupied dwellings and the rental prices. In turn, Rodríguez and Barrios (2004) 
and Barrios and Rodríguez (2004) calculated a user cost taking into account both the 
price of buying and the price of renting and some fiscal issues related to them. Several 
types of public intervention such as the fiscal incentives or the provision of public 
housing may also play a significant role (Rosen, 1979, Rosen and Rosen, 1980, 
Lauridsen and Skak, 2007).  
Thus, in general, while the demand of housing services is directly driven by a 
group of heterogenous factors ranging from demography to wealth, the supply side 
(landlords and sellers) is mainly affected by the interaction with costs, frictions and 
prices (derived from some heterogenous factors such as the user cost, the relative price 
of selling versus renting, the population density or the regulatory measures introduced 
by the tenancy Laws). 
                                                 
60 Theoretically it could even have the opposite sign (Henderson and Ioannides, 1983). See the discussion 
on this topic provided in section 4.2.2. 
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In this context, one extra “cost” or “friction” that a landlord face and that is not 
studied in the previous literature is the “judicial inefficiency”. The landlord, who cannot 
enforce a tenancy contract because the judicial system is slow or costly, will loose part 
of the flow of rents or will loose part of the value of his property.  Thus, an owner may 
decide not to put his dwelling into the tenancy market affecting with his decision the 
share of property and tenancy observed in equilibrium.  
 
 
4.2.2 Theoretical background 
 
 
To integrate all the reasonings offered in this paper, it seems useful to discuss 
how agents (on the demand or supply side of the market) behave in theoretical terms 
when they are confronted to the housing tenure choice. Moreover, it is useful to add to 
that theoretical background how those agents react when they are confronted to an 
inefficient judicial system.  
 
Henderson and Ioannides (1983) offer a useful model for this issue as they study 
the behavior of both owners and renters through their decisions to invest or consume 
housing services. If the investment demand for housing is large enough relative to 
consumption demand, the individual will own a dwelling and will rent part of the “free 
space” in the housing market. Thus, that individual will be a landlord offering housing 
services. On the contrary, if the consumption demand is larger than investment demand, 
the individual will opt for renting and will not own a house (that individual will be 
observed as a tenant consuming housing services but not investing).  
In the model, the housing consumption demand will depend on several factors 
such as wealth, the income path or financial restrictions. For instance, an individual 
confronted to less wealth at the beginning of his lifetime will be a renter if he is also 
confronted to financial restrictions.   
It is even more relevant for this paper to observe how the investment side works. 
If the profitability of investing in housing diminishes, less “space” will be offered in the 
market (the number of “landlords” will diminish in the economy). In fact, the 
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profitability of the investment in housing services is affected by several factors such as 
maintenance costs, taxation or depreciation. As it was already introduced, the aim of 
this chapter is to study the effects on the market of a very specific transaction cost: the 
judicial inefficiency that will affect exclusively the landlords. 
Following Henderson and Ioannides (1983) the individuals maximize the 
following multi-period utility function (4.1).  
 
 
)())(,( wVhufxU c +            (4.1) 
 
Where U stands for the utility obtained from the consumption bundle and V (w) 
stands for the indirect utility function of wealth remaining after period 1. The services 
obtained from a house (as a durable good) are determined by u (the rate of utilization) 
and hc (the capacity).  X stands for the consumption in period 1 of the numeraire. 
If the individual is an owner, he will maximize the utility function subject to the 
following constraints (4.2): 
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Where T(u) is the utilization cost function, Y represents income, P is the market 
purchase price of a unit of housing stock, S is savings and r is the rate of interest. 
If the individual is a tenant, the constraints he faces are the following (4.3): 
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Where R stands for the rental price of housing and τ (u) is the tenant cost 
function.  
To introduce the judicial inefficiency (J) in the model of Henderson and 
Ioannides (1983) the utilization cost function of the dwelling could be modelized as 
(4.4): 
 
 
2)( JuuT α=        (4.4) 
 
 
J will increase the transaction costs for the landlord. Three different ways to 
measure J will be explained in section 4.3.2. In any case, the judicial inefficiency (J) 
will take always positive values. α is a parameter and u is the rate of utilization. As 
required, T(u) is a convex function: T’(u)>0 and T’’(u)>0. 
On the other hand, the tenant cost function could take the following simple form 
that is not depending on the judicial efficiency (4.5): 
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Where τ (u) is also a convex function. τ’(u)>0 and τ’’(u)>0. 
With those two cost functions, the equilibrium condition of the Henderson-
Ioannides model will take the following form (4.6): 
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Thus, following that derivation, in equilibrium the rate of utilization will depend 
negatively on the judicial inefficiency. As it was already said, judicial inefficiency can 
be understood as a cost for the landlord. 
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J and r are considered to be exogenous variables affecting the equilibrium but R 
and P (together with the quantity of housing services in the market) are defined within 
the model.61 Therefore, in an econometric implementation R and P should be treated as 
endogenous and thus they must be instrumented. For instance, an exogenous shock 
increasing the judicial inefficiency will affect the equilibrium price and quantity of 
housing services through a shift in the supply side (or investment) of housing services 
but not through the demand curve as defined before. Thus, in the case of estimating 
econometrically the supply curve we will have to instrument the price (or the user cost) 
using for instance strictly “demand” instruments (that is, demand shifters which are not 
affecting directly the supply side). 
Theoretically, Henderson and Ioannides (1983) provide a discussion on some 
important factors affecting the equilibrium mainly thorough the demand side of housing 
services (that is, those who actually rent their consumption of housing services). In their 
model, higher wealth individuals will be renters, even though that is not the general 
                                                 
61 In section 4.3 a “user cost” is defined using both R and P. 
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finding in the empirical literature (see above) and the result is found without taking into 
account life cycle considerations. The issue of the life cycle is partly taken into account 
in this chapter through the use of the proportion of “young population” as instrument in 
the econometric model. 
Capital market imperfections also play a role in the Henderson and Ioannides 
model and are taken into account in this chapter (although through a very imperfect 
measure). Following the theoretical model, those with a high wealth in the future but a 
low wealth in the present will opt for renting rather than for owning. That can be 
understood as a result of the difficulties that the agents face when they try to smooth 
consumption and investment through time if there are capital market imperfections.    
 
 
4.2.3 Empirical strategy 
 
 
As it was already introduced, the objective of this research is to offer estimations 
of the effect of the inefficiency of the judicial system on the proportion of property in 
the economy. Judicial inefficiency can be understood as an extra cost that landlords face 
when they rent their properties in the market. Therefore, in this chapter it is proposed to 
estimate a supply curve. 
 
As it was discussed before, the “price” (taking the form of a relative rent or a 
user cost) will be an endogenous variable as a simultaneity problem arises. That is, the 
price and quantity are jointly determined by the demand and supply curves of the 
market. Thus, as the objective is to estimate a supply curve the price will be 
instrumented using several demand shifters (proportion of young renters, wealth and the 
proportion of social housing).62   
The following general model is proposed (equation 4.7):  
 
 
                                                 
62 See next sections. 
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Share of property in the province i,t = c + ∑ctTt  + β1 “Price” i,t  
+ β2 Judicial inefficiencyi,t + β3 Densityi,t  + (ηi + νi,t ) 
(4.7) 
 
 
Measuring β2 is the focus of this research. We also expect that the population 
density is negatively related to the property share. The “price” will take the form of a 
user cost or a relative price and will affect both landlords and tenants. As this research 
aims to estimate a supply curve, the price should enter the equation with a positive sign. 
Other controls such as regional effects and time effects will be included. 
 
 
4.3 Definition of variables and data sources 
 
4.3.1 Variables in the supply curve 
 
4.3.1.1 Housing tenure 
 
 
The proportion of property among the total number of principal dwellings in 
Spain (called “Prprop” in what follows) is chosen as dependent variable in this research. 
That proportion is the aggregate counterpart of the individual housing tenure decision. 
An increase in that proportion is expected if ceteris paribus the judicial system becomes 
more inefficient when solving conflicts affecting the rental market (that is, if renting 
becomes more “problematic”). The data are obtained from the Spanish Ministry of 
Housing (2008) and are available for the period 2001-2007 for 50 Spanish provinces 
(then, excluding Ceuta and Melilla).63 This classification divides the principal 
residences in three groups: dwellings in the property market, dwellings in the tenancy 
market, and “transferred dwellings” (cessions or non-lucrative use of the houses). In 
2007, 87,1% of the dwellings were in the property market, 11,2% were in the tenancy 
                                                 
63 Note that the data is provided in November of each year and not in January. That fact is taken into 
account in the estimations. 
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market and 1,6% were “transferred houses” (cessions). Table 4.1 shows the descriptive 
statistics of this variable. As it was said in the introduction, the share of property in the 
Spanish economy is very high (with a mean of 88,6% over the whole period)64 although 
some strong differences can still be found among provinces (share below 80% in the 
Balearic Islands, Las Palmas, Girona or Barcelona in several years and above 94% in 
Lugo, Soria or Castellón at the end of the period). Thus, there is some ground to explain 
and exploit inter-provincial differences. Table 4.2 presents the property shares in 2001 
and 2007. 
 
 
4.3.1.2 Efficiency of the judicial system 
 
 
The owner who wants to collect an unpaid rent or wants to evict a tenant for 
whatever reason (non-payment, vandalism) in Spain has to use the procedures set up by 
the CPL.65  
As it was discussed in chapter 3, the CPL is the basic procedural regulation of 
the judicial system for civil disputes. It establishes the rules of access to the court 
system, the formalisms that the parties must observe, the role of the judge or the court, 
the rules governing evidence, the control by superior instances and all related issues. 
Therefore that Law is a main determinant of the “aggregated” slow (or fast) 
performance of the judicial system in Spain. Although it is a national-wide Law, its 
application differs among Spanish provinces. A reasonable explanation for that is that 
the workload of the judges may be different among the provinces and that the resources 
invested in the justice Administration differ at least at a region66 level. As, in general, 
the courts are not specialized in Spain, no information exist on the means invested by 
type of conflict. In any case, it is possible to observe that the efficiency of the judicial 
                                                 
64 Mean computed excluding Ceuta and Melilla. 
65 It must be noted that some extrajudicial solutions may be found by the parties, as sending the case to 
arbitration. However, only a judge can execute an eviction in Spain.  
66 The so called “Comunidades Autónomas”. Even though the “judicial power” is not transferred to the 
regions, the management of the means of the “judicial power” is influenced by the policies developed by 
the regions. For instance, they decide how much resources are invested in new courts each year in their 
territories, even though the new courts are integrated in a system that is centrally governed.  
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system diverges among the different provinces of Spain over time so that a panel with 
information on the functioning of the judicial system could be constructed. It is 
reasonable to expect that in the most inefficient provinces, in which it is more difficult 
to evict a non-paying tenant or it is more difficult to have the rent paid through the 
judicial system, landlords will opt to quit the tenancy market (and thus the share of 
tenancy in the province will diminish). 
For tackling this problem, a relevant question arises: What are the specific 
procedures needed for recovering an unpaid rent (by a tenant) in Spain? The CPL 
(2000) establishes a method for recovering such a debt: first, a “declaratory judgment” 
will “declare” the existence of the debt and will declare the obligation of the debtor to 
pay. We can call that “first stage” or “first procedure” because there is still the 
possibility that the tenant decides not to pay the debt. In such a case, a final or 
definitive, procedure (“executory process”) takes place. In the “executory” stage the 
creditor asks the judge to “execute” the debt. As a result of this final procedure, the 
judge will seize the amount from the bank accounts of the debtor and probably will 
evict him from the dwelling.  
The General Council of the Judicial Power (Consejo General del Poder Judicial, 
CGPJ) has published a database reporting the number of cases filed, solved and still 
pending in the Spanish judicial system by subject, region, court67 and year. From that 
database three relative measures of efficiency can be constructed for the enforcement of 
each procedure: the resolution rate, the pending cases rate and the congestion rate (see 
the equations grouped as (4.8)). The resolution rate is defined as the ratio between the 
cases resolved and the cases that entered the system for a specific year and for a type of 
procedure. The pending cases rate is defined as the ratio between pending cases in a 
specific year and the cases resolved in the same period. Finally, the congestion rate is 
defined as the ratio between the sum of pending cases plus new cases in a specific year 
and the cases resolved in that same year. Higher resolution rate, lower pending cases 
rate and lower congestion rate are related to greater efficiency of the judicial system. 
 
                                                 
67 The “courts” analyzed in this study are the “juzgados de primera instancia” and the “juzgados de 
primera instancia e instrucción”.  Those are the courts available for the parties at the “entry level”. 
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The CGPJ offers homogeneous data for the different procedures for the period 
2001-2007.68 Table 4.3 shows the results for those computations. The prefix “prt” 
precedes the efficiency measures related to procedures in the “declaratory stage” (or as 
we called it, “first” procedure): prtresolution, prtpendency and prtcongestion. The prefix 
“ex” precedes the type of efficiency measure related to the executions: exresolution, 
expendency and excongestion. 
Both stages (declaratory judgment and execution) have been analyzed 
econometrically following the estimations explained in section 4.4. The efficiency in the 
declaratory stage has no significant effect on the share of property. Therefore, this 
chapter focuses the analysis on the final or definitive step (execution). Nevertheless, this 
is an interesting result by itself as it will be discussed in the conclusions. 
With respect to the first measure of efficiency related to executions, 
exresolution, the following can be said: on average the judicial system was able to solve 
nearly the same amount of cases that were entering the courts (resolution rate of 0,87). 
This does not imply a constant workload because some conflicts may be waiting in the 
pile at the beginning of the year (this aspect is better analyzed with more complete 
measures of efficiency as the pendency cases rate and the congestion rate). Even though 
some provinces underperformed quite radically (minimum of 0,42), others were able to 
solve two times more cases than the number of new cases entering the system, and thus 
were able to reduce the workload for future periods. Figure 4.1 represents the resolution 
rate in the Spanish provinces in 2001 and 2007. As it can be seen in the figure, the 
                                                 
68 Note that the new CPL (2000) entered info force in 8th of January of 2001. This new CPL changed 
radically several aspects of the civil procedures (see chapter 3) and therefore it is not advisable to relate 
the data after 2001 with previous observations in this specific research. 
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resolution rate diminished all over Spain (thus, the efficiency of the system diminished 
over time). 
On average (see table 4.3), almost three times more cases were pending (waiting 
to be solved) with respect to the cases that the courts were able to solve. As before, 
although some provinces had, on average, very good results (pendency rate of 0,46), 
other provinces had more than seven times more cases waiting to be solved than the 
average workload they were able to solve in a year. Figure 4.2 represents the pendency 
rate in 2001 and 2007. The rate grew over the period denoting a reduction in the 
efficiency of the system. 
Finally, an average congestion rate of 3,97 over the period 1999-2007 (see table 
4.3) indicates that around four cases (summing up the pending cases and the new cases 
arriving to the courts in a specific year) where waiting to be solved when the courts 
were able to solve just one. In the worst case, this amount was almost 10. Figure 4.3 
represents this quotient for the years 2001 and 2007. As before, a reduction in the 
efficiency of the system can be observed. 
No specific provincial pattern seems to show up in the reduction of the 
efficiency of the judicial system. However, the Basque Country has a better 
performance in both the pendency and congestion rates all over the period. 
Figure 4.4 represents the average resolution, pendency and congestion rates over 
the period 2001 and 2007. The figure confirms the reduction in efficiency already seen 
in the maps. The graph also represents the average property rate in the same period. As 
it can be seen in this figure, a reduction in the efficiency of the judicial system when 
solving tenancy conflicts (by a reduction of the resolution rate or an increase in the 
congestion and pendency rates) took place at the same time that the property rate was 
increasing. 
It must be noted that the “inefficiency” observed today may not affect the 
housing tenure decision today but probably in future periods. Owners may change their 
preferences observing the difficulties of other owners to evict problematic tenants some 
periods ago. That makes necessary to study the judicial variables lagged several periods. 
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Thus, in the estimations (section 4.4), the judicial variables enter the analysis with up to 
four lags. 
 
 
4.3.1.3 Price and user cost 
 
 
In the main estimations a measure of “user cost” (Usercost) is included as a 
independent variable (it will be treated as an endogenous variable in the estimations). 
The user cost is constructed as follows (see equation (4.9)): 
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=
δ
         (4.9) 
 
 
PViv is the price of the squared meter of the average house in the province 
(obtained from the official accounts of the Ministry of Housing) and PRent is the rent 
paid for renting a squared meter in the average dwelling offered for renting in the 
province. The Ministry of Housing of Spain provides the average rent by province just 
for 2006 so the series have been enlarged following the evolution of the component of 
the consumer price index (CPI) that captures the evolution of the rents. The resulting 
variable is defined for the period 2001-2007. “i” is the interest rate69 that changes across 
time but no across provinces (see table 4.4). Finally, I also add a house depreciation rate 
“δ” of 2%.70 Finally ∆PViv stands for the inter-annual increase in the housing price. 
“Price to rent” is a variable constructed as the quotient of the price of the 
squared meter of the average house in the province and the rent paid for renting a 
                                                 
69 Interest rate on lending for house purchase. 
70 Following the Spanish Census of 2001, 2% of the buildings were in poor condition. I opt to use that 
percentage, although other sources point to higher rates: Naredo et al. (2005) propose a rate of house 
demolition of 0,0397, the American Housing Survey arrives to a rate of 0,0295 and in the case of France 
the rate would be 0,025. 
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squared meter in the average dwelling offered for renting in the province. As before, the 
variable is defined for the period 2001-2007. 
 
 
4.3.1.4 Population density 
 
 
As it was already discussed, it also seems advisable to control the results by the 
population density (“density”) of the province as a way to control for the diversity of 
provinces in Spain and for the “efficiency” of landlords (Linneman, 1986). Related to 
that, previous works have found a reduced share of property in areas with higher urban 
population (Fisher and Jaffe, 2003). The population distribution in Spain differs greatly 
among provinces. On the one hand the population in Spain is concentrated in the coastal 
provinces (Barcelona, Valencia, Málaga, etc). On the other hand, some provinces inland 
are quite low populated and have not attracted much of the new immigrants (Soria, 
Teruel, etc). See table 4.1 for some summary statistics. 
 
 
4.3.2 “Demand shifters” and other controls 
 
 
4.3.2.1 Demographic variables 
 
 
This research proposes to instrument the “price” by the following 
“demographic” variables: the proportion of “young” population in the Spanish 
provinces (ppob2039) defined as the ratio of population that is 20 to 39 years old and 
that it is expected to have a higher proportion of tenancy than other population groups 
(although, at the same time, it is the group that applies more actively for mortgages) 
(Rodríguez and Barrios, 2004), the rate of nuptiality in the province, as it can influence 
the decision of buying a house (nuptiality) and the proportion of foreign population 
living in the province (foreign) because immigrants may be inclined towards renting as 
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a result of their higher mobility. These variables are obtained from the official 
municipal population accounts (Padrón Municipal, INE). However, in the final 
estimations, the rate of nuptiality and the share of foreign population are not included as 
they do not have any significant impact in the relation. 
 
 
4.3.2.2 “Financial” variables 
 
 
Probably the most important controls to include in this study are those that can 
be grouped as “financial” variables: a measure of income per capita and two measures 
of easiness of access to credit and financial services (bankarization of the province and 
credit constraint). As it was already discussed, both of them were studied theoretically 
by Henderson and Ioannides (1983). 
“ln GDPpc” represent the logarithm of the current GDP per capita once 
corrected by provincial purchasing power parities (PPPs). The source of the raw data is 
the regional accounts of the National Statistics Institute (INE). The information on 
provincial PPPs is obtained from Alcaide Inchausti et al. (2004) and Alcaide Inchausti 
and Alcaide Guindo (2008). Higher income is related in the literature with a higher 
weight of the property markets. The rate of temporary employment, that is another 
typical macro variable, showed up to be non significant in this study.71 
An increased access to financial services may also make available more credit to 
the individuals, and therefore may increase the share of property in the province. No 
direct measures of “financial” or “credit constrained” families is available for the 
Spanish economy for the whole period. Just some surveys provide that information for 
very specific years. Thus, it is necessary to construct alternative variables providing 
similar information for all the period under analysis. Two variables are proposed in this 
study: a measure of “bankarization” and an ad hoc measure of credit constraint 
(“credit”)(see below).   
                                                 
71 Obtained from the EPA micro-data. 
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“Bankarization”, that could be understood as a proxy for banking competition, is 
a variable constructed as the quotient of the number of banks, savings banks and other 
financial offices in a specific province and the population of the province in the specific 
year. The hypothesis could be that if more banks compete in the province more credit 
could be available. This variable does not have significant effects on the share of 
property. 
Finally, it would be interesting to control for a variable of “credit constraint”. As 
it was already discussed, no specific variable is available at a provincial level in Spain 
for all the years of study. Thus, this study captures that concept through at ad hoc 
variable called “credit”. “Credit” would be the residual (µi,t) of the following estimation:  
 
 
Number of Mortgages i,t = c + λ 1 GDPpc i,t + λ 2 ppob2039 i,t + λ 3 Coast i,t +µ i,t 
(4.10) 
 
 
The residual of the regression (4.10) will assign a positive sign to the provinces 
and years in which the number of mortgages given to the families (obtained from the 
statistics of the National Statistics Institute and the Bank of Spain-Eurosystem) is still 
positive (on average) after controlling for its wealth (GDP per capita, with the same 
source as before), its population (taken as young population as defined before) and a 
dummy variable (“coast”) taking value 1 for the Mediterranean and Andalusian coastal 
provinces plus the Balearic islands and the Canary islands).72 It seems necessary to 
control for the variable “coast” as those provinces are a typical destination of tourism 
and foreign real-estate investments and that would be influencing the number of 
mortgages observed in the statistics. Please note that the dependent variable of 
regression (4.10) is the number of mortgages and not the quantity of those mortgages 
(although that information is also available). That seems better because taking the 
quantity of the mortgages would bias the estimations in favour of provinces such as 
                                                 
72 “Coast” takes value 1 for the following provinces: Girona, Barcelona, Tarragona, Castellón, Valencia, 
Alicante, Murcia, Almería, Granada, Málaga, Sevilla, Cádiz, Balearic Islands and Canary Islands 
(provinces of Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Las Palmas
 167 
Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, San Sebastian etc. in which the prices of housing are 
much higher than in the rest of Spain.   
Thus, this variable ideally captures unexpected easiness of credit after 
controlling for the most typical and expected factors of concession of mortgages. 
Therefore it would be taken as a proxy for the inverse of credit constraint.73 Table 4.1 
presents some summary statistics of the variables already discussed. 
 
 
4.3.2.3 Public support, rule of law and other variables 
 
 
An issue that may add some variation among the Spanish provinces is the 
differential “government support” (see among others, Atterhög, 2005) of renting or 
buying in the different regions or provinces of Spain. The provinces have no power to 
pass specific tax deductions to rent or to buy a dwelling, although the regions 
(Comunidades Autónomas) do have that power.74 Table 4.5 presents the evidence of 
regional tax deductions applied to home ownership (O) or tenancy (T) in the period 
2002-2007.75 It also highlights that the Basque Country and Navarre have a special 
(foral, F) tax system. It must be noted that no one of the deductions applicable in the 
rest of regions are “general deductions” because they apply to very specific population 
groups (young residents, handicapped citizens, etc.) or to special circumstances (for 
instance small towns in risk of population loss).  
As a result, it would be advisable to take into account the different taxing 
systems in the Basque Country and Navarre. However, note that as long as the model 
will be estimated including fixed effects or transforming the data taking first differences 
(see section 4.4) a dummy variable, “basque”, taking value 1 for the three Basque 
                                                 
73 The residual takes positive values in all the years for the following provinces: A Coruña, Alicante, 
Asturias, Badajoz, Barcelona, Cáceres, Córdoba, Jaen, León, Madrid, Málaga, Ourense, Sevilla, Valencia 
and Toledo. 
74 Local taxes (as the IBI, “impuesto de bienes inmuebles”) are not taken into account although they could 
add some variation. 
75 The Law 21/2001 of December 27th established that the regions (Comunidades Autónomas) had the 
possibility to pass new deductions on the basis of personal or family circumstance or non-entrepreneurial 
investments. 
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provinces (Alava, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya) will be dropped in any case because of 
collinearity.76 With respect to the rest of deductions, it does not seem advisable to 
construct variables to capture all those effects for the following reasons (taking into 
account the small number of observations available for this research): most of them 
apply to young population, thus their effect is captured by the proportion of young 
population in the province, ppob2039, (that will be taken into account in the 
estimations). With respect to other deductions applicable for even more specific 
circumstances (handicapped citizens, targeted towns), their scope is too limited to be 
taken into account in this setup. 
A final relevant question would be: Are there other main interventions in the 
housing market in Spain? Spain has some strong instruments of intervention, such as a 
general house ownership deduction, a National Housing Plan and a Tenancy Law (see 
chapter 2) affecting the rules of the tenancy contracts. The Tenancy Law is the same for 
all the provinces and thus is not taken into account in this research. However, as result 
of the Housing plans, the number of social houses constructed in the provinces may 
differ.  This fact is taken into account through the variable “shousing” that is defined as 
the proportion of social housing (houses sold or rented at prices below market price by 
the public administration) over the total number of houses in the specific year and 
province. 
Other studies (Gwin and Ong, 2004) argue that the approach to the “rule of 
Law” may be different in different countries and that can influence the housing market. 
In the case of this research it can be argued that it is not expected to obtain significant 
variations in the “rule of Law” among the different provinces of a single country like 
Spain. Moreover, the relevant information about the “rule of Law” (if we can capture it 
as “delinquency” in the tenancy market) is already captured by the judicial system 
ratios. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
76 No dummy for Navarre is included in the panel data regressions as its differential effect must be 
captured by the fixed effects. Please note that Navarre is a province and a “region” at the same time. 
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4.4 Estimation and results 
 
 
Following section 4.2 and the variables discussed in section 4.3, the subsequent 
model (equation 4.11) will be estimated following 2-step (instrumental variables) 
generalized method of moments (GMM estimation) (Wooldridge, 2001, Arellano 2002, 
Baum et al. 2003).  
Two sets of results are provided to take into account two different ways to 
transform the data: tables 4.6 to 4.8 provide the results when fixed effects (FE) are 
included. Tables 4.9 to 4.11 provide the results when “first differences” (FD) are taken.  
In all the cases the standard errors provided are robust to both heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation. 
 
 
Prprop i,t = c + ∑ctTt  + β1 Usercost i,t + β2 Excongestion i,t-3+ β3 Densityi,t+ (ηi + νi,t ) 
(4.11)  
 
 
In equation 4.11 the dependent variable is the proportion of property in the 
province. As independent variables it includes mainly “supply” factors: the rate of 
efficiency of the judicial system and density. Time dummies are included to take into 
account the cycle. Wald tests of significance for those time dummies are reported in the 
tables. 
As it was already discussed, the user cost approximates the relation between the 
price to buy and the price to rent. Those prices are present in the decisions of both 
tenants and landlords and therefore connect both sides of the market. Thus, in this kind 
of “simultaneity”, the user cost will be instrumented. 
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As instruments a set of variables affecting directly the demand side of the market 
is chosen: the proportion of young population in the province (ppob2039) and its lagged 
value, the proxy to credit constraint (credit) and its lagged value, the lagged value of 
income per capita (ln GDPpc) and the proportion of social housing in the province 
(Shousing). Also the lagged user cost will be included as instrument. For choosing the 
set of instruments and providing evidence of their validity, the Hansen J statistic (as 
overidentification test) is computed with satisfactory results in all the cases.77 Note that 
in general the strategy of including as instruments the lagged dependent variables of 
equation 4.11 has been avoided thus providing a more robust experiment. 
Following section 4.3.1.2 judicial efficiency has been studied in its three 
definitions (congestion, pendency and resolution rates). Excongestion, expendency and 
exresolution enter the equation lagged several periods, up to four, taking into account 
that the decision to put a dwelling into the tenancy market may take into account the 
“judicial environment” observed some periods before. This fact would also mitigate any 
problems of endogeneity of the judicial variables. In any case, there are no reasons to 
suspect of the endogeneity of the judicial variables in this research. The courts taken 
into account in this study (“juzgados de primera instancia” and “juzgados de primera 
instancia e instruccion”) are not specialized courts and solve very different types of 
conflicts, ranging from inheritance conflicts to some bankruptcy proceedings, thus the 
distribution of tenancy conflicts (generated in part by the amount of tenancy and 
property contracts in the province) is not necessarily influencing the distribution of 
“juzgados de primera instancia” and “primera instancia e instrucción”). 
Finally, for completeness, tables 4.12 to 4.17 show the results of the estimation 
of this alternative model (equation 4.12) similar to the previous one, but including the 
measure of simple relative prices (pricetorent) instead of the user cost.78 
 
Prprop i,t = c + ∑ctTt  + β1 Pricetorent i,t + β2 Excongestion i,t-3+ β3 Densityi,t+ (...) 
+ (ηi + νi,t ) 
(4.12) 
                                                 
77 Note that this research does not assume homoskedasticity. Otherwise, the Sargan´s statistic would be 
reported. 
78 Thus, the usercost (t-1) is not used as instrument in this case. 
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4.4.1 Results       
 
 
First of all it is worth noting that both the user cost (in tables 4.6 to 4.11) and the 
relative price (in tables 4.12 to 4.17) enter the equation with a positive sign. The sign 
confirms that a supply curve has been estimated once it is taken into account that the 
overidentification tests were passed satisfactorily. On the one hand, when fixed effects 
are included, the effect of the user cost is significant and quite robust to different 
specifications. On the other hand, when first differences are taken, the results for the 
variables are generally not significant. However, the sign keeps on being positive in the 
majority of cases. Also, it should be taken into account that taking first differences has a 
high cost in terms of estimation in the case of this panel. Note that the T is very short 
and therefore an important part of heterogeneity is lost when we loose one year in the 
estimations.   
 
“Density” has the expected (negative) sign in all the cases. When fixed effects 
are included the variable is significant at 1% level and the results are quite robust to the 
different specifications. When first differences are taken, the significance reduces to 5% 
and keeps the negative sign.  
 
Finally, looking at the results for the judicial variables when fixed effects are 
included, the expected effects are found. First of all, it is found that a higher congestion 
or pendency rates have positive effects in the share of houses in the property market (by 
definition, in the case of the resolution rate the effect is the opposite). That is, a lower 
efficiency of the judicial system attracts more houses to the property market. That is to 
say that a “problematic” tenancy market prevents the owners/landlords to put their 
dwellings into the tenancy market. 
Table 4.6 shows that an increase in one point in the congestion rate would 
increase, the share of property in around 0,14-0,21 percentage points. Thus, taking the 
example of Madrid, the decrease in the congestion rate would attract to the rental 
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market an amount of around 3200-4800 dwellings. Those results are significant at 
around 5% or 1% respectively.  
Table 4.7 shows the results of the estimations when we consider the pending 
cases rate instead of the congestion rate as a measure of efficiency. The results are 
consistent with the previous ones. An increase of the pendency rate in one point would 
increases the property share of the province in around 0,17-0,27 percentage points 
(around 3900-6200 houses in Madrid). The results are significant at 5% level. In the 
case of estimating equation 4.12, the effect of the pendency rate would be around 0,16 
percentage points.  
Finally, an increase in one point of the resolution rate (see table 4.8) implies a 
reduction in the property rate of around 0,68 percentage points (that would be 
approximately 15000 houses passing from the property market to the tenancy market 
and related options in Madrid). However, the effect is not always significant in the case 
of the resolution rate. In the case of estimating equation 4.12, the effect of the resolution 
rate would be around 0,55 percentage points.  
 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
 
This research presents some estimations of the effect of the efficiency of the 
judicial system on the proportion of property in the housing markets of the Spanish 
provinces. The problem is analyzed econometrically through panel data techniques. 
Specifically, the generalized method of moments (two-step GMM) is used in the 
estimations as several instrumental variables are taken into account. This study is the 
first one in the economic literature tackling the case of Spain at the local level. 
Judicial efficiency is measured in three different ways (through the resolution 
rate, the pending cases rate and the congestion rate) for two stages of the procedure: the 
declaratory stage and its final executory stage.  
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First of all, this research does not find any significant impact of the efficiency in 
the declaratory stage on the housing property share. However, this research concludes 
that an increase in the judicial efficiency in the execution stage would reduce the share 
of property in the Spanish provinces. The effect amounts from 0,1 to 0,7 percentage 
points of the housing market depending on the efficiency rate taken into account. That 
effect would be denoting that homeowners avoid the tenancy market when they cannot 
enforce the contracts.   
The discussions presented in this research give some ground to improve the 
efficiency of the judicial system, at least in the execution stage, as a way to develop the 
Spanish tenancy market.    
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Figure 4.1: Resolution rate (executory stage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self elaboration and Consejo General del Poder Judicial (2009). 
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Figure 4.2: Pendency rate (executory stage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self elaboration and Consejo General del Poder Judicial (2009). 
2001
2007
De 0 a 1,89
De 1,90 a 
De 2,40 a 3,49
Más de 3,50
0 to 1,89
1,90 to 2,39
2,40 to 3,49
>= 3,50
 181 
Figure 4.3: Congestion rate (executory stage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self elaboration and Consejo General del Poder Judicial (2009). 
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Figure 4.4: Judicial efficiency (executory stage) and the property rate in Spain 
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Table 4.1: Dependent variable and controls 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self elaboration (see table for raw data sources) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Sources
Prpr 350 88,66 3,58 77,37 95,58 MVIV
Ln GDPpc 364 9,69 0,19 9,27 10,18 INE (Regional accounts)
Usercost 300 -13,43 16,34 -67,84 31,59 Banco de España, INE, MVIV
Pricetorent 350 346 93,57 150,96 642,57 INE, MVIV
Density 364 285,27 859,74 8,80 5260,92 INE (Padrón)
Ppop2039 364 31,32 2,69 25,05 38,31 INE (Padrón)
Credit 312 -444,78 24441,21 -33022,94 124393,2 Banco de España, INE
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Table 4. 2: Share of property in the Spanish provinces  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
province Share of property province Share of property
Baleares 77,37 Girona 78,85
Las Palmas 78,30 Barcelona 79,91
Barcelona 80,88 Las Palmas 81,47
Santa Cruz Tenerife 81,45 Baleares 82,91
Girona 82,46 Madrid 83,06
Cádiz 83,27 Santa Cruz Tenerife 84,58
Madrid 84,49 Cádiz 85,22
Asturias 84,49 Málaga 85,53
A Coruña 84,79 Pontevedra 86,19
León 85,39 Ourense 86,50
Cáceres 85,47 Asturias 86,71
Almería 85,60 Huesca 87,33
Lleida 85,78 Guipúzcoa 87,58
Pontevedra 85,94 Zaragoza 87,91
Tarragona 86,06 Segovia 87,96
Badajoz 86,17 Sevilla 88,04
Málaga 86,25 A Coruña 88,20
Granada 86,43 Cuenca 88,29
Zaragoza 86,66 León 88,38
Huelva 87,46 Álava 88,63
Segovia 87,75 Burgos 88,76
Murcia 88,01 Badajoz 89,74
Albacete 88,47 Almería 89,79
Huesca 88,49 Cáceres 89,82
Valladolid 88,56 Granada 90,05
Córdoba 88,73 Tarragona 90,22
Palencia 88,78 Valladolid 90,90
La Rioja 88,78 Huelva 91,19
Salamanca 88,85 Valencia 91,21
Cantabria 88,90 Salamanca 91,33
Castellón 89,01 Cantabria 91,36
Alicante 89,04 Alicante 91,36
Sevilla 89,08 Murcia 91,54
Jaén 89,20 Córdoba 91,67
Burgos 89,29 Palencia 91,93
Teruel 89,35 Ciudad Real 91,95
Soria 89,48 La Rioja 91,99
Ciudad Real 89,68 Lleida 92,71
Valencia 89,79 Guadalajara 92,75
Toledo 90,02 Toledo 92,79
Ourense 90,03 Albacete 92,82
Guipúzcoa 90,12 Navarra 93,17
Navarra 90,14 Jaén 93,25
Guadalajara 90,60 Zamora 93,27
Ávila 90,61 Vizcaya 93,50
Lugo 90,69 Ávila 93,84
Zamora 90,82 Teruel 94,00
Cuenca 91,32 Castellón 94,44
Vizcaya 91,55 Soria 95,36
Álava 91,65 Lugo 95,58
20072001
Source: Ministry of Housing of Spain (2008) and self elaboration 
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Table 4. 3: Judicial system variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CGPJ (2009) and self elaboration 
Type of procedure Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Declaratory Prtresolution 350 0,92 0,14 0,39 1,18
Declaratory Prtpendency 350 0,41 0,16 0,13 1,59
Declaratory Prtcongestion 350 1,53 0,36 1,03 4,17
Execution Exresolution 350 0,87 0,20 0,42 2,02
Execution Expendency 350 2,77 0,98 0,46 7,59
Execution Excongestion 350 3,97 1,20 1,20 9,99
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Table 4.4: Interest rate on lending for house purchase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Banco de España – Eurosystem (2009) 
Year i
2000 0,058
2001 0,059
2002 0,049
2003 0,039
2004 0,034
2005 0,033
2006 0,042
2007 0,052
2008 0,057
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Table 4.5: Fiscal regimes in the Spanish Autonomous Regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region (Comunidad Autónoma) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Andalusia O,T O,T O,T O,T O,T
Aragón
Balearic Islands O O,T O,T O,T O,T
Canary Islands O,T
Cantabria O,T O,T O,T
Castile-La Mancha
Castile and León O O,T O,T
Catalonia T O,T T T T
Valencian Community O, T O,T O,T O,T O,T O,T
Extremadura O O O O,T O,T O,T
Galicia T T T T T
Madrid T T T T T
Murcia O O O O O O
Navarre F F F F F F
Basque Country F F F F F F
Asturias O,T O,T O,T O,T O,T
La Rioja O O O O O O
Source: Agencia Tributaria (Spanish Ministry of Economics) (2009) and 
self elaboration. 
 
O: regional home ownership tax deduction 
T: regional house tenancy tax deduction 
F: foral tax regime 
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Table 4. 6: Effects of the judicial congestion rate and the user cost (FE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM
Data transformation FE FE
Excongestion (t-3) 0,137
0,05**
Excongestion (t-4) 0,213
0,071***
User cost 0,079 0,064
0,033*** 0,031**
Density -0,072 -0,051
0,02*** 0,02**
Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 250 200
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value)  0.709 0.834
Wald Test for time dummies 0 0
Source: self elaboration. 
Dependent variable: Share of property 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: User cost 
Instruments: User cost (t-1), Ppop2039, Ppop2039 (t-1), Credit, Credit (t-1), ln GDPpc (t-1), Shousing 
*** p<1% 
** p<5% 
* p<10% 
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Table 4.7: Effects of the judicial pendency rate and the user cost (FE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM
Data transformation FE FE
Expendency (t-3) 0,176
0,09**
Expendency (t-4) 0,274
0,134**
User cost 0,075 0,061
0,031** 0,035*
Density -0,070 -0,048
0,02*** 0,02**
Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 250 200
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,7289 0,8103
Wald Test for time dummies 0 0
Source: self elaboration. 
Dependent variable: Share of property 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: User cost 
Instruments: User cost (t-1), Ppop2039, Ppop2039 (t-1), Credit, Credit (t-1), ln GDPpc (t-1), Shousing 
*** p<1% 
** p<5% 
* p<10% 
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Table 4.8: Effects of the judicial resolution rate and the user cost (FE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM
Data transformation FE FE
Exresolution (t-3) -0,05
0,315
Exresolution (t-4) -0,69
0,284**
User cost 0,073 0,06
0,03** 0,022***
Density -0,067 -0,052
0,021*** 0,022***
Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 250 200
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,727 0,803
Wald Test for time dummies 0 0
Source: self elaboration. 
Dependent variable: Share of property 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: User cost 
Instruments: User cost (t-1), Ppop2039, Ppop2039 (t-1), Credit, Credit (t-1), ln GDPpc (t-1), Shousing 
*** p<1% 
** p<5% 
* p<10% 
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Table 4.9: Effects of the judicial congestion rate and the user cost (FD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM
Data transformation FD FD
Excongestion (t-3) 0,046
0,016***
Excongestion (t-4) 0,064
0,024***
User cost 0,000 0,003
0,002 0,004
Density -0,041 -0,029
0,016** 0,018
Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 200 150
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,11 0,376
Wald Test for time dummies 0.094 0.114
Source: self elaboration. 
Dependent variable: Share of property 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: User cost 
Instruments: User cost (t-1), Ppop2039, Ppop2039 (t-1), Credit, Credit (t-1), ln GDPpc (t-1), Shousing 
*** p<1% 
** p<5% 
* p<10% 
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Table 4.10: Effects of the judicial pendency rate and the user cost (FD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM
Data transformation FD FD
Expendency (t-3) 0,045
0,020**
Expendency (t-4) 0,079
0,046*
User cost -0,001 0,002
0,002 0,004
Density -0,040 -0,029
0,016** 0,018
Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 200 150
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,146 0,379
Wald Test for time dummies 0.039  0.256
Source: self elaboration. 
Dependent variable: Share of property 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: User cost 
Instruments: User cost (t-1), Ppop2039, Ppop2039 (t-1), Credit, Credit (t-1), ln GDPpc (t-1), Shousing 
*** p<1% 
** p<5% 
* p<10% 
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Table 4. 11: Effects of the judicial resolution rate and the user cost (FD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM
Data transformation FD FD
Exresolution (t-3) -0,102
0,068
Exresolution (t-4) -0,185
0,093**
User cost 0,000 0,004
0,003 0,004
Density -0,041 -0,029
0,017** 0,018
Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 200 150
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,121 0,282
Wald Test for time dummies 0.752 0.206
Source: self elaboration. 
Dependent variable: Share of property 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: User cost 
Instruments: User cost (t-1), Ppop2039, Ppop2039 (t-1), Credit, Credit (t-1), ln GDPpc (t-1), Shousing 
*** p<1% 
** p<5% 
* p<10% 
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Table 4.12: Effects of the judicial congestion rate and the relative price (FE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM
Data transformation FE FE
Excongestion (t-3) 0,138
0,04***
Excongestion (t-4) 0,115
0,037***
Pricetorent 0,019 0,002
0,019 0,016
Density -0,041 -0,035
0,017** 0,019*
Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 250 200
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0.123 0,336
Wald Test for time dummies 0 0.694
Source: self elaboration. 
Dependent variable: Share of property 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: Pricetorent 
Instruments: Ppop2039, Ppop2039 (t-1), Credit, Credit (t-1), ln GDPpc (t-1), Shousing 
*** p<1% 
** p<5% 
* p<10% 
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Table 4.13: Effects of the judicial pendency rate and the relative price (FE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM
Data transformation FE FE
Expendency (t-3) 0,183
0,080
Expendency (t-4) 0,150
0,075**
Pricetorent 0,020 0,001
0,018** 0,017
Density -0,040 -0,035
0,017** 0,02*
Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 250 200
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,134 0,349
Wald Test for time dummies 0 0.765
Source: self elaboration. 
Dependent variable: Share of property 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: Pricetorent 
Instruments: Ppop2039, Ppop2039 (t-1), Credit, Credit (t-1), ln GDPpc (t-1), Shousing 
*** p<1% 
** p<5% 
* p<10% 
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Table 4.14: Effects of the judicial resolution rate and the relative price (FE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM
Data transformation FE FE
Exresolution (t-3) -0,525
0,285*
Exresolution (t-4) -0,573
0,256**
Pricetorent 0,023 0,012
0,019 0,014
Density -0,037 -0,028
0,017** 0,019
Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 250 200
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,121 0,217
Wald Test for time dummies 0 0.267
Source: self elaboration. 
Dependent variable: Share of property 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: Pricetorent 
Instruments: Ppop2039, Ppop2039 (t-1), Credit, Credit (t-1), ln GDPpc (t-1), Shousing 
*** p<1% 
** p<5% 
* p<10% 
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Table 4.15: Effects of the judicial congestion rate and the relative price (FD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM
Data transformation FD FD
Excongestion (t-3) 0,049
0,015***
Excongestion (t-4) 0,060
0,024**
Pricetorent -0,013 0,000
0,014 0,011
Density -0,042 -0,029
0,017** 0,018
Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 200 150
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,283 0,237
Wald Test for time dummies 0.028 0.424
Source: self elaboration. 
Dependent variable: Share of property 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: Pricetorent 
Instruments: Ppop2039, Ppop2039 (t-1), Credit, Credit (t-1), ln GDPpc (t-1), Shousing 
*** p<1% 
** p<5% 
* p<10% 
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Table 4.16: Effects of the judicial pendency rate and the relative price (FD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM
Data transformation FD FD
Expendency (t-3) 0,053
0,021**
Expendency (t-4) 0,065
0,045
Pricetorent -0,017 -0,005
0,014 0,013
Density -0,042 -0,033
0,017** 0,019*
Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 200 150
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,39 0.273
Wald Test for time dummies 0.049 0.437
Source: self elaboration. 
Dependent variable: Share of property 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: Pricetorent 
Instruments: Ppop2039, Ppop2039 (t-1), Credit, Credit (t-1), ln GDPpc (t-1), Shousing 
*** p<1% 
** p<5% 
* p<10% 
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Table 4.17: Effects of the judicial resolution rate and the relative price (FD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM
Data transformation FD FD
Exresolution (t-3) -0,111
0,079
Exresolution (t-4) -0,262
0,1***
Pricetorent -0,013 0,008
0,015 0,007
Density -0,042 -0,025
0,018** 0,018
Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 200 150
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value)  0.291  0.192
Wald Test for time dummies 0.267  0.284
Source: self elaboration. 
Dependent variable: Share of property 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: Pricetorent 
Instruments: Ppop2039, Ppop2039 (t-1), Credit, Credit (t-1), ln GDPpc (t-1), Shousing 
*** p<1% 
** p<5% 
* p<10% 
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Conclusiones e implicaciones de política económica 
 
 
Esta tesis doctoral analiza el efecto de las instituciones en el funcionamiento de 
los mercados de vivienda en España y otros países europeos. Del estudio de la literatura 
económica es posible destacar que ésta proporciona un análisis preciso y completo de 
muchos aspectos del funcionamiento de los mercados inmobiliarios, sin embargo las 
teorías económicas tradicionales son insuficientes para explicar muchos otros aspectos  
que sí pueden ser analizados si se tiene en cuenta que tanto el mercado de alquiler como 
el de propiedad están afectado por un conjunto muy complejo de instituciones (North, 
1990). Aunque las “instituciones” son creaciones humanas orientadas a reducir los 
costes de información y de transacción en los mercados, es muy común encontrar 
instituciones con un diseño deficiente o que han quedado desfasadas con respecto a la 
situación actual de los mercados, incrementando de esta manera estos costes. 
 
La investigación realizada en esta tesis estudia concretamente el efecto de las 
normativas de alquiler en el funcionamiento del mercado de alquiler en España y otros 
países Europeos (capítulo 2). Esas normativas serían un ejemplo de “instituciones 
formales” siguiendo la clasificación de North. Por otro lado, esta tesis también efectúa 
un análisis de los efectos de la ineficiencia de las llamadas “instituciones de ejecución” 
en el funcionamiento del mercado inmobiliario español. Concretamente los capítulos 3 
y 4 analizan los efectos económicos de la ineficiencia judicial a la hora de hacer cumplir 
los contratos entre arrendadores e inquilinos. 
 
El capítulo 2 realiza en primer lugar un análisis de las regulaciones que afectan 
al mercado de alquiler tanto en España como en otros países europeos. La investigación 
concluye que todos los países europeos aprobaron normativas similares a lo largo del 
siglo XX y que éstas evolucionaron de una forma similar desde una concepción liberal 
del mercado de alquiler a una más intervencionista. Del análisis de estas regulaciones es 
posible concluir también que no solo se introdujeron medidas de “control de rentas”, 
relativamente frecuentes fuera de Europa aunque con algunas especificidades, sino que 
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también se aprobaron otro tipo de normas dirigidas a proteger al inquilino frente a la 
expulsión por parte del arrendador por un plazo mínimo obligatorio (5 años en el caso 
de España).  
 
Estas restricciones han sido estudiadas en el capítulo 2 mediante un modelo de 
información asimétrica del que es posible concluir que ambas medidas implican algunos 
efectos negativos para el funcionamiento del mercado de alquiler. Concretamente, si la 
tasa de crecimiento de las rentas del alquiler pagadas en el mercado es superior a la tasa 
de inflación general de la economía, los arrendadores sufrirán una paulatina pérdida de 
renta real (hasta llegar al final del plazo obligatorio impuesto por la Ley). Este 
mecanismo puede generar un importante desincentivo para los arrendadores, que 
podrían decidor abandonar el mercado de alquiler. 
 
El capítulo 3 proporciona una medida de “formalismo judicial” para el sistema 
judicial español. Esta medida se calcula tanto para los procesos civiles en su conjunto 
como para los procesos arrendaticios (que son un proceso civil especial según las Leyes 
de Enjuiciamiento Civil). De su análisis es posible concluir que el grado de formalismo 
judicial se ha reducido en España en las últimas décadas y que este nivel estaría 
significativamente por debajo del asignado por otros estudios a nivel internacional como 
el de Djankov et al. (2003). El grado de formalismo encontrado en esta tesis sería 
además más coherente con el nivel de renta per cápita de España en la actualidad. Sin 
embargo, del análisis de estas tasas de formalismo también es posible concluir que no 
ha habido mejoras en el caso de los procesos civiles arrendaticios. 
 
La literatura apunta a que las reducciones en las tasas de formalismo son 
positivas para el sistema judicial en tanto que, en principio, implican mejoras en su 
eficiencia. Sin embargo, el capítulo señala que las medidas directas de eficiencia del 
sistema judicial español (tales como la tasa de resolución, la tasa de pendencia o la tasa 
de congestión) empeoraron de forma significativa en los momentos en los que la tasa de 
formalismo mejoro más. Este resultado, a primera vista contra intuitivo, puede ser 
debido a que al reducirse la tasa de formalismo el sistema judicial español se volvió 
también más accesible para los ciudadanos y las empresas, atrayendo por tanto una 
mayor carga de trabajo a los tribunales que no pudieron resolver eficientemente. 
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El capítulo 4 presenta algunas estimaciones del efecto de la ineficiencia judicial 
en la proporción de vivienda en propiedad (e indirectamente en alquiler) en las distintas 
provincias españolas. La eficiencia judicial es medida en dos etapas distintas del 
proceso: en la fase de declaración y en la de ejecución de la sentencia. El capítulo no 
encuentra un efecto significativo de la ineficiencia judicial en las tasas de propiedad 
cuando la eficiencia es medida en la fase del juicio de declaración, sin embargo, un 
incremento de la eficiencia judicial a la hora de ejecutar sentencias reduciría la tasa de 
propiedad en las provincias españolas (aunque en una cuantía menor, como por otra 
parte sería esperable).  
 
Las conclusiones alcanzadas en los distintos capítulos de esta tesis apuntarían a 
que algunas reformas de las instituciones en España (y en Europa en algún caso) 
podrían mejorar el funcionamiento del mercado de vivienda. Así, por un lado la 
reducción en el plazo de protección de los inquilinos o una reforma a favor de la 
liberalización de las reglas de “control de rentas” podrían mejorar teóricamente el 
funcionamiento del mercado de alquiler y podrían incrementar su peso en el total del 
mercado de vivienda. 
 
Por otro lado, la investigación realizada señala que el grado de formalismo 
judicial en España se podría reducir aún más de distintas maneras (como por ejemplo, 
reduciendo el número de procesos o partes de los procesos en los que es necesario tener 
representación de abogado o procurador). Sin embargo, los mismos resultados apuntan a 
que sin un necesario incremento de los recursos del sistema judicial las mejoras podrían 
no traducirse en incrementos efectivos de la eficiencia de los tribunales. Por último, en 
el caso de aprobar medidas orientadas a mejorar la eficiencia judicial o a aumentar los 
recursos del sistema, el capítulo cuarto señalaría que sería conveniente concentrar estos 
esfuerzos en los mecanismos de ejecución de las sentencias antes que en mejorar los 
juicios de declaración.  
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Conclusions and policy implications 
 
 
 This doctoral thesis focuses on the effects of institutions on the functioning of 
the housing market in Spain and other European countries. The literature in economics 
provides precise and satisfactory answers to a multiplicity of problems affecting this 
market. However, there are several other developments of the tenancy and the property 
market which cannot be explained with traditional theories. North (1990) showed, 
through the analysis of a simple transaction such as selling a house, that the housing 
market is affected by a especially complex matrix of institutions. Moreover, its 
institutions are usually defficiently designed or outdated. That is, the housing market is 
affected by several “humanly devised constraints” that increase the transaction costs of 
the housing market instead of reducing them.  
 
This research analyzes the effects of some “formal institutions” introduced in the 
housing market by the tenancy Laws in Spain and Europe (chapter 2) and the effect of 
inefficiency of the “enforcement institutions” (such as the judicial system) in the same 
market in Spain (chapters 3 and 4). 
 
Chapter 2 concludes, after analyzing a set of tenancy market regulations in Spain 
and other European countries, that all European countries had similar regulations 
affecting their tenancy markets over the 20th century. Moreover, this research stresses 
that those countries shared the same evolution from a liberal approach towards the 
tenancy market relations to a more regulated and restrictive one. The regulations 
introduced not only “rent control policies“ (with several European specificities) but also 
a less studied, typically European, restriction which can be called “protection against 
eviction” or “protection term”. 
 
Both restrictions are tested theoretically in an information asymmetry model 
from which it is possible to conclude that both entail some negative effects in the weight 
of the tenancy market in the European economies. If the inflation rate in the rents is 
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higher than the inflation for the whole economy (measured through the general CPI, for 
instance), the landlords would suffer a real rent decrease that would desincentive them 
from participating in the tenancy market.  
 
Chapter 3 provides a measure of “procedural formalism” of the judicial system 
for the whole civil Law system on the one hand and for the specific tenancy conflict 
procedures on the other. From that research it is possible to conclude that the level of 
formalism of the Spanish judicial system has decreased over time during the most recent 
decades. The new Civil Procedural Law (2000) is responsible of the main improvements 
in the measure. Moreover, the results of the chapter contradicts the results of previous 
research in the area (Djankov et al. 2003) who assigned to Spain much higher levels of 
formalism (that were in fact less consistent with the current Spanish GDP per capita). 
Nevertheless, the chapter also concludes that the reductions in formalism are not 
observed in the case of the special procedures applied to the tenancy market conflicts 
(such as the procedures needed to evict a non-paying tenant).   
 
Finally, even though the literature stressed that reductions in formalism are 
positive for the judicial system efficiency, the chapter shows that the direct measures of 
efficiency in Spain (the resolution rate, the pendency cases rate or the congestion rate) 
suffered worsenings coincidently with the reductions in formalism. That contraintuitive 
result may be partly derived from the fact that a less formal system may attract more 
conflicts to the courts, reducing in the end the efficiency of judges. 
 
Chapter 4 presents some estimations of the effect of judicial inefficiency on the 
proportion of property in the housing markets of the Spanish provinces. Judicial 
inefficiency is measured directly through the congestion rate, the pending cases rate and 
the resolution rate in two stages of the procedures directed to solve a tenancy conflict: in 
the declaratory stage and in the final executory stage. The chapter does not find any 
significant impact of inefficiency in the declaratory stage on the housing property share. 
However, an increase of judicial efficiency in the execution stage seems to reduce the 
share of property in the Spanish provinces. 
 
The research presented in the chapters of this thesis give some ground for some 
reforms in the institutions of the housing markets in Spain. On the one hand, a reduction 
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in the protection term (protection against eviction) or a reform of the rent control rules 
towards liberalization would have, theoretically, some positive impacts for the tenancy 
market increasing its weight in the housing market.  
 
With respect to the judicial system, this research shows that some more 
reductions in formalism could be achieved, for instance through the reduction in the 
number of procedures in which legal representation is mandatory. However, the results 
of chapter 3 also show that improvements in formalism should also be accompanied by 
an increase in the resources of the judicial system in order to cope with a higher number 
of conflicts arriving to the judges. Finally, the fourth chapters stresses that in the case of 
achieving improvements in the efficiency of the procedures, it seems more effective to 
concentrate the efforts in the executory stage than in the declaratory stage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
